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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I.l The Problem 
Governments across the world use a wide variety of policy tools to intervene in the 
agricultural sector. These policies directly or indirectly influence the production incentives 
and consumption patterns of various agricultural commodities. The last decade has witnessed 
an increasing interest in the political economy of agricultural protection. The topic that has 
received the most attention is the paradox of developing countries typically taxing and 
industrialized countries commonly subsidizing their agricultural sector. Most of the work in 
the area of political economy of agricultural protection (PEAP) has focused on the 
consequences of farm programs. A growing number of studies have recently attempted to 
explain the causes of farm programs as well. These studies have increasingly become 
analytically more realistic than the earlier simple descriptive attempts to examine the policy 
mechanisms. The more recent development in this regard is the treatment of policy 
intervention as endogenous rather than exogenous, within a public choice framework. In this 
new line of political economy literature, the policy is seen as an outcome of the interaction of 
rational policy-makers and trade-sensitive economic groups (Moore, 1990; Petit, 1993 and 
1991). 
The PEAP literature has progressed along two distinct paradigms of the interactions 
among the economic agents: what Bhagwati (1989) calls the self-willed government (SWG) 
models and the clearing house government (CHG) models. The first approach assumes that 
the government is an autonomous unit maximizing a social welfare function. The political 
leadership, in choosing the level of policy instrument, takes into account the economic 
surpluses of various economic agents in the society. The welfare connotations of the 
approach highlight the altruistic motives aimed at improving the societal well-being. The 
CHG approach, based on the works of Olson (1965), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983), 
treats the political process as a clearing house where a relatively passive government is 
assumed to redistribute resources among different interest groups. The approach maintains 
that government policies are impacted upon by pressures from special interest groups and the 
policy-maker acts in rational self-interest. 
The and CHG approaches, therefore, represent two extremes of the policy 
formulation process. The SWG approach considers policy outcomes as results of altruistic 
motives while the CHG approach assumes that the government does not enjoy autonomy in 
decision-making and is assumed to simply reflect the influences of pressure groups. In 
practice, however, the truth lies somewhere in between these two paradigms. The distinction 
between the two approaches is increasingly being questioned (Foster and Rausser, 1992; 
McLaren, 1991; de Gorter, 1990; Paarlberg, 1989). It is suggested that the self-interest and 
social concern models are best viewed as complimentary explanations for government trade 
policy intervention. However, most of the work in this area to date falls in either of the two 
analytical viewpoints (see Chapter II). Therefore, there exists a need to study and verify the 
extent of complementarity between these two approaches. 
Moreover, most of the studies on the econometric evidence of the patterns of 
agricultural protection do not provide explicit theoretical support for their ad hoc 
specification of the analysis. Increasingly, some studies have attempted to use explicit 
political economy models in order to explain agricultural protection (Balisacan and 
Roumasset, 1986; Gardner, 1987; Rausser and de Gorter, 1989; de Gorter and Tsur, 1991). 
Some of these studies have not empirically tested for the implications of their theoretical 
models, while others show a less explicit cormection between the theory and the empirical 
analysis. Most of the empirical studies also suffer in terms of the goodness of fit and from 
the excluded variables bias or have regressed variables not suggested by their theoretical 
models. Moreover, the coverage of determinants as well as countries is rather restrictive in 
much of the earlier work. 
The food security literature suggests that farm programs seem to be responsive in 
part to the consumers' attitude towards food security risks. The literature also unambiguously 
establishes a link between the consumers' food security concerns, price stabilization policies 
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and the government intervention. There is also considerable evidence to suggest that low 
income countries tend to adopt policies that stabilize average domestic producer prices 
significantly below the world price levels to support consumer concerns (Tyers and 
Chisholm, 1982; Sanderson and Mehra, 1990; Hopkins, 1986; Bigman, 1985; Bale and Lutz, 
1981; Tullis and Hollist, 1986; Amat, 1982; Bouis and Herdt, 1982). While risk and 
uncertainty have been put forth as reasons for the social concerns view of the political 
economy, the work so far on the determinants of agricultural protection has not considered 
these as the causes of government intervention. 
Agricultural protection is commodity-specific and the protection levels vary 
significantly from one commodity to the other. For instance, while wheat and rice are 
generally taxed in India, commodities like rapeseed and mustard receive substantial 
protection; while sugar, rice, wheat, milk etc. have received support and protection in the 
U.S., several other commodities like soybean and poultry have not received significant 
protection (USDA, 1993; OECD, 1992; Gardner, 1990b). Aggregating protection levels for 
all commodities or for a number of commodities, especially with negative and positive 
protection levels, may provide less meaningful insight into the patterns of agricultural 
protection and the protection levels for the agricultural sector as a whole may not reflect these 
special commodity-specific characteristics. However, studies by Hormia and Hayami (1986a 
and 1986b), Anderson and Hayami (1986), de Gorter and Tsur (1990 and 1991), Balisacan 
and Roumasset, Gardner (1987) and others have not taken these factors into account and have 
rather concentrated on aggregate agricultural protection. A product-specific approach to the 
study of agricultural protection, therefore, seems necessary. 
The results obtained in earlier quantitative studies are also influenced by their choice 
of the measure of protection levels (Gardner, 1989a, 1989b). The simplest and most 
commonly used measures of protection levels in such studies include the nominal protection 
coefficients (NPC) and nominal rate of protection (NRP) (Bigman, 1985; de Gorter and Tsur, 
1989; Anderson and Hayami, 1986; Hormia and Hayami, 1986a and 1986b; Herrmarm, 1989; 
Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987). NPC and NRP are only a partial indication of how 
government policies affect domestic production since they only capture the border measures 
and producer subsidies and taxes that change producer prices. Since measuring the level of 
protection accurately is essential for any empirical analysis examining the determinants of 
agricultural protection, the use of NPC and NRP may not provide a more complete estimate 
of the actual level of intervention and are usually biased downwards in industrialized 
countries. 
In conclusion, then, as Gardner (1989a, p.l 170) suggests, "perhaps, in future, more 
attention to jointly developed theory and empirical investigation will provide findings that 
are less ad hoc" Given these factors, there exists a need to address the issue of agricultural 
protection with an approach that would provide a more comprehensive explanation of the 
patterns of international agricultural protection levels. 
1.2 The Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the prominent determinants of agricultural 
protection across industrialized and developing countries. The study is designed to explicitly 
introduce the supply of and demand for agricultural protection in the political market to 
analyze the patterns of government intervention in the agricultural sector in a single staple 
commodity framework. The aim is to develop, and empirically test, a theoretical framework 
which incorporates the two analytical viewpoints advanced in the PEAP literature. The 
analysis is intended to ascertain the superiority of one approach over the other or the degree 
of complementarity between the two. The self-interest of individuals seeking personal 
benefits is combined with the larger societal goals representing altruistic motives. 
The aim here is to propose an alternative hypothesis to the political economy of 
agricultural protection. Consumers accept government intervention in the agricultural sector 
because of the benefits of food security accruing to them. It is postulated that the perceived 
benefits from improved food security through stabilization of food prices translates into 
preferences of the consumers. These perceived benefits constitute the demand for 
intervention from them. Since incomes and the size of risk in relation to income vary from 
society to society, this generates varying degree of demand from consumers across countries. 
The self-interest elements, on the other hand, are assumed to be the mainstay of the 
producer model. The producers are assumed to lobby the government in seeking agricultural 
subsidies to enhance their profits. The producer model is intended to explicitly take into 
account this political resource constraint. 
Therefore, the overall demand for government intervention in the agricultural sector is 
assumed to be emanating from the producer and consumer interest groups. The political 
supply of intervention from the policy makers is assumed to respond to the welfare of both 
these groups. The hypotheses to be tested are that consumers' food security concerns and 
producers' pressure group characteristics play an eminent role in the determination of 
political market equilibrium in the agricultural sector. The methodology employed is 
designed to provide an integrated development of theoretical and empirical analysis. 
Since an accurate measurement of the actual level of intervention is a prerequisite for 
the effectiveness of the investigation, a comprehensive comparative analysis of different 
measurement concepts and their coverage of effects under a variety of policy scenarios 
becomes an important exercise. The aim of the study is to employ a measurement concept 
which includes the effects of a wide range of policies, and which is suitable for analyzing the 
extent of government intervention across countries. 
The present analysis is designed to improve upon earlier works on the determinants of 
agricultural protection in a number of other ways also. Patterns of protection are also studied 
for an individual agricultural commodity so as to provide more meaningful implications. The 
choice of countries is also much broader in that both industrialized as well as developing 
countries are included throughout the analysis. However, the focus here is not the 
examination of different policies and their effects on the protection levels, but rather to 
investigate the common determinants of agricultural protection across countries.' 
The empirical analysis uses the ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, 
pooled cross-section time-series, and Probit and Logit estimation techniques to test the data 
' It is beyond the scope of litis study to examine the different policies, like buffer stocks schemes and other type of policies, 
designed to achieve price stabilization and their relative efficiency. 
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from 30 industrialized and developing countries for the period 1982-87. The relative 
effectiveness of the consumer and producer models have been examined using the non-nested 
as well as nested testing procedures. 
Davidson and MacKinnon's pair-wise V tests have been used to analyze the 
superiority of the two approaches in the PEAP literature. Model specification tests are 
performed in order to correctly specify the functional relationship between explanatory and 
the dependent variables. To evaluate the extent of complementarity between these 
approaches, the nested tests are performed on the political welfare function by imposing 
additional restrictions. The nested test would allow to determine whether the protection 
levels can be better explained by including the determinants from the individual consumer or 
producer models or from both together. 
In order to ascertain the effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that the 
protection levels will be positive, the Probit and Logit estimation procedure are used. The 
results regarding the marginal effects of explanatory variables as well as their mean 
elasticities are also provided. This study, therefore, is the first comprehensive and systematic 
attempt to incorporate explicitly, in a stochastic environment, the consumers' concerns 
regarding stable food patterns. An integrated political economy approach to the study of 
protection levels across countries is presented using a much broader measurement concept. 
1.3 Organization of the Study 
The thesis is organized as follows. The literature on the political economy of 
agricultural protection is reviewed in Chapter II. The chapter highlights the different 
approaches in the PEAP literature and also emphasizes the food security concerns and their 
linkages to the determination of farm programs. Chapter III provides a broad analytical 
overview of the patterns of agricultural protection. The chapter develops a political market 
framework of agricultural protection to explain the divergent policy outcomes across 
industrialized and developing countries. The chapter also provides a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of various measurement concepts and their policy coverage under 
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different policy scenarios. The analysis also includes the case of domestic government as a 
price discriminating monopolist. 
Theoretical models of consumer, producer and policy-maker are developed in 
Chapter IV. The chapter also highlights the interactions among these agents using a 
schematic representation of the political market of demand and supply in agriculture. 
Chapter V provides the empirical analysis. The chapter begins with the details of sources and 
definitions of explanatory variables used in the study and the discussion of the pooled 
cross-section time-series estimation technique. The determinants identified in the theoretical 
models are subject to various econometric tests in the chapter. The results of the non-nested 
and nested tests as well as the Probit and Logit estimations are provided in this chapter. The 
last chapter summarizes the whole work. References are provided at the end of the 
manuscript. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews the PEAP literature relevant to the hypotheses being tested in 
the study. The chapter is divided into three broad sections. The next section highlights the 
two different sides of the political economy of protection literature and discusses its 
application in agriculture. An outline of these approaches is also provided. Section II.2 
reviews some pioneer theoretical works emphasizing the role of pressure groups. The more 
recent applications of these works in a political market framework, along with empirical 
evidence, are also provided. The studies dealing with food security and price stabilization 
and treating these as motives for government intervention in the agricultural sector, are 
discussed in the last section. 
II. 1 Alternative Approaches to the Political Economy of Protection 
The role of policy-makers in the policy outcomes had generally been ignored in the 
models aimed at analyzing the consequences of distortionary trade policies. Increasingly, the 
studies in the political economy of protection have focused on the interactions between the 
"rational" political agents, especially elected officials, and the pressure groups affected by the 
outcomes of trade and other policies. The manner in which this interaction is modeled in the 
political economy of protection literature has espoused two different approaches: social 
concerns approach and the self-interest approach (Figure II. 1). 
Studies in the social concern approach maintain that the government actions are 
primarily designed to promote national welfare. Policies effected in order to achieve the 
overall welfare motives have been explained via two distinct sets of models. The first lays 
great emphasis on the status quo and seeks to explain why major policy changes occur only 
at the time of deep crisis. This line of thought views government actions as correcting market 
failures whereby some sector of the economy witnesses a decline in incomes. The policies 
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Social Concern Models Self-Interest Models 
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Pressure Majority 
Group Voting 
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Policy-makers 
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of any segment 
of the society 
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redistribute national 
Income to protect 
the poorer segments 
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Special-Interest 
lobbying will 
Itl/Iuence 
trade policy 
Policy-makers 
favor Industries 
with large 
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voting population 
(A) 
Political Economy of Agricultural Protection 
Clearing House Government Models Self-Willed Government Models 
Policy-makers act to maximize a policy preference 
function whose arguments are economic surpluses 
of various Interest groups. 
Sample Studies: 
• Rausser & Freebairn (1974) 
• Rlethmidler & Roe (1986) 
• Saarls tS Freebairn (1983) 
• Paarlberg & Abbott (1986) 
• Lopez (1989) 
• Vanzetti and Kennedy (1988) 
(B) 
Policy-makers react to the Interaction of pressure 
groups while acting In self-interest 
Sample Studies: 
• Gardner (1987) 
• Ballsacan £ Roumasset (1987) 
• Miller (1989) 
• de Gorter & Tsur (1991) 
• von Witzke (1989) 
Source; Adapted from various sources; Moore, M. O. (1990), "New Developments in the Political Economy of Protection," and Carter, C.A. 
and A.F. McCalla (1990), "Introduction," botii in Carter, C.A., A. F. McCalla and J.A. Sharpies (eds.) Imperfect Competition and Political 
Economy: The New Trade Theory In Agricultural Trade Research, Westvlew Press: Boulder, CO.; MacLaren, D. (1992), "The Political 
Economy of Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community and Australia," Journal of Agricultural Economics, 43 (3); 424-439; 
MacLaren, D. (1991), "Agricultural Trade Policy Analysis and International Trade Theory; A Review of Recent Developments," Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 42 (3); 250-297; Alston, J, and C. Carter (1991), "Causes and Consequences of Farm Policy," Contemporary Policy 
Issues, 9(1); 107-121; Carter, C., M.D. Faminow, R.M.A. Loyns and E. Peters (1990), "Causes of Intervention in Canadian Agriculture," 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 38(4); 785-802; and Rausser, G. C, and P. Zusman (1992), "Public Policy and Constitutional 
Prescription," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74(2): 247-257; Moyer, H. Wayne and Timothy E. Josling (1990), Agricultural 
Policy Reform: Politics and Process In the E.C. and the U.S.A., Ames; Iowa State University Press; Baldwin, Robert E. (1989^ "The 
Political Economy of Trade Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (4); 119-135; Hillman, Arye L. (1989), The Political Economy of 
Protection, New York, Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Figure H I: Alternative approaches to the political economy of protection 
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attempt to preserve the status quo even though incomes of some other sectors might rise 
enough to increase the overall societal welfare (Corden, 1974). 
The equity concern models, on the other hand, argue that government actions are 
designed to compensate and protect those sectors of economy that are undergoing structural 
adjustments. In essence, the altruistic social concern argument goes, government policies 
effectuate income redistribution to compensate the poorer sections of the economy. The 
sectors employing low-wage workers are more likely to be awarded protection from foreign 
competition than the sectors where labor wages are relatively high (Cheh, 1974; 
Constantopoulos, 1974). 
The second approach in the political economy of protection literature views policy 
outcomes as the results of interactions between self-interested political leadership and the 
pressure groups. The policy-makers are assumed to be interested in maximizing their own 
utility, defined over their probability of reelection or maintaining political power, rather than 
any altruistic motives. In this case, then, the sectors with the largest number of voters would 
stand to gain from the policies. This is the focus of the majority voting models. The 
pressure group models within this approach maintain that policy outcomes are influenced 
greatly by the lobbying activities of pressure groups. The members in a group contribute 
towards lobbying and pressurize the self-interested policy-makers to obtain favorable policy 
outcomes. The policy-makers supply the protection in return for favorable voting by group 
members. A comprehensive survey of the self-interest approach can be found in Hillman 
(1989). 
The PEAP literature, on the other hand, has progressed along two narrowly defined 
variants of these models: the self-willed government (SWG) models and the clearing house 
government (CHG) models. In the SWG framework, the politician is assumed to maximize a 
utility function whose arguments are the economic surpluses of various groups. Studies in 
this area include Rausser and Freebaim (1974), Riethmuller and Roe (1986), Saaris and 
Freebaim (1983), Paarlberg and Abbott (1986 and 1984), Lopez (1989), and Vanzetti and 
Kennedy (1988), among others. These studies are reviewed in the next subsection. This 
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community welfare approach maintains that government regulations respond to market 
inefficiency and are designed to improve the welfare of the society. The groups witnessing a 
decline in their incomes or seeking risk-insurance are protected by the government. The 
policy outcomes are, thus, viewed as results of a social welfare function that assigns higher 
weights to the sectors bearing additional costs of structural adjustment. The protection 
awarded to agriculture in newly industrializing countries may be a case in point. Central to 
the paradigm is the assumption that preference weights reflect societal desires and the 
policy preference function, fV, may be of the form: 
W=W{CS,PS.GB}, 
where, CS and PS represent consumer and producer surpluses, respectively, and the GB is the 
government budget expenditure. The government chooses the policy instrument, T, SO as to 
maximize W. The first order condition is dW/dx = Wi(dCS/dx) + W2(dPS/dx) + W}(dGB/dx)^ 
where, w, are partial derivatives with respect to CS, PS and BG, respectively. In this sense, 
the w/s represent policy weights (marginal values) assigned by the govenmient to consumers, 
producers and taxpayers' interests. A description of these alternative approaches can also be 
found in MacLaren (1991 and 1992), Alston and Carter (1991), Carter et al. (1990), Rausser 
and Zusman (1992), Winters (1987), Moore (1990), Hillman (1989), Baldwin (1989) and 
Gardner (1983). 
In terms of Figure II.2, the surplus transformation curve (STC) denotes the 
government's ability to maximize the policy preference function. The slope of the STC curve 
over a relevant range assumes that the welfare of one group would decrease at an increasing 
rate with an increase in the welfare of the other group. It is implicitly assumed in this 
approach that the government policies are designed in such a manner to fall along the 
efficient STC, resulting in minimal dead weight loss. The political equilibrium, given the 
STC and the political preference indifference curves (PPICs), is found where the two curves 
are tangent to each other (point a). In other words, it is the point where the marginal gain in 
producer surplus for a marginal decrease in consumer surplus equals the slope of the PP/C. 
However, in the absence of government intervention, the market equilibrium is at point d 
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where a unit increase in producer surplus is associated with a unit decline in the consumer 
surplus. This may be represented by the zero-intervention line (ZIL) which has a slope of 
negative one. Therefore, the efficient redistributions would lie on the ZIL while any distance 
from it would represent the deadweight loss from the policy (the distance ah in this case). 
Producer Surplus 
Figure 11.2: Surplus transformation curve and self-willed government behavior 
The empirical SWG literature has focused on either estimating implicit welfare 
weights, Wi, or estimating reduced form policy choice equations. The first technique is a low 
payoff exercise since the results provide little insight into the policy formation process, while 
the second technique has not yielded any substantial empirical results so far (Alston and 
Carter, 1991 and Carter e/a/., 1990). 
The clearing house government (CHG) approach, based upon the works ofPeltzman 
(1976) and Becker (1983), provides an alternative explanation of the PEAP literature. The 
political market framework advanced under this approach views the demand for intervention 
as coming from the lobbying by these special interest groups. The self-interested politicians, 
acting so as to maximize their chances of reelection, supply the protection. The government 
is, therefore, viewed as weighing the influence of pressure groups who wield voting power. 
ZIL, Slope= -I 
Consumer Surplus 
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This approach views policies as being consequences of an influence function rather 
than a social welfare function. The influence of pressure groups in this framework 
constitutes a zero-sum game while the tax-subsidy outcomes may represent a negative sum 
due to the deadweight cost. In terms of Figure II.2, since the CHG approach does not 
consider a political preference function, there are no PPICs either. The political equilibrium 
lies somewhere on the STC curve, representing the interactions of the interest groups and the 
government. For example, in case where the producer group is more successful in its 
lobbying activities, the policy outcome may be somewhere around point c, where the slope of 
STC would represent the cost of the redistribution. Several recent works using the CHG 
approach, for example, Gardner (1987), Balisacan and Roumasset (1987), Miller (1989), de 
Gorter and Tsur (1991) and von Witzke (1989), are discussed in Section II.2. 
The SWG approach assumes that markets are fragile and tend to operate inefficiently 
while the goverimient policies, designed to correct these market failures or inequities, are 
assumed to be costless. The political power of private interest groups is the force that 
dominates the CHG paradigm. This approach differs from the SWG in that no weights are 
attached to the welfare of different groups. The government trades off political pressure 
among interest groups. Following the diagrammatic exposition of these two approaches, it 
may be possible to formulate the political equilibrium in case of two representative 
developing and industrialized countries or in case of changing protection patterns associated 
with economic development within a country, as shown in Figure II.3. 
In industrialized and developing countries, the index of transfers between consumer 
and producer groups may be indicated by the efficient surplus transformation curves STC, and 
STC J, respectively. The relative surplus transformation curves would be influenced by a 
number of factors such as market structure of consumer and producer behavior, as well as 
available technology. In case of industrialized countries, per unit increase in producer 
surplus may be expected to correspond to a relatively lower decrease in consumer surplus. 
This may be due, in part, to the large number of consumers with relatively lower Engel 
coefficients. The opposite would be true in case of developing countries. The large number 
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of producers in developing countries make a unit increase in producer surplus infeasible 
without an associated greater loss in consumer surplus. The PPICs would, on the other hand, 
depend upon the weights assigned to different groups in the political preference function 
which, in turn, may be constrained by the state of managerial ability of politicians, index of 
relative cost of political organization and the state of conceptual foundations on which 
policies and institutions are build (Rausser and Foster, 1990). 
Producer Surplus 
Consumer Surplus 
Figure II.3: Comparisons of political equilibriums across industrialized and 
developing countries 
Consequently, the free-market equilibrium in industrialized and developing countries 
would be at point a and a respectively, where the STC curves have a negative unit slope. In 
case of an industrialized country, the political equilibrium under the SWG approach would be 
achieved on point h, which is to the left of the free-market equilibrium. This reflects 
PPICs 
PPICs j 
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relatively higher weights assigned to the producer welfare relative to consumers. However, 
in case of a representative developing country, the political market equilibrium will be to the 
right of the free-market equilibrium. In these countries, the policy formulation generally 
favors the consumers at the expense of agricultural producers. Using the CHG approach, the 
corresponding equilibriums may be achieved at points c and c ' for industrialized and 
developing countries, respectively. In case producers in industrialized countries are less 
successful in their lobbying activities as compared to the consumers, the equilibrium point 
may shift to the right of the free-market equilibrium. Correspondingly, the equilibrium in 
developing countries would be to the left of a ^  if consumers are less influential in gaining 
political favors. 
The institution of a political economic resource transactions policy (what Rausser 
calls "PERTs"), such as research and extension in agriculture, may shift the STC upward, as 
indicated by STCl, reflecting a movement from a lower level of total available surplus to a 
higher level. Given the same policy preference fiinctions as earlier, the new equilibrium may 
now be obtained at b", reflecting a benefit to both the producer and consumer groups. This 
may reflect an expansion in the size of the total pie. However, the cost of organizing to the 
interest group may also change, affecting the relative weights of the economic groups. This 
may be reflected in a different set of PPICs (not shown). Whether this PERT activity 
benefits both groups, benefits the producer group and harms the consumer group, or benefits 
the consumer group and harms the producer group, would also depend upon the new political 
preference fiinction. 
The extreme stances taken by these two approaches are increasingly being questioned 
and the complementarity between the two is being stressed (see, for example, McLaren, 
1991; de Gorter, 1990). In a review article on the recent developments in agricultural policy 
and trade theory, McLaren contends that both these motives may have some bearing on the 
outcome in the political market for agricultural protection. For example, special interest 
considerations are enhanced by invoking equity and nationalist arguments. This widens the 
source of political support to enable protectionistic policies to be politically feasible. He 
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further contends that "it is apparent from casual observation of agricultural trade policy that 
efficiency is not of paramount concerns to governments: instead they appear to respond to the 
income concerns of certain domestic groups, e.g. producers." 
Moreover, risk and uncertainty have been put forward as the reasons for the social 
concerns view of the political economy of protection. However, income risk is also 
compatible with the political self-interest explanation. In the context of agricultural trade 
policy, the two approaches are therefore complementary. Baldwin (1989) also suggests 
integrating the two approaches. In addition, as Variyam, Jordan and Epperson (1990) assert 
in their analysis of a survey of public attitudes towards farm programs in the United States, 
doubts can be cast on the altruistic motivation as a cause of redistributional farm policy. 
They find self-interest as the primary motivational force, which is the focus of the CHG 
approach. In another study using a similar data base, Duffy and Molnar (1989) conclude that 
both producer and consumer groups are generally supportive of government involvement in 
agriculture and do not favor farmers competing in a free-market situation. The public seems 
to be supportive of agriculture and the family farm concept while corporate agriculture is not 
viewed favorably. 
Paarlberg (1989) contends that the public choice approach of the CHG models that the 
government has no autonomy and cannot act on its own seems to be too extreme, de Gorter 
(1990) and Rausser and Foster (1990 and1992) also question the limited rationale imposed by 
the boundaries of these two extreme approaches. They argue for a third middle-of-the-road 
approach. Such an approach is attempted in the next chapter, which involves the interaction 
between rational self-interested politician and the farm lobby, incorporating some social 
welfare characteristics such as ensuring food security for low income consumers. Politicians 
maximize support and voters act strategically in affecting government policy. Politicians 
choose policy to get elected and not vice-versa. 
The main criticism of the SWG approach in Alston and Carter (1991) relies on the fact 
that group weights estimated under this approach do not provide any additional information. 
The information on relative weights can easily be obtained by much simpler approaches, such 
as calculating the nominal protection coefficient. Moreover, the distinction between the 
causality and correlation is not well identified in this approach. The reduced form equation 
approach suggested in SWG models is more useful but results have been less satisfactory thus 
far. The CHG models, on the other hand, are based on a more persuasive theoretical 
modeling but the empirical testing of theoretical results is often problematic. The empirical 
estimation thus far has been restricted to analyzing the relative influence of producer and 
consumers only. The next subsection reviews some sample studies in the SWG literature as 
shown in Figure II. 1. 
II.l.l Self-Willed Government Models 
Initial attempts in the SWG literature on estimating the relative weights of different 
economic groups include Rausser and Freebaim (1974), Saaris and Freebaim (1983) and 
Paarlberg and Abbott (1986). In one of the first papers in this area, Rausser and Freebaim 
estimate the implicit welfare weights of producers and consumers consistent with the U.S. 
policy on beef import quotas. They conclude that during the period 1959-69, the U.S. beef 
policy favored consumers over producers. Saaris and Freebaim model the net effects of 
domestic policies as the solution to a domestic welfare optimization problem. The results are 
then empirically tested by a world economy model including 21 wheat-trading countries. 
Using averages for 1978-79 and 1979-80, they estimate the relative weights for producer and 
consumer groups as well as for the government. The findings suggested lower weights for 
producer groups only in case of four countries while consumer weights were lower in other 
nine countries. Equal weights were observed for producers and consumers in the rest of the 
countries. The major trading blocs such as the European Community and the United States 
were found to have significant influence on the world market prices and supplies of wheat. 
Vanzetti and Kennedy (1988) extended the Saaris and Freebaim framework by allowing for 
endogenous world wheat prices while it was considered as exogenous in the latter model. 
Using a revealed preference methodology, Paarlberg and Abbott determine the 
relative weights for five groups: producers, consumers, taxpayers, livestock feeders and 
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private stock holders. The study analyzes government intervention in wheat sectors in the 
case of Canada, U.S., E.G., Japan and Australia during the period 1960-61 to 1976-77. 
Their study also represents an extension of the Saaris and Freebaim framework in that they 
combine the endogenous treatment of domestic policies as influenced by pressure groups 
with the consideration of market power in international trade. The results show that in case 
of the U.S., the consumer weights were greater than unity only during the last year of the 
study coinciding with the emergence of the consumer lobby. The results also suggest that the 
relative weights accorded to each group do not necessarily coincide with a national welfare 
function and that the weights are also subject to change over time. 
In an intuitively appealing framework within the SfVG approach, Riethmuller and Roe 
(1986) study the government intervention in Japanese rice and wheat markets. A conceptual 
framework is developed where the utility of the politician is dependent upon the consumer 
and producer welfare and the budgetary outlays. The politician is postulated to choose the 
levels of seven policy instruments so as to maximize the utility function. The empirical 
results suggest that changes in the international wheat prices seem to induce changes in 
domestic prices for rice. The world rice prices are reported to have no such effects. It is 
suggested that cost of production for rice and wheat are relatively higher in Japan and that its 
policies have served to subsidize producers and tax consumers. 
An extension of the Riethmuller and Roe's theoretical framework is advanced in 
Lopez (1989) and Lopez and Sachtler (1989). These articles study the political economic 
decision-making process with respect to sugar policies in the United States. Government 
forms preferences over the welfare of domestic consumers, producers, net treasury position 
and foreign interests. The level of policy instrument is shown to be set such that the marginal 
rate of substitution between the producers' and consumers' interests is equal to the market 
welfare trade-offs. Sugar target prices and import-quota decisions seem to be significantly 
correlated with consumer and producer surpluses. 
The policy instrument approach of Riethmuller and Roe and Lopez is criticized by 
Alston and Carter (1990) on the grounds that they provide little insight into policy 
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formulation and their results were statistically less than satisfactory. They conclude that the 
estimated welfare weights tend to be implausible or they shed little new light on the process 
that underlies policy formulation. 
In a descriptive paper, MacLaren (1992) illustrates the differences between the SWG 
and CHG methodologies by applying these to explain the agricultural policies in the 
European Community and Australia. The pace of agricultural reform in these countries is 
related to the economic philosophy of the government, to the budgetary constraints, and the 
power of the farm lobby. MacLaren contends that the Australian government has "behaved 
more like the Puppet Government of applied welfare economics," that is, as the omniscient 
planner maximizing the social welfare. In this sense, the government policy formulation 
follows the SIVG ideology more closely than the CHG one. In addition, he reports that the 
CHG model remained supreme at the national level in the E.G. 
These approaches are, however, considered as too limiting and representative of two 
extreme viewpoints by Rausser and coauthors. In an important contribution to the literature 
in this field, Rausser (1982) considers endogenous government behavior in an attempt to test 
distinguishable hypotheses about market failure and government failure. He defines political 
economic resource transactions (PERTs) as policies designed to reduce transaction costs of 
market failure and increase general welfare. The political economic-seeking transfers 
(PESTs), on the other hand, refer to the case where the govenmient has no autonomy and 
policies are based on the outcome of rent-seeking actions of politically powerful groups in 
the economy. The paper critically evaluates the supply side approach of political economy 
advanced by Downs and the demand side as proposed by Olson. He contends that the weights 
attached to the interests of different groups in the political preference function may be 
affected by these supply and demand factors. However, the analysis advanced by the author 
needs to be empirically verified. 
The forward and backward linkages between political and economic markets 
advanced by Rausser have been further discussed in a partial equilibrium setting in Rausser 
and de Gorter (1989). They provide an explicit model of a democratic government with 
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endogenous policy formulation. The politicians compete for political support from two 
interest groups - producers and consumers/taxpayers — in an Olson-Becker framework. The 
policy maker's utility function is defined over the probability of support from each group 
where the support functions of producers and consumers are assumed to be generated by, 
among other factors, profit function and the indirect utility function, respectively. However, 
the analysis is, again, not empirically supported. 
A political preference function is specified in Rausser and Foster (1990 and 1992) 
which is defined over a weighted average of the producers' and consumers' surplus measures. 
They offer a middle ground in their paper to the SWG and CHG approaches. The national 
policies are viewed from two interrelated standpoints, PESTs and PERTs. The PEST policies 
here are viewed as a way of compensating the farmers for the losses that they suffer due to 
the PERT policies such as public investments in science and technology. They maintain that 
the national welfare enhancing agricultural policies ~ the PERTs - and the national welfare 
reducing agricultural policies - the PESTs - operate in tandem. Collin (1989), in his review 
of the PERT-PEST framework of Rausser, comments that if these policies operate 
simultaneously, then the policy choices may also be interdependent. 
In a comment on Rausser and Foster's paper, however, Tweeten and Coggins (1992) 
disagree. They argue that the evidence suggests that publicly funded agricultural research 
has been beneficial not detrimental to the farming sector. They also express dissatisfaction 
with the ability of this dichotomy to explain the causes of farm programs across countries. In 
a rebuttal, Rausser and Foster comment that public policy reveals that not only there exists a 
trade-off between PERT and PEST policies but also some degree of coordination between the 
two. They demonstrate that in case of two competing groups, the relative weights may 
change as the overall social welfare changes. The apparent weight given to one group may 
increase as the total social welfare increases in favor of the other group. This might explain, 
they argue, the prevalence of inefficient wealth transfer policies in a world of rational utility 
maximizers. Moreover, the simultaneous existence of farm policies of protection as well as 
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public investments in research and technology in industrialized countries might also be 
explained via this framework. 
Rausser and Zusman (1992) discuss the two extreme perspectives of political 
economy protection that have emerged over the years in the profession of economics. They 
opine that the public choice perspective which focuses on allocation of public resources in a 
political market emphasizing redistribution to interest groups, such as that of Downs, 
Buchanan and Tullock, Olson, and Becker, confines to an extremely limited view of the 
government. They point out that the paradigm in these studies "is limited by its profoundly 
cynical view of the political process." The literature aimed at explaining the protectionistic 
policies from a "market failure" perspective is stated to presume that the "first best outcomes" 
are feasible. The two approaches are, then, combined to propose an example of a "central 
coordinator" where protectionistic policies are viewed as rational outcomes of the policy 
formulation process. The weights accorded to different interest groups in the coordinator's 
optimization function are shown to be contingent upon his evaluation of the group's 
objectives. 
Gardner (1983) provides an extensive analysis of social transformation fi'amework to 
estimate the cost of redistribution by a social welfare function defined over aggregate utilities 
of producers and consumers. The production control and deficiency payment programs are 
analyzed under the SWG approach. He suggests that this framework can be useful in 
evaluating farm programs under the assumption that the observed policies represent efficient 
outcomes of interactions among the interest groups. The paper represents a shift in the focus 
of research in this area, as noticed by Beghin and Foster (1992), from analysis of policy 
effects towards the determination of causes of farm programs. They also contend that 
policies may be viewed as the outcomes from a single aggregate optimization problem, as 
represented by a political preference function that balances the interests of confiicting 
pressure groups. Using a linear criterion function of welfare measures, they analyze the 
models advanced by Becker and Zusman as well as the standard CHG model. The paper also 
suggests various simplified approaches to the empirical testing of the political economy 
22 
models. Unlike Becker, they introduce a policy-maker who maximizes an objective function 
and modify the Zusman model to a two-groups game theoretic framework. Under Nash 
behavioral assumptions, they show that only one of the groups will contribute towards 
lobbying to achieve Pareto efficient equilibrium. 
Yamauchi and Kwon (1989) also recognize these alternative approaches to analyze 
the protectionistic patterns. They conceptualize a political preference function where 
political weights represent the willingness of policy-makers to favor one interest group over 
the other. They estimate the weights assigned to producer and consumer groups as well as 
the government in case of East Asia. Their empirical model is based on a simultaneous 
equation approach that considers the economic structural equations, endogenous policy 
decision equations and the political macroeconomic system equations. 
II.2 Clearing House Government Models^ 
Pioneering analytical works of Olson, Stigler, Pincus, Becker, Peltzman and others 
laid the groundwork for models endogenizing the determination of the level of protection. 
The recent explicit theoretical modeling in agricultural protection found in Gardner, Miller, 
von Witzke, de Gorter and Tsur, Balisacan and Roumasset and others, derives from the 
pressure group models of Peltzman and Becker. The pressure group models have been 
reviewed in the next subsection. A more explicit exposition of the political supply and 
demand analysis advanced by Downs, Buchanan and Tullock and Breton, have been further 
analyzed in Honma, Hayami, Anderson and Tyers and are reviewed in subsection II.2.2. 
Studies providing empirical evidence on patterns of agricultural protection are reviewed in 
the last subsection. 
11.2.1 Pressure Group Models 
In his seminal work. The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson (1965) points out 
that the groups that are successful in obtaining a collective good tend to be small in size. 
^ It may be noted that some studies reviewed in this section may also contain some characteristics of the 5 (f G framework and may not 
necessarily be pure CHG studies. 
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Using a simple mathematical framework, he shows that for any group, the collective good 
will be provided if the benefits to an individual in the group from the provision of this good, 
would exceed the total costs of obtaining the good, C. In other words, the necessary 
condition for any collective good to be provided is that 
where, T is the level of collective good, and Vg and V, represent the value of benefits from 
receiving T to the entire group and to the representative /'* individual, respectively. That is, 
in terms of Figure II.4, the collective good will be provided only within the shaded region 
where the total cost curve, TC, falls below the ray, IG, showing the individual gains. The 
other ray labeled GG represents the value of the good provided to the whole group. In this 
case. 
must hold for the group to receive any T at all. Alternatively, eg must be greater than^ at 
the level of the collective good provided. 
(T,g-T,e)>(T ,g-Tn 
$ GG 
TC 
IG 
O 
Level of 
Collective 
Good 
Figure 11.4: Provision of collective good in Olson's Model 
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He further theorizes that the larger the disparity among the group members in terms of 
their shares in the total benefits, the more optimal amount of collective good would be 
provided for. In addition, as the share of the largest member in the group decreases, the 
suboptimality will be more serious. This conclusion is then linked to the size of the group. 
According to Olson, the ability of any group to obtain a collective good for itself "depends to 
a striking degree upon the number of individuals in the group" (p. 45). The larger the 
number of individuals in a group, the higher will be the costs of organization^ and the smaller 
the share of total benefits accruing to any individual. Large groups often face the free-rider 
problem where individual incentives for contributing to the efforts aimed at acquiring the 
collective good would not be perceptible. Moreover, the costs of organization may also 
become formidable as the size of the group increases. These factors, he asserts, keep larger 
groups from fostering their own interests since size and share of members seem to be 
negatively related to the optimality in providing the public good. "Small groups will further 
their common interests better than large groups," and "only when groups are small,... will 
they organize or act to achieve their objectives," he concludes. 
In his later works, Olson (1985,1986,1987 and 1988) has applied his theory of the 
group size to seek an answer to the paradox of industrialized countries subsidizing their 
agricultural producers and developing countries taxing theirs. These divergent policies 
culminate in lower than free-market price (in the absence of intervention) received by 
agricultural producers in the developing countries and higher than the free-market price 
received by such producers in developed countries. These papers deals extensively with the 
issues of size of lobbying group and collective action emphasizing the organizational 
problems of large and geographically dispersed groups in seeking political protection. 
Becker (1983) provides a theory of the political redistribution of income which is 
based upon the competition among pressure groups for political favors. Each group 
maximizes its income under the Cournot-Nash assumption by spending time, energy and 
' These costs have been identifled by Olson as including the costs of communication and bargaining among the members 
and the costs of formally establishing the physical organization (p, 47). 
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money in generating political pressure. The political equilibrium is determined by the 
following equation: 
n,F(R,)=-I'^ n,G(RJ=r, 
where, t and s refer to taxpayers and subsidy recipients, respectively; M, refers to the numbers 
in the group; R, is the vector of taxes/subsidies; / 'refers to the influence function of the f 
group; and F and G are the deadweight losses associated with taxes and subsidies, 
respectively. Equilibrium in the political market, then, depends upon the number of members 
in the competing groups, the deadweight cost of the policy, the efficiency of each group in 
generating pressure and the effect of additional pressure on their influence. Efficiency in 
generating political pressure also depends upon controlling free-riding among the members. 
He points out that the "most important variables" in his framework are the deadweight costs. 
He further contends that the deadweight costs may explain why farmers are 
subsidized in rich countries and urban dwellers in poor countries. Deadweight cost to 
taxpayers falls as the number of taxpayers increases. This decreases their opposition to the 
subsidization of the other group. Successful groups tend to be small compared to the groups 
who pay for their subsidies. Becker's framework also seems to admit altruism motives 
besides only self-interest on the part of the economic agents. 
In a path breaking work, Stigler (1971) developed a theory of economic regulation 
within a demand and supply framework. The demand for political intervention arises from 
the recognition, on the part of the lobbying groups, that the political clout of the groups can 
be used to further the group's economic betterment. The features of the small groups emanate 
the characteristics that provide elements of the supply of protection. The factors that might 
positively influence the ability of a group to secure political power are appropriately 
identified as the number and incomes of the members within a group as well as their 
concentration and proximity to the center of government. He also acknowledges the adverse 
effects of the problem of free riders for large groups which is dealt with in more detail in his 
later work (1974). He asserts that, similar to Olson, the extent of heterogeneity among the 
members within a group would positively influence the probability of collective action. 
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Following Stigler's work, Posner (1974) critically analyzes the public interest and 
interest group theories of economic regulation. He concludes that neither of these 
approaches had thus far been rectified empirically. However, the interest group theory 
variant advanced by economists seemed more promising than the altruistic public interest 
approach based on unrealistic assumptions of fragile and inefficient markets and costless 
government regulations. These assumptions would incorrectly imply, according to Posner, 
that highly concentrated industries and industries that generate substantial costs or benefits 
would be greatly regulated. 
A model of supply of and demand for protection in a political market framework is 
developed by Peltzman (1976). Peltzman generalizes the theory of economic regulation 
proposed by Stigler, which, by his assertions, is a theory of optimal size of effective political 
coalitions. The regulator in this case maximizes his support, via a majority generating 
function, where policy setting equates the political cost of unfavorable policy outcomes to the 
political benefits from the favored groups. 
Krueger (1974 and 1990) demonstrates the importance of incorporating the effects of 
rent-seeking by interest groups in the estimation of trade distortion under traditional trade 
theory. She compares the welfare implications of trade policies under import restrictions 
with and without rent-seeking. It is found that such distortionary trade policies resulted in a 
net social welfare loss of equivalent to fifteen percent of the gross national product in case of 
Turkey and about seven percent in case of India. 
The marginal political costs of instituting unfavorable policies are balanced by the 
policy-makers against gains in political support from the favored groups in a CHG model 
developed by Young and Magee (1986). The interest groups lobby politicians for favorable 
policy outcomes while politicians attempt to maximize their own political returns. Using the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson approach, they conclude that the initial level of group 
endowments would be positively related to the level of protection awarded to the group. 
Gardner (1987) develops an explicit political economy model using the 
Peltzman-Becker framework. Following Peltzman's viewpoint on regulation as a majority 
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generating function, or a political power function, and Becker's theory of competition among 
groups, he specifies the demand and cost (supply) of redistribution for U.S. farm commodity 
programs. He contends that farm commodity programs in the United States are primarily an 
attempt, given the political forces, to redistribute income efficiently. The results indicate that 
the intervention would narrow down substantially as the deadweight losses per dollar of the 
transfer increase. He further identifies an "optimal" size of the group seeking protection. 
Any deviations in either direction from this size are purported to lower the protection 
obtained. In a later attempt, Gardner (1989a) specifies a political preference function and 
concludes that people's political weight tends to increase as their incomes fall. However, as 
Lee (1989) points out, much of this work, and the political economy literature in general, 
lacks the "empirical analysis well grounded in theory with explicit cormections between 
hypothesized behavior and actual outcomes" (p. 1173). 
Miller (1991) also develops a model on the Peltzman-Becker framework where gains 
from the policy are expressed as a function of interest group political expenditure. Each 
group seeks to maximize its net income from the political involvement in a non-cooperative 
equilibrium. She points out that when farmers receive subsidies, the effect of the group size 
will be negative on the level of subsidies received. When farmers are taxed, larger groups 
should experience smaller price distortions. It is contended that the political influence 
associated with a given level of protection would be larger when output per farm is greater. 
However, without an increase in the level of political contribution, a higher political 
influence cannot be sustained. 
Alston et al. (1989) analyze the causes and consequences of farm programs in the 
United States. They contend that the political economy literature usually focuses on farmer 
and consumer/taxpayer interactions, ignoring the role of agribusiness firms. The paper 
concludes that the instruments of farm policy are chosen in response to pressures from both 
agribusiness firms and farmers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Hallberg (1992) 
also analyzes the agricultural protection in the United States and points out that the U.S. farm 
policy over the past 60 years has been aimed at enhancing farmers' incomes. He argues that 
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an absolutely "free-market" solution for the U.S. agriculture may not be "workable". At the 
same time, he criticizes the present policies as being too expensive and may sometime work 
against the main aim of redistributing farm incomes. 
II.2.2 Political Market Framework Models 
Another approach to the study of political economy of protectionism focuses on the 
demand for and supply of protection within a political market framework. Breton (1974) 
combines and extends the essential arguments of the theory of public goods (Buchanan and 
Tullock) and the theory of democracy (Downs) to formulate a theory of decision-rules in 
order to explain the goverrmient behavior in democratic countries. His static theoretic model, 
based on a positive economics approach, provides the background for the governmental 
decision-making in a demand and supply framework. The demand for political action, in his 
model, depends upon the income and preferences of consumers as well as the participation 
costs for budgetary instruments. On the supply side of the public sector, it is concluded that, 
apart from the prices of public goods, the "dominant force in shaping the pattern of 
[government] policies ... is the relative power of politicians and bureaucrats." 
Following Downs, Buchanan and Tullock, Breton, and Anderson and Baldwin (1987), 
the theory of political markets maintains that increased demand would be emanating from 
groups that expect greater per capita gains from protection. A more exhaustive articulation of 
this theory in context of agricultural protection is available in Anderson and Hayami (1986) 
where the demand for protection is linked to the stage of economic development of the 
country. Within a public choice framework, the book deals with the rise of protectionism in 
East Asian economies. The structural changes that occur during the course of economic 
development have been shown as instrumental in bringing about a switch in domestic 
agricultural policies from taxing to subsidizing the producers. Arguing that the relative 
strength of agriculture in the political market grows in the course of economic development, 
it is shown that the smaller the comparative advantage of agriculture, the earlier the switching 
takes place. Later that year, Honma and Hayami extended the analysis to the study of 
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structure of agricultural protection in industrialized countries. A more complete case of 
agricultural protection in Korea is provided in Anderson (1989) and Vincent (1989). 
In an insightful article, Paarlberg (1989) disputes Anderson and Hayami's "uncritical 
embrace" of an extreme version of the public choice theory. He stresses that this approach 
rules out any possibility that the government will ever be able to act free from societal 
constraint. The Anderson and Hayami approach fails to explain why a significant portion of 
the benefits of farm programs in the United States goes to the least hurt farmers by the 
economic transformation process associated with structural change. Their approach is also 
inadequate in that it ignores external political and economic macro shocks. However, he 
forwards an alternative viewpoint that the government is more likely to respond to a static set 
of quasi-contractual obligations by the state towards the farmers. When production and land 
values become dependent upon protection, fanners will organize politically to resist any 
withdrawal. In response to Paarlberg's comments regarding the Honma and Hayami 
framework, David Lee points out that what is lacking in much of this work is the empirical 
support of the hypothesized behavior. 
In another attempt, Anderson and Tyers (1989) conceptualize a general framework for 
examining the factors affecting the demand and supply curves for distortionary policies. 
Their approach to the agricultural protectionism is similar to that of Hayami and Honma. It is 
pointed out that some underlying patterns associated with structural changes that take place 
in a developing economy may include the decline in Engel coefficients and agricultural 
comparative advantage and prices. The marketable surplus of producers increases during this 
process. The features associated with the political market for protection are described in the 
case of a poor agrarian economy and an industrial economy, contending that the solution in 
the political market may not coincide with economic efficiency. The factors that they point 
out for weak demand for producer price supports in poor agrarian economies include the high 
cost of collective action by farmers, relative to potential benefits from lobbying, and the lack 
of other significant groups that argue for farm favor. On the supply side, the industrialists in 
poor countries emphasize a number of features which lower the political cost of supplying 
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assistance to manufacturing relative to agriculture. The demand for prices favoring 
agriculture expands as the economy grows since the benefits of price supports to farmers 
increase, the costs of collective action by farmers fall and a number of other groups with a 
vested interest in expanding agricultural output emerge. 
In response to this paper, Honma contends that a more formal and empirically testable 
framework is needed to translate the subjective findings into objectively verifiable 
conclusions. Farm program interventions are associated with a high cost to consumers and 
taxpayers, as well as on foreign producers and consumers. However, the authors do not 
explicitly touch on this aspect. In addition, they have not analyzed the effect of foreign 
pressures on domestic agricultural polices and ignore the international linkages. 
In yet another attempt, Anderson and Tyers (1991), and Tyers (1990) assess the 
potential effects of agricultural protection as well as of liberalizing agricultural trade in 
industrialized countries in a partial equilibrium framework. They use a simulation model of 
world agricultural markets for the years 1980-82,1990 and 2000, for seven commodities or 
groups of commodities: rice, wheat, coarse grains, sugar, dairy, ruminant and non-ruminant 
meat. It is shown that liberalization of agricultural trade would negatively impact the 
producers' incomes but increase the overall net economic welfare. 
Using the similar data base as well as commodity bundle, Tyers and Anderson (1992) 
have provided a more comprehensive version of their political market framework in their 
recent book Disarray in World Food Markets. They emphasize that the international food 
prices have been on a long-run downward trend, the trends in and direction of international 
trade has also changed markedly, and that agricultural protectionism has been growing in 
industrialized, newly industrialized and middle-income countries. Following Yujiro Hayami 
(1988), they provide an explicit model for the international political economy in a stochastic 
environment. They use nominal protection coefficients for approximating the protection 
rates. The existing food policies and associated cost structures are also analyzed. Overall, 
the book is fairly readable and is intuitively appealing in its methodology. 
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In a related approach, Balisacan and Roumasset (1987) extend Honma and Hayami's 
analysis. Employing an explicit public choice framework, they explain the correlation 
between economic development and agricultural protection. The reactions functions of 
opponents and proponents of agricultural protection are analyzed within the scope of 
neo-classical political economy, culminating in a non-cooperative equilibrium. While 
corroborating Olson's view on organizational difficulties faced by geographically dispersed 
farmers in developing countries, they conclude that since the farmers in developing countries 
have relatively low marketable surplus, their incomes are insensitive to the government's 
food price policy. 
Johnson's much celebrated work. World Agriculture in Disarray (1973) presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the important effects of the farm and trade policies of 
industrialized countries. Johnson believes that agricultural protectionism in these countries 
has had little influence on increasing the productivity of labor in agriculture although it did 
increase the returns to land and capital. The domestic farm policies in the 1960s and 1970s 
are shown to have resulted in "enormous" costs to consumers and taxpayers. The major 
objectives of these policies included national self-sufficiency concerns as well as providing 
income support to farmers and supply insurance to consumers. However, he notes, the 
redistributive effects of these policies have transferred incomes away firom consumers, many 
of whom were poor, to the farmers who were not really "poor". The real effects of these 
policies had contributed to the increase in agricultural production, under high-cost conditions, 
in these countries. The problems of lagging farm incomes were purportedly more due to the 
inadequate education and training rather than due to low farm prices which are the targets of 
such policies. 
In the second edition of the book (1991), Johnson concludes that the disarray 
mentioned in the earlier version had in fact "deepened" in the intervening period rather than 
diminished. In this addition, he also focuses on the influence of exchange rate and interest 
rate distortions on the productivity and incomes in the agricultural sector. In addition, some 
newly industrialized and developing countries have also been included in his fi'amework. 
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de Gorter and Tsur (1989,1990 and 1991) adopt a model based on frameworks 
advanced by Downs and Breton, where politicians maximize their support from rural and 
urban groups. Both groups are assumed to share a homogeneous political support function. 
The protection afforded to each group is shown to be a function of relative income between 
the groups and redistributed income within the group. In their analysis, the equity motive is 
the focus of redistribution efforts. The explanatory variables used as proxies for endowment 
income differentials are per capita gross domestic products (GDP) in rural and urban sectors. 
However, contrary to the authors' contention, the facts suggest that in both an industrialized 
(for example. United States) and a developing country (India), the per capita GDP is higher in 
case of urban populations. Moreover, the assumption that rural people in developing 
countries have higher initial (or endowment) incomes, is contrary to the observed trends of 
rural-to-urban migration in these countries. The model loses generality due to the complexity 
of the comparative static analysis. 
II.2.3 Empirical Evidence 
There have recently been some studies analyzing the causes of agricultural protection 
levels within and across homogenous groups of countries. Studies analyzing these patterns 
across industrialized and developing countries and those providing theoretical background for 
their empirical work are relatively few. A sample of such studies along with their main 
features is provided in Table II. 1. 
The first and the best-known econometric analysis of cross-country agricultural 
protection by Honma and Hayami (1986) focuses on agricultural protection in ten 
industrialized countries for the period 1955-1980. Using the Nominal Protection Coefficients 
(NPC) for an aggregate commodity bundle, they conducted a multiple regression analysis in 
order to identify economic and political factors contributing to agricultural protectionism in 
these countries. The study identifies the comparative advantage in agriculture, its share in the 
economy, terms of trade between countries and other political factors as some of the major 
determinants. The ratio of labor productivity in agriculture to the labor productivity in 
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Table II I: A sample of studies analyzing the causes of farm programs 
Reference Country Commodities/ Measure of PEAP Theoretical 
Groups Period Covered ' Protection' Approach Modeling 
Group Focus 
Honma and Hayami 10 Wt. Avg. ofl3 NPC CHG No Explicit Producers 
(1986) Industrial Commodities; Modeling 
Countries 1955-80 
Honma and Hayami 15 Wt. Avg. of 12 NPC 
(1986) Industrial Commodities; 
and NIC 1955-80 
Countries 
CHG No Explicit 
Modeling 
Producers 
Gardner (1987) United 
States 
17 Commodities; Producer CHG 
1912-80 Gains 
Becker-Peltzman Producers 
Framework 
Balisacan and 68 Market 4 Commodities; NRP 
Roumasset(1987) Economies 1979-81 
CHG Becker-Olson 
Framework 
Producers & 
Consumers 
Riethmuller and Japan Wheat and Rice; Producer SWG Social Welfare 
Roe (1986) 1960-81 Price Function 
Producers, 
Consumers 
& Politician 
Lopez (1989) United Sugar; 1955-85 Target 
States Price 
SWG Social Welfare Producers, 
Function Consumers 
& Politician 
Herrmann (1989) 38 Wheat- Wheat; 
Importing 1968-80 
NPC CHG None None 
de Gorter and Tsur 18 Aggregate NRP 
(1991) Developing Commodity 
Countries Bundle; 1975-79 
and 1980-84 
CHG Downs-Breton Rural & 
Framework Urban 
Miller (1991) 15 Commodity 
Industrial Bundle; 
and Mid-Late 1970s, 
Developing Early 1970s and 
Countries Early 1980s 
NPC CHG Becker 
Framework 
Producers & 
Consumers 
Fulginiti and 
Shogren (1992) 
18 Aggregate 
Developing Commodity 
Countries Bundle; 1975-79 
and 1980-84 
NPC CHG Olson Agriculture 
& Industrial 
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Table II.l: (contd.) 
Reference Country 
Groups 
Commodities/ 
Period Covered ' 
Measure of PEAP Theoretical 
Protection' Approach Modeling 
Group 
Focus 
Fulginiti (1992) 18 Aggregate 
Developing Commodity 
Countries Bundle; 1975-79 
and 1980-84 
NPC CHG Becker-Peltzman Agriculture 
Framework; & Industrial 
Hayami 
Carter et al. (1990) Canada Ten Crop and 
Livestock 
Products; 1965-87 
NPC CHG No Explicit 
Modeling 
(Gardner, 1987) 
Producers 
von Witzke (1989) United 
States 
Wheat; 
1963/64-1983/84 
Producer 
Price 
CHG Criterion 
Function 
Producers 
Gautam etal (1991) 10 
Industrial& 
Developing 
Countries 
Rice; 1982-87 PSE CHG Becker-Olson 
Framework 
Producers 
1 Period of coverage in most studies is divided in five-year periods. 
2 NPC: Nominal Protection Coefficient; NRP; Nominal Rate of Protection. 
industry and the ratio of agricultural land area per farm worker to average capital endowment 
per worker are used as proxy variables for comparative advantage of agriculture. Similarly, 
the share of agriculture in labor force and in total GDP were the two proxy variables used for 
the relative share of agriculture in the national economy along with some qualitative 
explanatory variables. 
Honma and Hayami further extended this work in Anderson and Hayami (1986) by 
including five "exceptional" newly industrialized and industrialized countries to the above 
analysis. Using the same measure of protection for the same time period, the multiple 
regression analysis included some binary variables to account for European Community 
countries, non-militarily-aligned countries, and East Asia. The results of the OLS analysis 
indicated that agricultural protectionism in East Asia could be attributed mainly to the rapid 
increase in the comparative advantage in manufacturing rather than to a unique bias towards 
protecting agriculture. They conclude that the high costs of sectoral adjustment to farmers in 
some countries, along with the desire for maintaining political stability, necessitate 
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appeasement of farmers by the politicians, resulting in increased protection. Both of the 
above studies, however, lack any explicit theoretical modeling and are rather based upon ad 
hoc specifications. Moreover, they also suffer from the familiar problem of 
interdependences present in such analyses. For example, while the declining comparative 
advantage in agriculture may result in price support, the price supports reduce international 
competitiveness of agriculture. 
Balisacan and Roumasset (1987), on the other hand, empirically test the conclusions 
drawn by Honma and Hayami using nominal rates of protection for 68 industrialized and 
developing countries for a two-year period. They conclude that high proportion of food in 
urban consumer's budget generates intense pressure from consumers in developing countries. 
However, their empirical results indicate a less satisfactory explanation of the cross-country 
variation in protection levels when both developed and developing countries are included in 
the analysis. The connection between their empirical and theoretical analysis is also less 
explicit. As Gardner (1989a) points out, the studies in this area so far suffer from the lack of 
integrated development of theoretical and empirical analysis. Moreover, the choice of the 
dependent variable may be more suitable for comparisons across either industrialized 
countries or developing countries alone, not both. Direct payments to agricultural producers 
make these estimates biased downwards in case of industrialized countries. The taxation of 
producers in developing countries, on the other hand, would make these estimation biased 
upwards. Therefore, unlike the authors' contention, the results might be affected by the use 
of nominal rates of protection for the selected countries. 
Using a pooled cross-country and time-series framework, Herrmann (1989) also 
presents an extension of Honma and Hayami's analysis by including a second independent 
variable (import-dependence) to the economic development measure. His empirical analysis 
of wheat protection levels for the period 1968-80 represents the "first such attempt" across 38 
industrialized and developing countries. The study approximates the protection levels using 
the nominal protection coefficients. However, the "unsatisfactory" level of values, in case 
of developing and all countries, indicating omitted-variables problem, necessitated extending 
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the model to acknowledge the structural differences between countries and time periods. The 
major conclusions emerging from this analysis indicate that, apart from economic 
development and import dependence, the structural differences between countries is also an 
important determinant of the level of wheat price protection. Moreover, qualitative 
dependent variables can be successfully used to measure these structural differences. 
However, the empirical estimation in this paper is also based on ad hoc specifications. 
In a series of comprehensive studies of the political economy of agricultural 
protection, Krueger analyzes market distortions in 18 developing countries (1989,1992 and 
with Schiff and Valdès, 1991). The results of a World Bank research project are presented in 
five volumes. Volume 1 deals with studies of Latin American countries. Volume 2 with 
those in Asia and Volume 3 with African countries. Volumes 4 and 5 present a synthesis and 
comparative analysis of the findings of each country. Using a common analytical framework, 
the project was designed to systematically estimate the degrees of price discrimination 
against agriculture within individual countries. The dynamics of such policies over time as 
well as their effects on key variables such as agricultural output, income distribution and 
foreign exchange earnings, are also studied. 
These volumes and other related papers by Krueger study the combined effects of 
direct pricing policies, and of "those more general economic policies that have an important 
but indirect impact upon agricultural returns", such as exchange rate distortions. A 
significant contribution of these studies is the calculation of direct, indirect and total nominal 
protection rates for a number of countries for the period 1960-85. The direct policies are 
reportedly designed to stabilize domestic prices. However, it is demonstrated that effects of 
indirect intervention policies dominate direct interventions in most cases. The results 
indicate that there is a strong tendency in developing countries to tax exportable agricultural 
commodities and to subsidize the importables. 
She further contends that interventions in domestic pricing of agricultural 
commodities have their historical origins in four sets of circumstances; 
(i) producers' activities to unite towards a common purpose or purposes. 
37 
(ii) governments' efforts to increase revenues, 
(iii) efforts to keep food prices low for consumers, and 
(iv) dynamic adjustments to external conditions. 
Given these, it is pointed out that the protection of domestic consumers, price incentives to 
producers, self-sufficiency in food commodities and stabilization of prices are among the 
prime motives for government intervention in the agricultural sector in most of the countries 
studied. The individual country studies also reported, to varying degrees, the desire to 
promote food self sufficiency as an overriding motive for agricultural intervention. The 
desire for inducing price stability was also mentioned as an important aspect of food pricing 
policies. 
These and other factors such as foreign exchange earnings and controlling inflation 
were also assigned positive weights in the national agricultural policies. While these weights 
slowly shifted over time, none of the motives disappeared from the policy formulations. 
Moreover, the interrelationship among these variables suggests that the interventions 
designed to accomplish any one of these motives may soon encourage contests among 
various political and economic interest groups to tilt the outcome in their own favor. The 
country studies point out that, at times, government agencies were instructed simultaneously 
to try to guard the interests of different economic agents. It is also suggested that the 
determinants of protection awarded to different commodities differ sharply, depending upon 
the trade nature of the commodity, and whether it is a staple food commodity or not. 
A single regression equation specified by de Gorter and Tsur (1991) to support their 
theoretical analysis uses the total nominal rates of protection estimates from Krueger et al. 
(1988) as a measure of protection for 18 developing countries. The analysis is done across a 
number of commodities covering averages for two periods (1975-79 and 1980-84). However, 
the transition from theoretical to econometric specification is somewhat unclear. The 
hypothesis advanced in the theoretical model claims that the pre-policy income gap is higher 
between rural and urban sectors of the industrialized countries. The analysis, however. 
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covers only developing countries and uses post-policy data. A number of other binary 
variables are used for which no theoretical interpretation is provided. 
In his doctoral dissertaion, de Gorter (1983) formulates a behavioral model of 
consumers, producers and politicians which outlines the supply and demand for government 
intervention in the United States dairy sector. The theoretical analysis indicates that the 
productivity of political pressures and resources, the inter- and intra-group reaction to 
protection levels awarded, the sensitivity of politicians to the pressures generated by various 
lobbying groups and the demand and supply elasticities are some of the major determinants 
of government intervention. On the other hand, the factors influencing the supply of 
government intervention include the level and sensitivity of political resource contributions 
and the usefulness of political resources in generating electoral votes. The comparative static 
analysis, however, lacks consistency and accuracy. 
Using a similar World Bank data set (Krueger et al., 1988 and Valdès, .1991) of 18 
developing countries, Fulginiti and Shogren (1992) perform an econometric analysis using 
the nominal protection coefficients to reflect relative strength of manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors. In the theoretical portion, they apply the economic theory of rent-seeking 
contests to these sectors. The manufacturing sector dominates agriculture in developing 
countries. As economic development follows, the weight of manufacturing decreases and 
both sectors become equally powerful. However, their econometric test for this conclusion 
does not yield significant results. It is concluded that there is a positive correlation between 
the exportable agricultural surplus and taxation of agriculture. "Food favoritism" as a reason 
for agricultural taxation in developing countries could not be validated empirically. 
In another different yet related paper, Fulginiti (1992) uses the political market 
framework of supply of and demand for protection as articulated by Yujiro Hayami. The data 
set as well as the dependent and independent variables are similar as in the above paper. 
Using the same regression equations, it is implied that there is a strong correlation between 
economic development and agricultural protection. The same results are reported in this 
paper as above. 
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The econometric estimation in Gardner (1987) analyzes the farm programs in the 
United States for 17 commodities over 69 years. The protection levels are measured using a 
variation of nominal protection coefficient - the price gains to agricultural producers as a 
percentage of observed market prices. Results from the pooled cross-section time-series 
regression estimated using Tobit maximum likelihood estimator indicate that the farm 
programs could partially be explained by, among other variables, supply or demand elasticity, 
number of producers, geographical concentration of producers, farmers' numbers and farm 
incomes. However, the analysis seems to suffer from the excluded variable problem since the 
coefficient of determination values obtained are significantly low. 
Miller (1991) uses nominal protection coefficients as the dependent variable to 
approximate the level of protection in 34 countries for a sample of commodities. Some 
observations on the dependent variable correspond to the years of middle-to-late 1970s and 
some to early 1970s and early 1980s. The results from the Probit model, however, seem less 
satisfactory. In one of the regression models, none of the variables tested were significant 
and the coefficient of determination varied from 21 to 33 percent. Considerable bias may be 
present for treating output and consumption as exogenous variables to explain the protection 
levels. 
A reduced form type model of U.S. producer price support in wheat, representing the 
supply-side approach to agricultural policy modeling, was empirically tested by von Witzke 
(1989). A criterion function is specified for the policy-maker which is defined over 
producers' income and budgetary expenditures. The target price for wheat in the U.S. is used 
as the dependent variable in the study which covers the period 1963-64 to 1983-84. It is 
concluded that shifts in farm price support in the U.S. are negatively influenced by the share 
of the U.S. in world wheat exports, budgetary expenditures of the farm policies and the U.S. 
presidential election years. However, as McCalla responds, it is unclear that the empirical 
equations estimated flow from the theoretical framework developed in the paper. 
Causes of government intervention in Canadian agriculture have been studied by 
Carter et al. (1990) using a public choice framework. The conceptual approach as well as the 
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empirical model are similar to that of Gardner (1987), which, in turn, is based on the 
framework of Peltzman and Becker. The politicians are assumed to be passive and voters to 
be rationally ignorant. The focus in the empirical estimation is on the interest group variables 
for explaining protection. The empirical model uses a pooled cross-section time-series data 
for nine different grain and livestock commodities for the period 1965-87. The nominal 
protection coefficient is used as a dependent variable and the explanatory variables include 
commodity and interest group characteristics and 'national interest' variables. They do, 
however, realize that the nominal protection coefficient does not include effects of policies 
that do not have direct price effects and this variable "may be an imperfect proxy of the 
degree of protection ... and also does not reflect lagged effects." 
Their results show higher levels of output growth to be associated with low levels of 
protection. The increased geographical variability of production is found to increase 
protection. However, casual observation reveals that the higher level of output implies 
higher level of income, which may, in turn, generate more political pressure and not less as 
suggested above. They also contend that the Peltzman-Becker model may be a useful tool in 
understanding agricultural policies in Canada but the redistribution in agriculture does not 
appear to be efficient. There also seems to be a bias present in the results since some of the 
explanatory variables may not necessarily be independent of the dependent variable, as is the 
problem with most empirical studies in this regard. 
In a quantitative analysis Miller (1987) analyzes the political, institutional and 
economic complexities on the way to agricultural policy reform. Focusing on Japan, Canada, 
the European Community and the United States, he attributes the growth in farm programs in 
these countries to the slowdown in the rate of growth of demand and the recession of the 
early 1980s. Miller maintains that the world agricultural markets are in their worst state since 
the great depression of the 1930s (p. 7). He further contends that although the cost of farm 
programs has increased dramatically, the farmers in most countries face serious economic and 
financial hardships. He contends that quite apart from the cost of farm subsidies, farm 
programs adversely affect national income growth, domestic employment and income 
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distribution. The E.G. alone is estimated as having a net loss of one million jobs in 
manufacturing and services as a result of agricultural protection. Farm policies are aimed at 
similar objectives in all countries, such as farm income support, financial security, price 
stability and food-supply security. Reform of agricultural policy must be undertaken by 
many countries if the costs of liberalization are to be equitably distributed, he concludes. 
The World Development Report: 1986 highlights the dichotomy of the treatment of 
agricultural sectors across industrialized and developing countries. Small organized groups, 
such as organized labor and the middle class in developing countries, are shown to be 
politically more successful. On the other hand, large dispersed and unorganized groups, like 
small farmers and unskilled workers in developing countries, tend to be politically 
inarticulate. The report opines that "political decisionmaking tends to take over, so that 
prices are determined by the relative power of the interested parties." 
Winters (1987) provides a descriptive analysis on a variety of themes related to the 
political economy of agricultural protection in industrialized countries. According to him, 
farm policies of industrial countries bring financial strain to their economic welfare. He 
argues that the problem results from the conflict between social attitudes which abhor change 
and an economic system and an agricultural technology which is constantly changing. 
Within the boundaries defined by these forces, agricultural pressure groups, bureaucrats and 
politicians have considerable freedom to maneuver, and their interactions typically lead to 
increasing amounts and complexities of farm support. This outcome results not just from 
equilibrium in the political marketplace but also from the 'process' by which decisions on 
agriculture and other issues are taken. 
Gautam et al. (1991) formulate a structural theoretical framework of the government 
intervention in agriculture across industrialized and developing countries. Producers 
maximize their profits by taking into account the political resource constraint which depends 
upon their contributions towards lobbying for political gains. A number of propositions are 
drawn from the comparative static analysis which are then tested empirically. The model 
uses a pooled cross-section time-series data for ten industrialized and developing countries to 
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explain the protection awarded to rice producers. Four different models, using a combination 
of proxies for explanatory variables, are specified to substantiate the results of the theoretical 
model. The coefficients are found to be highly significant and are able to explain up to 90 
percent variation in protection levels across countries. It is established that as the production 
of the commodity rises relative to its consumption, the level of protection awarded may 
decrease. The group-size is also found to be an important variable that explains the 
protection awarded to rice producers. A corollary of the results is that as a country gets 
richer, it shifts from taxing to subsidizing its agricultural sector. 
Lutz and Scandizzo (1980) attempt to analyze the extent of price distortion across 
seven developing countries in a partial equilibrium framework. The extent of distortions are 
studied on output, income, and government revenues using Marshallian surplus measures. 
Price distortions are measured by the nominal protection coefficients for a period of 1-2 years 
in the early- or mid-1970s. A brief review of supply and demand elasticities, along with the 
ranges of elasticities used in their analysis, is provided. They report that the agricultural 
sector is discriminated against in developing countries which also depresses domestic 
production. Domestic consumption, on the other hand, is subsidized in these countries which 
is stated to be one of the objectives of price intervention. 
In the next year, using a similar partial equilibrium approach. Bale and Lutz analyze 
price policies pursued in nine developed and developing countries for the year 1976. They 
also quantify the impact of distortions as captured by the nominal protection coefficients on 
income, output, employment and efficiency, using the Marshallian surplus measures. They 
report that price distortions have altered rural employment in both developed and developing 
countries. Compared to the free-market scenario, distortions are shown to have resulted in 
higher unemployment rates and consumption, and lower production in developing countries. 
The opposite is found to be the case in developed countries. These incorrect price signals 
have also caused distortions in trade, making many importing countries self-sufficient and 
many potential exporting countries net importers. 
» 
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Using a pooled cross-country and time-series framework, Herrmann (1989) concluded 
that wheat price protection is influenced by the levels of economic development and import 
dependence across countries. Due to unsatisfactory level of values in case of developing 
and all countries, he extends the model to acknowledge the structural differences among 
countries and time periods. This improved the results in that up to 60 per cent of the 
variation in the dependent variable was explained by some of the regression equations fitted. 
The major conclusions emerging from this analysis indicate that, apart from economic 
development and import dependence, the structural differences among countries are also an 
important determinant of the level of wheat price protection and that qualitative dependent 
variables can be successfully used to measure these structural differences. Nevertheless, the 
paper fails to outline broad theoretical framework to support the empirical analysis. 
II.3 Food Security and Price Stabilization: A Motive for Intervention 
A great deal has been written about food price stabilizing policies and the food 
security for consumers since the world food crisis of the 1973-74, when the prices doubled 
and, in some cases, tripled (Hopkins, 1986; and Thompson, 1983). A wide array of price 
stabilization and other policies are adopted in countries across the world in order to mitigate 
food shortages and to enhance accessibility to food for the poor consumers (Bigman, 1985). 
Various studies have highlighted the complex interaction among the domestic food price 
policy, food production policy and food security concerns in industrialized as well as 
developing countries. As Adelman and Berck (1991) point out, the food-security and 
associated problems are a serious concern of policy-making, especially in developing 
countries. Nevertheless, some of the policies adopted might be incompatible with each other 
and also with the long-run food security objectives (Krueger, 1992 and 1990; Tullis and 
Hollist, 1986). 
Heckscher (1935) termed as provisionistic the trade and pricing policies that maintain 
domestic food prices below international levels. Such policies, as the following reviews 
demonstrate, are common in developing countries. As Tyers and Chisholm (982) point out. 
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poor consumers — especially urban consumers — in these countries are "an important political 
constituency" acting in rational self-interest. Policies to stabilize domestic markets to ensure 
consumer food security prevail in almost all countries trading in staple food products. 
However, the PEAP studies reviewed above have neglected the role of such concerns in the 
determination of domestic protectionistic policies. 
Some relevant works on the consumer food security and its attainment through 
domestic price stabilization policies are reviewed below. This section stresses the need for an 
analysis which quantifies the linkages between food security, price stabilization and PEAP 
policies. The focus of this section is not on whether price stabilization policies, food aid or 
other development strategies are the best and most efficient instruments for achieving food 
security. Rather, the purpose here is to emphasize the point that there is a linkage between 
the food security perceptions of the general public and politicians and the determination of 
domestic food policies. 
II.3.1 Consumer Food Security 
Food security has generally been defined as availability of adequate supply of food 
for all the people at all the times and accessibility to food in terms of purchasing power of the 
people. According to the World Food Council (1988), food security may imply two things: 
availability of and accessibility to adequate food supplies for all people; and inter-temporal 
stability of food supplies. In this sense, first, adequate quantities of quality food should be 
available, accessible, and affordable - when and where needed - to ensure food security. 
Second, this state of affairs should be stable and expected to continue in the future. Busch 
and Lacy (1984) comment that food security has at least three dimensions: availability; 
accessibility; and adequacy of food supply for all people at all times. Bigman (1982 and 
1985) measures food insecurity by not only the per capita consumption in different income 
groups, but also by the probability that, in a given year, their food consumption might fall 
below a certain critical level. A second element of risk may be introduced by the fluctuations 
in production. 
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A "less ambitious" concept of food security has been adopted by Chisholm and Tyers 
(1982) as the ability of a country to meet some target level of consumption. Food insecurity, 
in this sense, is ultimately a problem that affects the ability of people to command adequate 
food for consumption in the face of exorbitantly high prices. In this excellent collection of 
articles on food security, especially in Asian and Pacific Rim countries, they also report that 
many "low-income countries have subsidized and attempted to stabilize retail food prices to 
provide food security for urban consumers." They conclude that these programs have largely 
been successful but at the cost of rural population. Tyers and Chisholm report that 
governments in industrialized countries serve to increase their food self-sufficiency and to 
support agricultural income. They point out that policies adopted to ensure food 
self-sufficiency may entail some positive externalities such as "social sentiments favoring the 
maintenance of traditional rural life-styles." 
Fafchamps (1992) argues that for developing countries, "food security is best assured 
by food self-sufficiency." He develops a crop portfolio choice model under multivariate risk. 
The absence of integrated food markets result in a high variance in food prices and a high 
covariance between individual and market supply. The combination of the staple nature of 
the commodity and low income elasticity of consumption and other factors lead to a situation 
in which food security at the household level is best achieved by a high degree of food 
self-sufficiency. 
Sturgess (1992) similarly defines food security as "access by all people at all times to 
enough food for an active healthy life." He provides an operational definition of security as 
"the capacity to meet target levels of food consumption on a yearly basis." Self-sufficiency as 
a means of ensuring food security is the essence of his paper. He points out that 
self-sufficiency in food is seen as a safeguard against food shortages and hunger in the 
Western European countries. Although government intervention in agriculture is required to 
ensure stable food supplies, he argues that the agricultural interests have been crucial in 
defining agricultural price policies. Agricultural lobbies in these countries "seek to use vague 
public fears to buttress their protected positions" (p.316). He cites the following extracts 
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from an E.G. bulletin, A Common Agricultural Policy for the 1990s, that confirm the desire 
for ensuring food security through food self-sufficiency as being instrumental in E.C.'s 
agricultural policies: 
Agricultural products are mainly intended for consumption as food, which is one of humanity's basic 
needs. Most civilizations have therefore placed great importance on developing and safeguarding 
agricultural production. In Europe on the other hand reliable food supplies are now taken for granted, 
largely thanks to a farm policy which has made it possible to expand agricultural production. 
Self-sufficiency in foodstuffs does not of course rule out trade with the rest of the world but such trade 
must be kept in balance and must not lead to one-sided and therefore potentially dangerous dependence 
on other countries (p. 9). ... [The] food shortages of early postwar years were still fresh memories and 
the increasing tensions of the Cold War made a stable supply base all the more desirable (p. 14).... 
Critics of the CAP point out that world prices for agricultural products are low. They may well be at 
times, but the crux of the matter is to achieve long-term security of supply at reasonable and stable 
prices (p. 23). 
As a result, the prices of agricultural products in Western Europe, especially cereals, 
have been highly stabilized and maintained at about 40 percent higher than the world price 
levels during the last decade. Although these policies have increased self sufficiency, these 
have generally adversely affected social welfare. Sturgess feels that the fear of food 
shortages is one important element that generates willingness, among people in the Western 
Europe, to acquiesce to agricultural protection. Over the past half-century, the United 
Kingdom has, in its pursuit of self-sufficiency in food products, espoused agricultural 
policies that enhance production. However, as O' Hagan (1976) points out, food 
self-sufficiency has been an overt or covert objective of national development plans in almost 
every country, industrialized as well as developing, although with different policy 
instruments. The depressing effect of protective CAP policies on the world prices has also 
been studied by Saaris (1991). 
Johnson (1991) reports that for the past century, food security has been an important 
objective of farm policies in most European and Asian countries. He questions the 
policy-makers' beliefs that food security can be enhanced by food self-sufficiency. He 
contends that food self-sufficiency does not assure food security, although the two are 
considered to be synonymous in many countries. Countries that pursue such policies, incur 
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huge costs in terms of reduced national incomes and increased tensions within their trading 
blocs. He points out that liberal trading system in international markets and peace are the 
essential conditions for food security. 
Thompson (1983) contends that much of the literature on food security deals with a 
country's aggregate food security, ignoring it from the individual viewpoint. He comments 
that individual food insecurity can result from a drop in income or from a sharp increase in 
the price of food that reduces the purchasing power of that income and hence the amount of 
food it can buy. Aggregate food security, according to him, is achieved by ensuring adequate 
food supplies to feed the country's population at reasonable prices regardless of fluctuations 
in crop yields. Food insecurity at the most basic level, according to him, is not a problem of 
crop-failure but of poverty. "Only poor people go hungry." He further comments that 
international price risk is often cited as the rationale for developing countries' unwillingness 
to rely on food imports as a source of food security and for their desire to become 
self-sufficient in food. 
Weber et al, (1988) define food insecurity from short-term and long-term 
perspectives. The short-term food insecurity arises out of immediate disasters such as 
crop-failures while long-term food insecurity comprises the chronic shortages of food 
supplies such as are encountered in many African countries. They contend that the problem 
of long-term food insecurity may be dealt with by increasing real incomes of food consumers. 
They argue that food prices play a dual role, especially in developing countries. They act as 
an incentive to agricultural producers but are a major detriment of the real incomes of the 
consumers. This price policy dilemma hinges on the question: who are net producer and 
net-consumers of food? Citing the example of some African countries, they show that the 
agricultural policies in these countries have erroneously kept food prices at higher level to 
increase the incomes of vast majority of rural people, aiming to increase long-term food 
security. However, the empirical evidence suggests that most of these countries have had 
lower than 50 percent of their population as net producers, with very little marketable 
surplus. This implicitly suggests that the appropriate policy would have been to keep food 
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prices low as is the case in many Asian countries. Moreover, they also point out that the 
supply response to higher food prices has been quite low, even negative in some cases, in 
developing countries. Citing evidence from elsewhere, they contend that "even with a 
hundred percent increase in cereal prices, the degree of self-sufficiency would only increase 
from 47 to 55 percent." 
Two different dimensions of food security have been mentioned in the literature. 
Valdés (1983) distinguishes between the demand and supply side of food security. Warley 
(1983) separates short-term and long-term aspects of food security. Long-term food security 
implies assured availability of increasing per capita food supplies, while in the short-term, 
food security may be achieved by avoiding sharp reductions in consumption due to variations 
in incomes, food prices, supply and availability. Bale (1983) cites the problem of bias in 
policies towards attaining short-term food security while the long-term issues are seldom 
addressed and may be exacerbated by short-term measures. The problem is said to originate 
from the pressure on politicians to respond quickly to "short-run imperatives with a continual 
series of short-run policy palliatives." 
Adelman and Berck (1991) acknowledge these divergent patterns in agricultural 
pricing policies across industrialized and developing countries, albeit with a common aim to 
ensure food security. They adopt the definition of food security as proposed by Reutlinger 
and Knapp (1980): food security represents a condition in which the probability of a 
country's citizens falling below a minimum level offood consumption is quite low. The 
results of their simulation models indicate that the adoption of different food security 
programs will depend upon the degrees of risk aversion of the society and upon the political 
influence of rural versus urban groups. They report that most developing country 
governments institute cheap-food policies mainly due to their high degree of risk aversion 
rather than any urban bias, though these two are not mutually exclusive factors. They admit 
that the pursuance of self-sufficiency to ensure food security results in higher food prices 
than would be the case in specializing according to comparative advantage or importing. 
Most developing country goverrunents that are concerned with poverty tend to subsidize the 
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price of grains to consumers. But this policy benefits the poor less than the rich in absolute 
terms and also in proportion to their incomes. 
Roumasset (1982) develops a conceptual model of short-run and long-run food 
security. A less obvious cost of stabilization is the reduction in domestic production. He 
suggests that without costly producer subsidies, stabilization policies that put a ceiling on 
consumer prices will also lower producer prices. Bouis and Herdt (1982) share Roumasset's 
view of the trade-off between short- and long-run food security. They report that the 
short-run government objective is often to keep the staple food prices low as is the case in 
many Asian countries. Such a short-term policy "runs counter to the long-run goal [and 
represents] a classic trade-off in the distribution of income between consumers and 
producers." They further report that long-range policy issues are often accorded second 
priority in government policy formulation to the short-run issues. 
Phillips and Taylor (1990) contend that thefood security literature so far has failed to 
appreciate the cross-sectional and inter-temporal distinctions in the concept of food security. 
Food insecurity, defined by Reutlinger and others as a 'temporary decline in households' 
access to enough food,' is too restrictive according to them. They assert that the problem of 
assuring food security for the masses is prevalent in industrialized economies as well, 
although not as visible as in developing countries. They comment that "although vast 
majority of hungry people live in countries with very low average per capita incomes, food 
insecurity is not restricted to these countries alone." For example, approximately 20 million 
people in the United States did not have access to sufficient food in 1990, They also 
recognize the link between food security and domestic agricultural price stabilization 
policies. Defining food insecurity as the current state of food insecurity plus anticipated 
deviations from this state, they develop an elaborate conceptual framework with an optimal 
control problem that may form the basis for ftiture quantitative efforts in this area. The 
conceptual model acknowledges the risks imposed by the excessively high food prices and 
the concept of food insecurity insurance at micro (household) as well as macro (national) 
levels. 
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Staatz, Agostino and Sundberg (1990) also recognize the distinction between the 
national and household concepts of food security. They point out that the problem of food 
insecurity may no longer be viewed as a transitory one but as a chronic problem arising out of 
inaccessibility to adequate quantities of food. Moreover, the relationship between higher 
household incomes and good nutrition may itself be too weak in some instances, as they 
show in case of Mali. The insecurity is not as much due to the shortage in supplies as it is 
due to inequitable distribution of these supplies. Moreover, they point out that the factors 
ensuring food security at the national level may do nothing to alleviate the problem of food 
insecurity at the household level. Therefore, they contend, the commonly used indicators of 
food security at national level may at best be "poor guides to interventions to help the 
hungry," and hence the need to develop indicators for food security at the micro levels. 
The relationship between household incomes and individual food security is also the 
focus of Schiff and Valdés (1990). Like Staatz et al., they contend that increasing incomes 
may not improve the nutritional intake of individuals. They argue that the focus in 
developing countries on industrial development and providing cheap food to urban 
consumers through price interventions has resulted in severe underdevelopment of their 
agricultural sectors. This has adversely affected their long-term food security. In a comment 
on this paper, von Braun (1990) suggests that one of the emerging issues in this regard is the 
problem of food security for the urban poor in low-income countries. He commends the 
paper's appropriate stress on the linkages between food security and the role of public 
interventions for nutritional improvement. In an earlier attempt (1988), he cautions against 
risks of food subsidy policies followed by developing countries. He contends that in all of 
the developing countries studies, the consumer prices of agricultural products are kept below 
the international prices. 
Sanderson's (1990) compilation of papers on agricultural protectionism provides a 
comprehensive evaluation of farm policies in industrialized countries. He points out that 
food security is often cited as a justification for protecting agriculture in the European 
Community and in the United States, which produce much more than their domestic 
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requirements. The argument seems more plausible in the case of Japan which has pleaded for 
exempting basic foods from GATT negotiations on the grounds of food security. He 
contends that agricultural fundamentalist and food security considerations still hold powerful 
sway over attitudes in many countries. A similar collection of articles on PEAP literature is 
available in Burger et al. (1991). Koester, in the same volume, highlights the cost of farm 
programs on consumers and taxpayers in E.G., Ganada, Japan and Australia. 
Gardner (1990b) also cites promoting food security as one of the five main reasons 
for farm policies in the United States. He hypothesizes that non-farmers acquiesce to farm 
programs as they consider that these programs guarantee food availability at reasonable 
prices. Farm programs may constitute a form of insurance for risk averse consumers and 
producers. He contends that price instability is generally viewed as a market failure and that 
farm programs are corrective and benefit the economy as a whole although this may not be 
supported by factual evidence. 
Sanderson and Mehra (1990) opine that food security concerns become more 
important than concern about food prices, the more affluent the consumer gets and the 
support for agricultural protection increases (p.323). They further contend that wars and 
embargoes, with their attendant food shortages, leave an enduring legacy of anxiety about 
food security. Similar sentiments are also expressed by Josling, Sanderson and Warley 
(1990), George and Saxon (1986), and Anderson and Tyers (1989). Assuring food security at 
stable and equitable food prices, "keeping people on the land" slogans, and supporting a 
simpler and healthier rural life style may be some important vote-getters in industrialized 
countries. Koester and Tangermann (1990) also mention assuring adequate food supply at 
reasonable prices as one of the four main determinants of food policies in the European 
Community. 
Hayami (1990) and Kobayashi (1989) cite achieving food security as one of the 
Japanese government's most important responsibility. George and Saxon (1986) corroborate 
Hayami's contention by pointing out that "many Japanese consider that the present cost of 
agricultural protection is not too much to pay for the food security it is perceived to provide." 
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The Japanese obsession with food security is believed to have deep historic roots in the 
memories of periodic famines and food shortages over past several centuries. Moreover, 
Japan's location and extremely high ratio of population to agricultural land also make it 
appear vulnerable to external threats to its food supply. They further point out that the value 
Japanese people place on these functions of the farm sector has given rise to an ideology of 
support that is built into Japan's agricultural legislation. Hayami (1986) also adduces the 
threat of war with North Korea as an underlying factor in South Korea's protectionistic 
policies aimed at maintaining adequate food security. 
A good collection of informative and analytical articles on the international political 
economy of food security and food policies is provided in Pinstrup-Andersen (1993, 1988a 
and 1988b), Ruttan (1993), Ruppel and Kellog (1991), Knudsen (1990), Horwich and Lynch 
(1989), Bryant (1988), Gittinger et al. (1987), Wamock (1987), Konandreas et al. (1978), 
Lele and Candler (1981), Valdés and Konandreas (1983) and Valdés (1981). 
Falcon et al (1987) discuss long-run and short-run food security and the dilemmas 
associated with policies addressing these issues. Short-run consumption oriented food 
security can be obtained in part by pricing policies that benefit the poor and the 
malnourished. The difficulty is that such price policies may be in direct conflict with longer 
term food security objectives, such as increased food production or certain food trade policy. 
The same conflicts are also reported by Reutlinger (1987) and Pinstrup-Andersen (1987). 
Miller (1987) states that important among the goals pursued by farm programs in food 
importing countries are those of security and quality of food supplies. The importance of 
these genuine national concerns have been heightened by war time and other famines and by 
grain export embargoes. Both Japan and the E.G. have sought to pursue food 
self-sufficiency. On a calorie basis, Japanese food self-sufficiency has declined to now stand 
at around 59 percent. In Japan, the basic approach to achieve food security has been to 
encourage domestic self-sufficiency and consumer prices of food are over 60 percent higher 
than they would otherwise have been. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC 
guarantees regular food supplies and ensures reasonable prices to consumers. European 
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consumers pay prices for agricultural commodities that are considerably higher than world 
prices. The objective of guaranteeing regular supplies to consumers in EC have been met but 
at a high cost to consumers and taxpayers. However, the objective of consumers paying 
"reasonable" prices have not been met, since E.G. consumers pay prices much higher than 
would be the case if a free flow of world agricultural commodities were allowed into the 
Community. 
Variyam, Jordan and Epperson (1990) estimate the determinants of U.S. citizens' 
preferences regarding government involvement in agriculture. The results from the survey 
indicate that roughly 75 percent of the respondents favor the idea that the family farm must 
be preserved since it is a vital part of their heritage. However, when the questions were 
worded differently to take into account the consumers' willingness to pay for farm programs, 
only 35 percent supported the idea of increasing the food prices to help pay for these 
programs. The results also indicated that as incomes and education increase, the support to 
protect the family farms as well as the government intervention generally declines. The 
negative correlation between incomes and preference for farm programs is contrary to 
Anderson, Honma and Hayami's argument that as consumers' incomes increase and their 
Engel coefficients decline, the resistance to farm programs also declines. It may be noted 
that these differences in preferences may be due primarily to the micro and macro level of 
investigation in these studies. Overall, about 82 percent of respondents felt that government 
should be involved in the agricultural sector. Their results indicate that individual 
preferences exhibit rational self-interest in deciding government policy towards agriculture, 
as contrary to the economic arguments suggesting altruistic motives as a cause of 
redistributionary farm policies. The results are contrary to Pope (1986) who suggests that 
people feel altruistic towards farm families and are willing to support income transfers to the 
agricultural sector. However, the survey lacked direct questions on consumer food security 
issues such as maintaining stable and surplus food production and reasonable prices. 
Mellor (1988) stresses the structural imbalance in global food production and 
consumption. Developed countries produce surplus food whereas in developing countries. 
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the demand outstrips domestic production. He offers opportunities to increase food security 
from this imbalance in the short-run as well as in the long-run. Improving food security 
requires both increasing the purchasing power of the poor and boosting overall food 
production. Security of food consumption cannot be separated from production stability 
programs. He contends that the domestic food price policy, food import policy, and food 
production policy represent a complex interaction from the food security perspective. Cheap 
food policies may also be implemented for reasons of maintaining political stability in the 
face of little income growth. 
FAO (1988) states that the major objectives of agricultural policies in industrialized 
countries also include attaining food self-sufficiency and supporting domestic consumers. 
The food self-sufficiency has been a major goal of domestic farm policies in many countries, 
in part due to the uncertainty, real or perceived, of imported food supplies. In industrialized 
countries, with a history of substantial exports of major food commodities, food prices paid 
by consumers tend to be closer to international prices. In importing countries with a 
substantial measure of protection to domestic producers, consumer food prices tend to be 
high in line with producer support prices. As a consequence of such policies, consumers in 
industrialized countries have been guaranteed regular food supplies and have often been 
unaffected by fluctuations in the world market. The direct link between trade and food 
security of developing countries is also stressed, highlighting the interdependence between 
agricultural sectors of industrialized and developing countries. FAO (1987) specifies 
consumer food price stabilization and food security as important objective of price policies in 
developing countries (p. 34). The World Bank's World Development Report: 1986 also 
reports that "most developing countries pronounce self-sufficiency as an important objective 
but follow policies that tax farmers, subsidize consumers, and increase dependence on 
imported food." Consumer subsidies help the poor but they also end up reducing the incomes 
of farmers who are much poorer than many of the urban consumers. 
Tullis and Hollist (1986) report that governments in many industrialized and newly 
industrializing countries suddenly found a pressing need to reduce their food insecurity. It 
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has generally been accomplished by further protecting and subsidizing domestic food 
production, even when the costs of these programs exceeded those manifest in international 
market prices. "Some governments found that cheap food seemed less desirable than secure 
food and the political tranquillity that such security implied" (p. viii, italics added). 
Hayami (1986) argues that consumers' acceptance of agricultural protection policies 
in Newly Industrialized Countries may be a necessary reason for food security. It has been 
argued that protectionist policies are essential to the maintenance of adequate food security, 
especially in Korea. Anderson and Hayami (1986) point out that the food-security objective 
has usually been perceived as requiring farm prices to be raised to ensure self-sufficiency. 
Hillman and Rothenberg (1988) trace out the Japanese concern for food security, which, they 
argue, "has been predicted on, if not fully identified with, self-sufficiency" (p.40). 
Developing countries usually support cheap-food policies to the benefit of consumers 
of agricultural products over farmers (Peterson, 1979). State controls through the marketing 
boards set prices of food products below the levels that would be determined by the 
competitive free-markets, thus ensuring short-term food security to poor consumers. Other 
policies designed to lower domestic prices may include the imposition of export taxes and 
overvaluation of currencies. On the other hand, prices received by farmers in industrialized 
countries were about four to five times greater than those received by farmers in low-income 
countries. Using the data from 28 developing countries, he concludes that unfavorable farm 
prices have resulted in a 40-60 percent decrease in the agricultural output in these countries, 
thus adversely affecting their long-run food security. Similar conclusions are also reported in 
Kerr (1985). In a related work. Bale and Lutz (1981) also conclude that such pricing policies 
have provided more food to the non-agricultural population in developing countries. These 
studies seem to suggest that short-term food security is the primary focus of agricultural 
policies in low-income countries than long-term food security. 
Byerlee and Sain (1986) evaluate the differences between domestic producer and 
consumer, and world prices of wheat for 31 developing countries for a period of 1980-82. 
They comment that there is an ample evidence to suggest that governments in developing 
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countries consistently try to provide low price wheat to urban consumers. However, the 
policy of favoring consumers has not always been at the direct expense of domestic 
producers. The lowest wheat prices were reported where wheat is a staple food and where 
most of the wheat is produced domestically (about 90 percent self-sufficiency). Consumer 
subsidies were high in countries which are relatively less dependent upon agriculture for 
income and taxation. It is also suggested that higher levels of wheat imports were generally 
associated with high producer prices. They conclude that the discrimination against 
agriculture as well as the producer-consumer conflict in policy formulation may not be as 
wide spread as reported in earlier studies. 
Lutz (1988) provides a bibliography of protectionism in which the common theme 
expressed is that countries create berriers to food imports because of food and national 
security. The reasons pointed out for domestic protection include national security of food 
supplies and a quick government response to shprtages. He further asserts that many 
industrialized countries also protect their farmers for reasons of food security. 
II.3.2 Price Stabilization to Ensure Food Security 
Consumer benefits from price stabilization policies were the focus of initial works by 
Waugh (1944), Oi (1961) and Massell (1969). Waugh's famous theorem on consumer 
benefits of price stability states that, under some specific assumptions, consumers are harmed 
by price stability while variable prices benefit consumers. This result stems fi-om the 
downward sloping nature of the demand curve. However, symmetrical fluctuations in prices 
may raise consumer welfare while welfare declines from asymmetrical price fluctuations. 
This is because a price decline increases welfare by more than a price increase of equal 
magnitude decreases it. 
His methodology was later challenged by many economists including Massell (1969) 
and Samuelson (1972). Massell demonstrated that while price stabilization increases welfare 
to society, its effect on individual groups depends crucially on the source of instability. 
Consumers gain from price stabilization if price fluctuations arise from demand disturbances 
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and lose if these arise from the supply side. The opposite is true in case of producers. 
Although his analysis is based on some special assumptions such as linear supply and 
demand curves and risk-neutrality of agents, the simplicity of his results nevertheless has had 
great appeal (Wong, 1989). Samuelson demonstrated that Waugh's results could only be 
verified under certain very restrictive and unrealistic assumptions and "can never feasibly 
apply". Samuelson theorizes that in a closed economy, price stabilization must result in a 
lower mean than the unstabilized base scenario. In a final statement, he concludes that "price 
stability is, other things equals in itself a virtue." 
These pioneering works have been the basis of a flood of subsequent theoretical 
research. Much of the earlier work in price stabilization was based on some special 
assumptions including perfect competition and risk neutral agents. A substantial body of 
literature has since been developed and the models have become increasingly sophisticated 
incorporating more realistic assumptions about uncertain market conditions, distortionary 
interventions and risk attitudes of agents. For example, works by Newberry and Stiglitz 
(1981), Tumovsky (1976), Samuelson (1972), Bigman and Reutlinger (1979), Bigman (1982 
& 1985), Zwart and Blandford (1989), Wong (1989), Wright and Williams (1989), Sicular 
(1989), and Konandreas et al. (1978) relax some of the earlier assumptions. 
The study by Newbery and Stiglitz offers a different analytical approach. Their 
comprehensive analysis incorporates a number of realistic assumptions and does not suffer 
from the weaknesses of Waugh-Oi-Massell framework (Ch. 9). They identify errors in the 
models using the conventional Marshallian consumer surplus measures to evaluate the 
benefits of price stabilization. One of the errors of the earlier literature is in assuming that it 
is possible to stabilize prices at the mean. The correct price around which to stabilize is the 
price at which average supply equals average demand. Evaluating the effects of price 
stabilization, they demonstrate that risk-averse consumers benefit from price stabilization in a 
stochastic environment. They contend that the consumer would be willing to pay a fraction 
of their incomes to have the price stabilization introduced. This fraction would depend upon 
their relative risk aversion, variance of prices, income and price elasticities, and their 
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expenditures on the commodity in question. They conclude that consumers would prefer 
stable prices when they are averse to income risk and their demand is relatively inelastic. 
Newberry and Stiglitz's framework has been applied in Tyers and Anderson (1992, 
Ch. 3 and Appendix 4) to account for short-run disturbances originating in domestic 
production and in the international market for rice. Assuming linear demand and supply 
schedules they introduce an element of risk through random disturbance in production and 
border price. Domestic demand is divided between rural and urban households. They opine 
that both producers and consumers prefer more rather than less stable prices and highlight a 
public interest case for insulation of food markets in both rich and poor countries. Moreover, 
since relatively more influential pressure groups are expected to be the main beneficiaries of 
such programs, government intervention is thus supplemented by aggressive lobbying by 
these groups. The supply of intervention is relatively less costly for the politicians since no 
group of agents in the domestic economy would appear to lose significantly. If economic 
agents are risk-averse, they conclude, then a public interest case for price stabilization exists 
if instability in prices threatens their welfare. 
Using a simple conceptual framework, Foster and Rausser (1992) attempt to explain 
why consumers and taxpayers acquiesce to seemingly inefficient wealth transfers to a 
relatively small number of producers. They disagree with the proposition advanced by 
political economists that consumers and taxpayers suffer too little in the rent-seeking game to 
bear the cost of opposing the aggressive political influence of producers. They contend 
instead that consumers in fact benefit from this transfer. Their model assumes two interest 
groups, each of whom has a veto power over a change from the status quo. They believe that 
farm policies are part of a larger portfolio of policies and that these price distorting 
redistributory transfers are the cheapest means of securing public interest policies. They 
conclude that producers as a group might actually be losers from such transfers when the 
implementation of the larger portfolio is accounted for. Their framework demonstrates "how 
a seemingly inefficient policy that appears to harm consumers could, in fact, be a rational 
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component of a larger portfolio of policies ultimately benefiting consumers at the expense of 
producers." 
Adelman and Berck (1991) highlight the link between price stabilization and food 
security. They contend that price stabilization policies have been used to ensure food 
security in both industrialized and developing countries, albeit with contrasting results. Price 
stabilization policies of industrialized countries are useful in reducing the likelihood of food 
shortages. Many groups would be willing to pay for such a policy, but it may have virtually 
no effect on decreasing the percentage of malnourished or the food-deficit on the average. 
Other food security policies impoverish domestic farmers and reduce their production 
incentives, as those pursued in developing countries. They report that urban groups, except 
marginal workers, would be willing to pay 0.21 to 1.5 percent of their incomes for price 
stabilization introduced. If the cost of price stabilization programs were to be passed on to 
the households in the form of increased taxes, it would amount to four-tenths of a percent of 
their incomes and these groups would be willing to pay this insurance cost. 
Bigman (1985) also examines the link between food policies and food security under 
instability and develops a behavioral model of farmers' production and consumption decision 
in response to stabilization policies. One of the objectives in his work is to highlight the 
trade-offs between short-term food needs and long-term production goals. He discusses the 
policy analysis in an open and closed economy case amid price uncertainty and under various 
scenarios, incorporating food security risk in the analysis. In one of his earlier attempts 
(1982), Bigman also examines the methodological framework under the welfare economic 
analysis that seeks to assess the desirability of stabilization policies. He also provides a 
review of the policy being used in many developing countries to cope with specific food 
problems and to secure price stability. Gardner (1981 and 1990a) also proposes a hypothesis 
that unregulated markets cannot cope adequately with unstability. 
Stabilizing agricultural prices or reducing fluctuations of some high priority 
commodities is an important objective of agricultural price policies in developing countries 
(Reca, 1983). Johnson (1991) points out that in the E.G. and Japan, stable prices and assured 
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supply at those prices are the primary benefits that consumers obtain for their acceptance of 
farm subsidies and price supports. He points out that consumers find it difficult to respond to 
prices that vary significantly from one period to another. This, he contends, may explain why 
consumers benefit from price stabilization, although it may still be questionable. He argues 
that measurement of consumer benefits from price stabilization should rather focus on an 
aggregate price index, such as the consumer price index. 
The World Development Report: 1986 states that price stabilization in case of staples 
is a major concern in many developing countries, where the poor spent a large proportion of 
their incomes on these foods. It also points out that the price stabilization schemes that 
protect farmers from large price falls and consumers from large price increases may be 
explained by the variability of agricultural commodity prices. For example, the Food 
Corporation of India runs one of the greatest food distribution systems in the world. The 
system has been successful in providing greater price stability for consumers than would have 
existed otherwise. Stabilizing and increasing farmers' incomes and containing the migration 
of people out of the farming sector are contended to be the primary objectives of agricultural 
policies in industrialized countries. Underlying these objectives, it is claimed, are the social 
and political aims of stable food prices and self-sufficiency in production. The Report 
maintains that though self-sufficiency is supposed to contribute to food security, stabilize 
food prices and make prices reasonable, cheaper means may exist to accomplish these 
objectives. 
Kerr (1985) analyzes the trends in agricultural price protection for a sample of 37 
developing countries during the period 1967-83, using nominal protection coefficients. The 
major emphasis is on checking whether a significantly different pattern of price protection 
existed for major staple food commodities. The results show that governments in these 
countries have placed more importance on stabilizing the price of these commodities, 
particularly that of cereals. He further points out that "stabilization of food crop prices is not 
in the interest of farmers but rather in the interest of stabilizing and maintaining retail food 
prices at low levels for urban consumers." Less than 20 percent of the price increases 
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associated with the world food crisis of early 1970s were passed on to the cereals farmers 
whereas non-food export crop prices reflected almost double that amount. Nevertheless, 
these policies have resulted in increasing scarcity of food products in these countries. 
Hazel, Jaramillo and Williamson (1990) use the post-War data to examine the trends 
in world price stability and its impact on the prices received by agricultural producers in 
developing countries. They conclude that while world prices of most commodities have been 
quite variable with an upward trend in variation, the domestic marketing arrangements as 
well as government interventions have prevented the variability from being transferred to 
producer prices in developing countries. The impact of such marketing boards and other 
price stabilization schemes in Canada are studied by Spriggs and Van Kooten (1988), They 
contend that price stabilization schemes may even have negative impacts on stability of farm 
incomes, and thereby on consumption and overall welfare. Therefore, they suggest removal 
of commodity-based stabilization programs which, they claim, are essentially a means by 
which "a select group in society can successfully pursue rent-seeking activities." 
Welfare impacts of domestic and international price stabilization policies are also 
analyzed by Wong (1989). He comments that earlier studies on welfare effects of price 
stbilization have assumed a perfectly competitive framework. Following Massell's 
framework, with apparent modifications, he develops a two country model to draw the 
distinction between the effects of these two types of price stabilization. Chisholm and Tyers 
and others also conclude that the world price stability is adversely affected by the domestic 
price stabilization programs. 
In industrialized countries, such as the European Community, Canada and the United 
States, government intervention is usually designed to keep producer prices at a level above 
their nonintervention levels. The welfare effects of domestic and world price stabilization 
policies are also analyzed by many authors (Spriggs and Van Kooten, Bullock, 1992; 
Devadoss, 1992; Choi and Johnson, 1992; Thompson, 1983; Evenson, 1983; Schultz, 1978; 
de Janvry, 1983). Devadoss concludes that domestic distortionary policies themselves may 
contribute to the world price instability and that world price stabilization programs would 
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result in gains to agricultural producers. Similar conclusions were also reported by Zwart and 
Meilke (1979)." 
In short, then, food security concerns seem to be relevant for consumers across both 
developing and industrialized countries. These concerns may also influence domestic 
protectionistic policies. However, the patterns of intervention aimed to achieve food 
security seem to differ across these countries. Although long-term food security is ensured 
through increasing domestic production, the immediate government objective is often 
primarily concerned with keeping food prices low in countries with large number of poor 
consumers (Bouis and Herdt, 1982). The food security literature, thus, suggests an 
unambiguous link between the food security concerns of consumers, price stabilization 
policies and government intervention in the agricultural sector. Food programs and food 
price stabilization policies, therefore, also seem responsive, in part, to consumers' attitudes 
towards food security risk. Some significant influences on the direction and magnitude of 
distortionary intervention may include, among others, the relative strengths of economic 
pressure groups, the relative size and incomes of different groups. The preferences of 
rational self-interested political leadership may also bear importantly in the political market 
equilibrium. 
The next chapter provides an analytical overview of the protectionistic patterns across 
industrialized and developing countries. 
' Literature in this area is extensive. However, in iveeping with the focus of the present thesis, these studies ore not reviewed here. 
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CHAPTER III 
AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION 
The variation in protection awarded to agricultural commodities indicates some 
general patterns of protection across industrialized and developing countries. The observed 
patterns exhibit a positive relationship of the level of protection with the per capita incomes 
and negative relationship with the number of farmers and the share of agriculture in the 
national economy (see Gautam, 1992). A predominant pattern of agricultural protectionism 
across countries is that while farmers in industrialized countries receive subsidies through 
income enhancing and price support programs, their counterparts in developing countries are 
generally taxed (USDA, 1993; OECD, 1992). The producer support programs in 
industrialized countries invariably result in higher food prices for consumers while 
developing countries adopt cheap food policies to improve accessibility to food for poor 
urban consumers (Schultz, 1978; Miller, 1986; Byerlee and Sain, 1986). 
This chapter begins by providing a simple political market framework of agricultural 
protection in order to explain the factors that lead to such divergent policy outcomes across 
industrialized and developing countries. The idea is to analyze the interactions among 
producers and consumers of agricultural commodities as well as the politicians, and examine 
other factors that affect the demand for and supply of agricultural protection. The first 
section, therefore, highlights these interactions within a theoretical framework, along with 
supporting factual evidence. An accurate measurement of the actual level of intervention is a 
prerequisite for the effectiveness of the analysis. Therefore, a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of various measurement concepts and their policy coverage is provided in 
Section II.2. The choice of a measurement concept is also highlighted along with its merits 
and limitations. The analysis is followed by a display of the comparative results with a 
graphical exposition of the food commodity market distortions in the cases of small and large 
countries. The case of price discrimination, where foreign markets are competitive and 
domestic market is monopolized, is also discussed at the end of the chapter. 
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III.l A Political Market Framework of Agricultural Protection 
In analyzing the divergent outcomes of agricultural protectionistic policies across 
industrialized and developing countries, one plausible starting point may be to employ the 
traditional theory of demand and supply to the market for political intervention. The 
theoretical frameworks developed by Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1968), and 
Breton (1974) and further advanced by Hoimia and Hayami (1986), Anderson and Hayami 
(1986), Hayami (1988) and Tyers and Anderson (1992), conceptualize a political market 
where the demand for a particular policy emanates from the potential beneficiaries while the 
political leadership is the supplier (Figure III.l)/ The political process is assumed to consist 
of three groups: agricultural producer interest group, agricultural consumer interest group, 
and the political leadership.® The groups whose incomes are positively associated with the 
prices of agricultural commodities are included in the producer subset. The non-farm 
population, broadly mentioned as consumers who are net purchasers of agricultural 
commodities, would comprise of groups whose incomes are negatively associated with these 
Cost/Benefits 
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Figure III.l: The political market for government intervention in agriculture 
' The frameworks advanced do not require the political leadership to be democratic. For example, farm protection was introduced in 
South Korea while it was still under dictatorial rule However, it is generally assumed that the leadership is contestable (Tyers and 
Anderson, 1992). The explicit graphical exposition of the political market concept was provided by Hayami (1988, p. 130), and 
later by Tyers and Anderson (1992, p. 85). In addition, the slopes of the political supply and demand curves are also influenced by 
the political characteristics of different interest groups. 
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prices. Any distortionary policy designed to benefit a specific group would invariably harm 
the other group in the society. The political support from the group opposed to the policy 
would, therefore, decrease, constituting a cost to the policy makers. The higher the level of 
protection, the higher the political cost of each additional increase in the level of support. 
This would produce an upward sloping supply curve, reflecting the marginal cost of the 
policy, as shown in the figure. On the other hand, the marginal gains to the beneficiaries of a 
policy would be lower at higher levels of protection, thus giving a negatively sloped demand 
curve, reflecting marginal benefit. Therefore, the policy maker, realizing this trade-off, 
balances the marginal cost of a distortionary policy to its marginal benefits, with the 
equilibrium level of protection awarded being decided at the intersection of the political 
supply and demand curves. 
Given this simple political market framework, the next step would be to analyze the 
factors that affect these demand and supply curves in such a way that diametrically opposite 
agricultural protection policies result in industrialized and developing countries. 
Inter-temporal dynamics of agricultural protection within a given country can also be 
analyzed using this framework. 
III.l.l The Political Market in Developing Countries 
In developing agrarian economies, the demand for agricultural protection is generally 
weak primarily due to high cost of collective action by farmers relative to potential benefits 
from lobbying (Olson, 1965 and 1988; Anderson and Tyers, 1989). The large number of 
geographically dispersed farmers in these countries are faced with poor communication and 
transportation infrastructures and evident free-riding problems. Therefore, they find it hard 
to organize themselves for political lobbying. The per capita gains from lobbying for higher 
prices of their products are relatively less worthwhile for small farmers with little marketable 
'' Groups interested in agricuiturai poiicy include farmers, consumers, taxpayers, bureaucrats, foreigners, input suppliers and other 
agribusiness firms. There might also be numerous subgroups within these broad categories. For example, within the producer 
group, livestock producers and com producers may represent different interests. Moreover, interests of low-income farmers may 
be represented in both producer and consumer groups or some of them can be net consumers. However, to keep the exposition 
comprehensible, ail interests have been confined to either of the three groups. 
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surplus. Moreover, the absence of farm-support groups like fertilizer, pesticide and credit 
corporations and related lobbies also makes it formidable for farmers in developing countries 
to successfully lobby the political leadership. These factors tend to keep the demand curve 
for agricultural producer protection, Dp, relatively weak (Figure III.2). 
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Figure ni.2: The protection levels for agricultural producers and consumers 
in low income countries 
On the other hand, the relatively strong demand for agricultural consumer assistance 
policies in developing countries, £)„ emanates from their relatively small number and large 
Engel coefficient. The relatively easier organization in case of urban consumers and 
industrialists and their close proximity to the political leadership assists in obtaining political 
gains. The industrialists also favor cheap food policy in order to keep the wages of their 
workers at lower levels. Food price fluctuations tend to increase the expenditure risk of 
agricultural consumers and the profit risk of industrialists. The fluctuations in prices and 
quantities supplied of some essential food commodities may induce an element of uncertainty 
in the consumption patterns of poor consumers who are trying to meet a minimal target level 
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of consumption. These problems are even more accentuated for consumers who spend a 
large portion of their incomes on food. Under such circumstances, consumers may prefer 
government intervention in the agricultural sector to have price stabilization introduced. 
According to Tyers and Anderson (1992), people seem to "prefer prices of (especially 
necessary) products to be more rather than less stable over time" (p. 99). The consumers' 
concerns regarding food security and food prices seem to be overriding (Webb et al., 1990, p. 
85). This premise is explored in some depth in the theoretical model of consumers of food 
products developed in the next chapter. 
The relative size of consumer subsidies may also be contingent upon the risk aversion 
position of the country (Adelman and Berck, 1991). A highly risk averse country may opt to 
pursue policies of higher subsidization for consumers in order to ensure accessibility to 
adequate food supplies. This subsidization is often carried out by keeping the domestic food 
prices at levels lower than the international prices, which, in turn, also depresses the prices 
received by agricultural producers.' Therefore, the demand for consumer protection in 
developing countries generally lies to the right of that of the producers. 
On the supply side, the cost to other sectors of providing subsidy to the large 
agricultural sector becomes prohibitive due to their small size and high per capita tax burdens 
associated with even a small amount of agricultural subsidy. Such subsidies, which generally 
result in increased food prices, are, therefore, resisted by the urban consumers and 
industrialists. High and volatile food commodity prices may also result in political instability 
for the leadership. In addition, the high costs of tax collection from the consumer interest 
group in developing economies, in terms of leakages and corruption, make consumer taxation 
less worthy. Moreover, the relatively small size of the consumer group in these countries 
would bring forth lower absolute tax revenues. The lost support from the disadvantaged 
groups would, thus, make the cost of assisting a particular group inversely proportional to the 
size of that group (Anderson and Tyers, 1989). 
' It seems appropriate that if a country is risk-averse, then low producer prices to ensure cheap food to consumers would 
increase the risk of food shortfalls and not reduce it. This is the dilemma faced by developing countries which strive to 
ensure short-run food security to their consumers while such policies often run counter to the long-term food security. This 
apparent trade-off between the short- and long-term food security is discussed in detail in Section 11.3. 
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Therefore, in developing countries, there is generally a high political cost to the 
leadership in supplying protection to the agricultural producers. The assistance provided to 
the consumer group by keeping food prices low, would usually entail lower political cost. 
Most developing countries accomplish this objective of cheap-food through a host of 
government agencies which, in some cases, monopolize both buying and selling of staple 
food commodities. The Food Corporation of India, the National Food Authority of 
Philippines and the National Logistics Agency of Indonesia, are some examples of state 
controls aimed at maintaining stability in agricultural supplies and prices. In addition, some 
other social and fiscal characteristics also tend to favor the consumer interest groups. The 
bias in favor of industrialization as a tool of modernization in government policies may also 
put adverse pressure on the agricultural sector. Some nationalistic perceptions also work to 
reinforce the continuing exploitation of the agricultural sector in favor of the urbanized 
consumer group. 
Thus, the resultant supply curve for the producer political support, Sp, is generally to 
the left of that of the consumer interest group, S^, as shown in the figure. This reflects that 
the per unit cost of supplying protection to the consumer group relative to the producers is 
much lower. For example, supplying Xj units of protection to consumers costs Oc per unit, 
while per unit cost of the same level of protection to producers costs the political leadership 
Oa. On the demand side, the marginal benefits of obtaining one unit of protection is higher 
for consumers (Ob) as compared to producers (Od). Overall, the interaction of political 
supply and demand for agricultural producer and consumer protection in developing 
countries invariably results in taxation of the former (Ei) and subsidization of the latter (Ec). 
Thus, food price policies in these low-income countries generally favor consumers and 
discriminate against agricultural producers.® 
Table III.l substantiates the above political market explanation of agricultural 
protection by providing information on costs and benefits of seeking protection to the 
* However, the extent of discrimination against producers would depend upon their relative size and level of effective 
organization. In countries where producer groups are relatively more effective, the level of taxation will correspondingly 
be lower (Miller, 1981, p. 499). Such groups may also receive explicit input subsidies but the taxation in these countries is 
normally indirect and is not explicit to the producers. 
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producer and the consumer groups. The matrix depicts that per capita benefits to the 
successful group happen to be much higher than the cost to the disfavored group. In case of 
China, the per capita benefits to consumers (non-farm population) of protection equal 
$119.65 while the cost to each farmer (farm population) is $36.21 only. If the same benefits 
were distributed among the farm population, these would have provided a per capita benefit 
of $42.04 and, if the same costs were borne by the consumers, each consumer would have 
had to pay $103.05. Thus, eliminating the protection would harm consumers more than it 
would benefit the farmers. In short, these characteristics of poor agrarian economies increase 
the demand for and supply of protection to agricultural consumers. The reverse is true in 
case of industrialized countries, as discussed below. 
Table III.l: Cost-benefit matrix of agricultural protection 
(1990) 
Country Benefits Costs 
United 
States 
î^r Capita; $6,939.4 
million 
Consumers 
Per Capita: -$80.07 
Total: -$19,616 million 
Chitia^ 
Cuiisumers 
Per Capita: $119.65 
Total: $33,619 million 
i 
' The data for China correspond to the year 1987. 
Note: The total benefits and costs are calculated for each country by adding tlie gross PSEs (or CSEs) for the 
commodities for which data were available. The per capita benefits (costs) are derived by dividing the total benefits 
(costs) received by the group by total number of members in that group. 
Source: Figures are calculated using the PSE/CSE data fronOECD (1991), The Tables of Producer Subsidy 
Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; 1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; and Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. 
Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; Government Intervention in Agriculture, 
1982-87, USDA, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, 1990: Washington D C. The population figures and the 
proportion of people in each group are taken from the World Bank, World Bank Report, various issues. 
70 
ni.1.2 The Political Market in Industrialized Countries 
In industrialized countries, the per capita benefits to the agricultural producers of 
engaging in political lobbying are relatively higher due to their small numbers and high 
marketable surpluses. The costs of organization and collective action are relatively small 
because of improved communication infrastructure, better education and less free-rider 
problems (Olson, 1965). Relatively wealthier farmers in these countries find increased 
means and motivation to demand higher protection in the face of decreasing importance of 
agriculture in the national economy (Paarlberg, 1989).' The demand for agricultural producer 
protection may also rise as the farmers in industrialized countries see their incomes lag 
behind those of non-farm sectors (Sanderson and Mehra, 1990). Even in some industrialized 
countries with relatively large number of farmers, the problems of free-riders are minimal due 
to several factors, such as increased awareness and better communication. In addition, other 
agribusiness groups, such as fertilizer and pesticide lobbies, also have a vested interest in 
expanding agricultural output and, therefore, support output enhancing policies such as price 
subsidies. Moreover, the government bureaucracy also often provides political support to the 
farm lobbies. The high costs of moving off the farm, both economically and emotionally, 
also step up the demand for protection by the farmers. 
The demand for protection from the consumer interest group is, however, relatively 
weak in these countries due to factors such as high costs of collective action, geographically 
dispersion, increased free-riding problem and small Engel coefficients. These factors reduce 
per capita benefits of seeking protection. The resulting demand curve for producer support, 
Dp, therefore, lies to the right of the demand for consumer support, (Figure III.3). The 
society is reported to have an income elastic demand for assisting farmers. The resistance to 
increasing food prices by non-farming groups in industrialized countries dissipates as their 
incomes increase and the overall share of food in the household budget declines (Anderson 
and Tyers, 1989). In addition, the increase in per capita incomes also reduces the price 
' For Ihesc farmers, it migtit be worth it to spend most of their farming subsidies on political resource contribution towards 
increasing these subsidies in the following years. As The Economist (December 12,1992) exclaims, "The Swiss farmer who 
cams 80% of his income from subsidies would do well to spend 80% of his time farming the government." 
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Figure III.3: The protection levels for agricultural producers and consumers 
in industrialized countries 
elasticity of demand for food commodities (Sanderson and Mehra, 1990). 
The supply of political support in industrial countries tends to favor the producer 
group (OECD, 1985). The relatively lower share of agriculture in the national income also 
lowers the cost to the political leadership of supplying protection to the agricultural 
producers.'" Certain other factors, such as food security considerations, fondness of non-farm 
population towards preserving the farming lifestyles, and self-sufficiency in food 
commodities, work to abate the opposition to the supply of protection to this group. In 
addition, food shortages associated with wars and famines may also instill anxiety about food 
security. Agriculturist fundamentalist and food security considerations have been reported to 
still hold a powerful sway over attitudes about agriculture in many industrialized countries 
(Josling, Sanderson and Warley, 1990). 
Moreover, as Gardner (1990b) points out, there seems to be a perception that an 
economically sound agriculture becomes a kind of food insurance for risk-averse consumers 
who prefer stability in the supplies of food products. These concerns add to the support for 
Anderson and Tyers ( 1989) argue that any given price distortion policy results in deadweight weifare loss (as a percentage of the gross 
national product) that is roughly proportional to the share of that sector in the country's total gross domestic product (p. 183), 
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increasing agricultural production through subsidizing producers. The food security 
concerns, therefore, may become overriding compared to the concerns about food prices as 
the consumers' incomes rise (Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Sanderson and Mehra, 1990; 
Anderson and Tyers, 1989). More about food security and benefits of price stabilization to 
the consumers is discussed in the development of theoretical framework of consumers. 
The supply curve for the producer group, Sp, therefore, would generally be to the right 
of that of consumers, Sc as shown in the figure, reflecting lower marginal cost to the political 
leadership. The marginal cost of supplying protection to the large consumer group as 
opposed to the small farming group may be formidably higher. The political leadership 
would have less to lose politically by hurting the interests of the large and unorganized 
consumer group. In short, a number of features lower the political cost of assisting 
agricultural producers and raise the political demand for benefiting this group, thus resulting 
in subsidization of the producer group (Ep). On the consumer side, the weak demand, 
associated with high cost of political support, result in taxation of consumer groups (EJ in 
industrialized countries." 
These conclusions may also be supported from the data for the United States 
presented in Table III.l above. The table shows that in 1990, the per capita benefits to 
agricultural producers (per capita of the farm population) were $6,939.40 in the United States 
whereas the per capita cost to the disfavored group (consumers) was relatively small 
($80.07). These protection levels amount to even greater benefits when calculated on a per 
farmer basis rather than the per capita of farm population basis. For example, the subsidy 
equivalents per farmer during the same period in the United States amounted to $22,000 
(OECD, 1992). Similar estimates for other industrialized countries were also comparable. 
Japan and B.C. farmers, for example, got relatively lower but significant benefits ($16,000 
and $13,000, respectively). On the other hand, per hectare subsidy equivalents were 
significantly higher in Japan ($8,422) as compared to other nations (OECD, 1992). 
' ' In industrialized countries where consumer organizations are relatively vocal, consumer support may take forms other than 
price support. For example, the public funding for product quality inspections, medical research on dietary habits, and 
other publicly subsidized research costs may be more significant than programs encouraging lower staple prices. 
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III.1.3 A Comparative Analysis of Patterns of Agricultural Protection Across Countries 
Figure IIL4 explains the outcome of divergent protectionistic policies across countries 
on a single graph showing subsidies to farmers in industrialized countries and taxation of 
farmers in low-income developing countries. In terms of the figure, x, representing the units 
of protection, generally appears on the left side of the origin in low-income developing 
countries while it falls in the positive quadrant (subsidy) in the case of industrialized 
countries. The patterns of consumer protection policies, on the other hand, would represent 
the opposite of this outcome across developing and industrialized countries. Figure III.5 also 
corroborates this political market framework by providing factual evidence for 1991 on 
producer and consumer protection levels, as approximated by the producer and consumer 
subsidy equivalents, respectively. For example, producers in industrialized countries such as 
Australia, Canada, E.G. Japan, United States, etc. are subsidized while the low-income 
countries such as China, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Bangladesh, Argentina, etc. tax the farmers. 
On the consumer side, these low-income countries subsidize their agricultural consumers 
while they are taxed in high-income countries. Some middle-income countries, like S. Africa 
and Mexico, subsidize both the agricultural producers and consumers. The source of 
protection in such cases invariably comes from the taxation of the non-agricultural sector. 
Although the demand for protection has increased from the producer group, yet the relatively 
high proportion of food in private household consumption expenditures (for example, 35% in 
case of Mexico), limits the government's options to start taxing the agricultural consumers. 
Therefore, among the factors that influence the level of producer assistance across 
countries, the effect of the share of food in total household consumption expenditures, or the 
Engel coefficient, is of particular interest. Engel coefficients are one of the primary 
determinants of benefits to consumers of seeking food assistance or opposing agricultural 
producer protection (Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987; Honma and Hayami, 1986). These 
coefficients may not only affect the demand for protection from poor consumers in 
developing countries, these may also subdue the protests to increasing producer protection in 
industrialized countries. These patterns are analyzed in Figures III.6 and III.7, which show 
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Figure III.4: The divergent outcomes of agricultural producer 
protection policies in industrialized and developing countries 
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Figure III.5: Producer and consumer protection levels across industrialized 
and developing countries for wheat 
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Figure III.6: Decreasing food expenditure and its influence on the demand 
for consumer protection 
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Figure III.7: Decreasing consumer resistance to agricultural producer support 
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the relationship of Engel coefficients to the consumer and producer protection levels, 
respectively, across industrialized and developing countries. Figure III.6 shows that 
consumer protection tends to be higher where food expenditures amount to a greater 
percentage of the total. The consumers in low-income countries with low purchasing power 
are highly vulnerable to fluctuations in food supplies and prices. Thus, the political market 
outcome in developing countries favors consumers at the cost of producers, as shown in 
thenext figure. Engel coefficient is, thus, shown to be positively related to the consumer 
protection levels, giving rise to the S-shaped area in the figure. 
As the percentage expenditure on food declines, the importance of food prices 
diminishes for urban consumers in industrialized countries and the resistance against 
producer protection declines. The diagonal reverse S-shaped area in Figure III.7 shows that 
Engel coefficients are negatively related to the producer protection levels. The higher the 
Engel coefficient, the more the farmers are taxed and vice versa.An important corollary of 
this observation is that as the proportion of household budget spent on food declines further 
to a certain level, the effective taxation of the consumer groups may begin. 
Other important determinants of agricultural protectionistic policies may include the 
import-dependence or self-sufficiency in the commodity concerned. Countries like E.G. and 
Japan have raised their food-security and self-sufficiency in some food commodities and have 
decreased dependence upon imported food (Gardner, 1990b).'^ The E.G., a food importing 
country in the early 1960s has become a major food exporter. Japan's pleas for exception of 
staple foods from multilateral trade negotiations have been linked to the reasons of food 
security (Sanderson, 1990). Such policies in these countries have invariably been associated 
with heavy taxation of consumers. Goncerns about food security are more important in case 
of developing countries where food prices are kept low to ensure immediate food security. 
" The countries iilce Mexico and Argentina may be considered as tiie outliers in this figure although the policies in most middle-income 
countries tend to favor both producer and consumers simultaneously. 
" Food self-sufficiency is generally defined as the domestic production as a percentage of consumption. In most industrialized countries, 
food production has outstripped consumption, thereby increasing their food self-sufficiency and making them major exporters of these 
commodities. See for example, Sanderson and Mehra (1990), p. 355. 
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which has invariably depressed production and has made them net food importers. 
The relative size of the consumer and producer groups also has significant impact on 
the protection awarded to the group. Politically successful groups tend to be small relative to 
the size of the groups taxed to pay their subsidies, as discussed in the earlier section. Figure 
III. 8 plots the share of agriculture in labor force against the wheat producer protection levels 
in a cross-country framework. The countries where agriculture accounts for a relatively 
lower (higher) proportion of the total labor force, generally subsidize (tax) their farmers. 
Most of the countries with share of agriculture in labor force between the range of 
approximately 18-38 percent (the shaded area in the figure) in the given sample, are 
middle-income countries which have relatively recently started subsidizing their farmers. 
Noticeable contrasting patterns in agricultural protection and their magnitudes can 
also be observed when policy outlays are compared across industrialized and developing 
countries (Table III.2). An obvious dichotomy in policies may be observed through the 
market price support mechanism. Industrialized countries tend to keep their domestic 
producer market prices above the border price levels. Developing countries, on the other 
hand, tend to keep the domestic producer price below the border level, depressing domestic 
production incentives. 
Among the selected industrialized countries, the least distortionary policies are being 
followed in wheat market by the Australian government. While domestic producers are paid 
input and other assistance, the domestic producer prices are kept at the same level as the 
border prices. The levels of market price support ($7086.11 million) as well as the overall 
expenditure outlays ($8408.23 million) in case of wheat farmers are the highest in the 
European Community. Similarly in Japan, about 78 percent of the support to farmers comes 
through market price support measures. In these countries, where market price support 
policies are the main mechanism of support to domestic farmers, the majority of the burden 
of such policies is borne by the domestic consumers. For example, the incidence of producer 
support on the consumers in the European Community and Japan accounted for about 58.7 
percent and 78.4 percent, respectively, in 1991. By contrast, in countries where direct 
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Producer Protection Levels (%) Labor Force in Agriculture (%) ggg 
Note; Wheat producer protection levels ore approximated by PSE Wtieat. The Labor Force (Agriculture) data 
have been arranged in an ascending order to facilitate comparison. 
Sources; World Bank, World Development Report, various issues; and Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Pcnn (1990), 
Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; Government Intervention In Agriculture, 1982-87, USDA, 
ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, Washington, D.C, 
Figure IIL8: Farm group size and variation in protection levels: Wheat, 1982-1987 
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Table III.2: The magnitude of intervention in wheat markets: Cross-country 
comparisons of policy outlays 
($ Millions, 1990) 
Country Market Direct Input Other Total Policy NRP PSE 
Price Payments Assistance Assistance Outlays (%) (%) 
Support 
Industrialized Countries 
Australia 0 0 67.87 132.63 200.5 0 17 
(34) (66) (100) 
Canada 915.17 292.2 52.27 249.36 1509 41 43 
(61) (19) (3) (17) (100) 
E.C. 7086.11 218.2 1035 70 8408.23 65 46 
(84) (3) (12) (1) (100) 
Japan 842.54 82.87 55.25 96.69 1077.35 521 99 
(78) (8) (5) (9) (100) 
U.S.A. 1149 2403 270 350 4172 19 44 
(28) (58) (6) (8) (100) 
veloping Countries" 
Argentina -65.52 0 0 31.54 -33.98 -10 -7 
(68) (32) 
Bangladesh -29.7 0 3.72 -15.5 -41.48 -16 -27 
(60) (8) (32) 
China -1566.4 0 0 0 -1566.4 -11.5 •13 
(100) (100) 
India -2872.7 0 920.7 1906.6 -45.4 -40 -1 
(50) (16) (34) 
Nigeria 5.2 0 0.63 -2.62 3.21 I 98 48 
(62) (7) (31) 
Note: Figures in parentlieses represent percentage of totai. The percentage figures in case of developing countries indicate how much of the 
total does each policy account for, had all these policies been favorable to the producers. 
a Figures for developing countries pertain to the year 1986. 
Source: The PSE and AWvaiues have been extrapolated using the data on policy outlays from OECD (l99\)Tables of Producer Subsidy 
Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 7579-90, OCDE/GD (91)128; and Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Pern, Estimates of Producer 
and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, USDA, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April: 
Washington, D.C. 
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payments are the mainstay of agricultural policies, such as in the United States, the main 
burden falls on the taxpayers. The market price supports in the United States accounted for 
only about 28 percent of the total outlays, whereas the direct assistance policies accounted for 
about 58 percent of the same. 
The average transfers per head of population in the E.G. amounted to $409 while the 
same figure for the United States was $318 in 1991. Such transfers were highest among the 
Scandinavian countries such as Finland ($1173), Norway ($987) and Sweden ($416) as well 
as in Switzerland ($925). The producer support levels per farmer (PSEs) were about $22,000 
in both Canada and the United States while E.G. farmers received $13,000 per head in the 
same period. Although the transfers per farmer in Japan were $17,000, the per hectare 
transfers in case of Japan were the highest ($8,422). In the Japanese dairy sector as well, the 
transfers to dairy farmers amounted to $3,472.8 per cow, which were the highest among the 
industrialized countries. 
In case of developing countries, the market price support was generally negative. The 
domestic prices relative to the border prices were lowest in case of India resulting in highest 
taxation of farmers among the selected countries (Table III.2). None of the developing 
countries make any direct payments to farmers as is the case in industrialized countries. 
However, providing input assistance to farmers in developing countries is not unusual. 
The measurement concepts aimed at gauging the level of intervention by the wedge 
between the domestic and border prices only, such as the nominal rate of protection (NRP), 
would show no government intervention in case of policies such as those followed by 
Australia. Some other measures, such as the producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs), would 
account for the input and other assistance policies and show a more accurate positive level of 
intervention. The comparative efficiency of these and other measurement concepts is 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
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III.2 Comparative Analysis of Protection Measurement Concepts 
The government intervention in agriculture affects the market prices and producer 
incentives through a myriad of distortionary policies. The policy transfers to agricultural 
producers may be occasioned by means of price and non-price supports. While some policy 
instruments may affect these variables directly with relatively transparent effects that are 
easily calculable, some other policies designed to affect the agricultural sector as a whole or 
the entire economy may also have substantial influence on the market conditions for 
individual commodities. The product-specific effects of such indirect policies may not, at 
times, be easily discerned. One of the underlying elements of the policy analysis, therefore, 
is to determine the magnitude of the influence of such divergent policy instruments on the 
market incentives (Josling and Tangermann, 1989). 
The number of different policies as well as the ambiguity of the effects of certain 
policies require that the measurement concept used to gauge the actual level of intervention 
must be capable of identifying the product-specific and aggregate effects of a wide range of 
diverse policies. The recent focus in international trade policy forums, such as GATT, on 
using estimates of the extent of protection has espoused a variety of measurement concepts, 
each with its own specific coverage of given policies. The studies on the extent of 
government intervention and the trade distortion impacts of the market price support and 
other policies have emphasized the measurement of the gaps generated between the domestic 
and border prices. The various concepts developed to determine the market distortions are 
related to one another representing modifications, extensions or derivatives of the 
measurements of this gap (Cahill and Legg, 1990). 
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of these measures of estimation and 
their policy coverage. Various measures of protection have been defined in the next 
subsection along with a comparative analysis of the policy effects captured by these 
measures. The analysis is then used to determine the appropriateness of the measure 
employed in the empirical part of the study. 
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III.2.1 Alternative Measurement Concepts of Agricultural Protection 
Studies on agricultural protection have employed alternative measurement concepts 
which differ in their meanings and in terms of their uses and degree of complexity. One of 
the most common concepts to measure the extent of government intervention is to determine 
the price wedge, the difference between the domestic and the border prices, for a specific 
commodity, as used by Bela Balassa (1965). The most simple and widely used measurement 
of the price wedge is the nominal rate of protection (NRP) and the nominal protection 
coefficient (NPQ (for example, Tyers and Anderson, 1992; de Gorter and Tsur, 1991; 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdés, 1991; Miller, 1991; Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987; Anderson 
and Hayami, 1986; Honma and Hayami, 1986; and Bigman, 1985). However, where the 
effects of government policies are not directly translated into domestic prices, these measures 
would provide only a partial indication of the extent of government intervention. While 
some concepts are restricted to the measurement of the price wedge alone, some other 
aggregative measures have also included in their scope the effects of a wide range of other 
interventionary policies. Some other measures have, therefore, been developed over time that 
try to capture the distortionary effects of a number of policies. 
Table III.3 lists the mathematical formulas for 14 different measures of the levels of 
agricultural producer and consumer protection. The NPC is defined as the ratio of domestic 
to border prices, expressed in a common currency. The NRF estimates the price wedge, 
measured in the domestic currency, in percentage terms. These estimates indicate the 
responsiveness of domestic prices to government policies. The consumer counterpart of 
NRP, the nominal rate of protection for consumers (NRPQ, similarly measures the wedge 
between domestic consumer price and the border price of a given commodity. The novelty of 
these measures is the relative ease with which these estimates can be calculated provided that 
reliable statistics on domestic and border prices are available. However, these measures fail 
to take into account the effects of any policies that do not affect producer prices (Schwartz 
and Parker, 1988). 
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An extension of the NRP concept is provided by the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) 
which takes into account the aggregate returns to producers - the output produced times the 
domestic price plus other subsidies or taxes - and expresses it as a percentage of the world 
prices (Cahill and Legg, 1990). Subsidies like deficiency payments that are not captured by 
NFC or NRP are included in the NRA estimates. The higher the level of such payments, the 
greater would be the difference between the estimate provided by NRP and NRA. 
Nonetheless, the NRA and NRP measures do not capture the effects of distortions in the input 
markets. 
Since input pricing policies effectively distort the producer incentives, it is imperative 
to account for policies that affect both input and output markets. The effective rate of 
protection (ERP) provides a better measure of the level of protection since it considers the 
joint effects of input and output policies on the value added (Corden, 1971 and 1987; Josling 
and Tangermann, 1989). The ERP is calculated as the percentage difference in the unit value 
added at domestic and border prices, expressed in a common currency. Thus ERP would 
capture the effects of a subsidy on an intermediate input that might distort the supply and 
prices of the final commodity. In case of agricultural outputs that use the outputs of other 
sectors as an intermediary input, such as grain-fed livestock, the estimates of overall 
distortion provided by the ERP measure would be superior to those provided by the NRP or 
NRA. The ERP, therefore, may provide better indication of the resource misallocation among 
various sectors of an economy (Corden, 1971). 
A number of policies, such as investment subsidy for agriculture, that do not affect 
the value added are not incorporated in ERP calculations. Thus, ERP may not provide a 
complete picture of all policy-induced output distortions (Cahill and Legg, 1990). Moreover, 
information requirements for calculating ERP are quite stringent since ERP calculations 
involve estimating NRP for the final commodity, NPRCs for all intermediate inputs, and 
technical information on input-output coefficients, which are relatively difficult to obtain 
(Schwartz and Parker, 1988). 
Table III.3: Comparison of alternative agricultural protection measurement concepts 
Measurement Concept' Acronym Definition^ 
Nominal Protection Coefficient NPC Pd/P„ 
Nominal Rate of Protection NRP Q(P,-P,)/Q-P, 
Nominal Rate of Protection for 
Consumers 
NRPC •Qc(Pc-PJ/Qc-P, 
Nominal Rate of Assistance NRA Q{(Pa + (O)~PJ/Q-P. 
Effective Rate of Protection ERP (VAJ-VAJ/VA, 
Effective Rate of Assistance ERA f(yA,, + S)-VAN)/VA, 
Direct Nominal Protection Rate NPRO ((P,-C)-(P„-C')}/(P,-C') 
Indirect Nominal Protection Rate NPR, {(P\.^EJ/(PSA-E' ) ) - 1  
Total Nominal Protection Rate NPRR [((P.r C)/P,,J - {(P„-C')/P\,}(E'/EJ]/{(P,.C')/P'S,}(E'/EJ 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent PSE {Q(PJ-PJ + D + I-L}/{Q-PJ + D-L} 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent, Trade 
Distortion Variant 
PSERO {Q(Pp-PJ + D + I-D/iQ-P.+ D-L} 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents CSE •{Qc(P.-PJ+DJ/(Q,-PJ 
Trade Distortion by Support TDS Q'^,'S„-QC - E J -S„+ Q - E , 'SP-QC - E J -SC+ Q-e/S„-SSO 
Aggregate Measure of Support, GATT AMSQ  Qt (Pp.i • Pw,avg) 
1 The measurement concepts refer to the protection levels for a single agricultural commodity, However, these can easily be aggregated to 
reflect overall protection to the agricultural sector. Percentage values can be derived by multiplying the each measure by 100, except the TDS 
and AMS. 
2 The variables used are defined as: Pj. Domestic Producer Price; f»; World price (measured in domestic currency); 
Q\ Domestic production; m: Set of other subsidies/tax on output (including deficiency payments); C\ Adjustment for differences in quality, 
storage, transportation, handling costs and other margins; Adjustment for differences in quality, storage, transportation, handling costs and 
other margins measured under competitive condilions;?^^: Price index of non-agricultural sector; P'n^, Price index of non-agricultural 
sector in the absence of trade distortions; £„; Nominal official exchange rate; Equilibrium exchange rate in the absence of intervention; 
VAj. Value Added per unit of output at domestic prices; VA,: Value Added per unit of output at world prices (measured in domestic 
currency); S: Assistance on all outputs and inputs; D: Direct transfers to agricultural producers; I: Indirect transfers (budgetary-financed 
support) to agricultural producers; L\ Agricultural producer levies; Pp\ The "Policy", "Incentive" or "Shadow" price of the commodity that 
would keep the output the same as the current policies if all policies were removed; G,an(j,B Own-price supply and demand (negative) 
elasticities, respectively; S„\ Market support ratios^ and 5^; Direct income support rates for producers and consumers, respectively; Q 
Quantity consumed; SSO-. Set-aside offset resulting from direct payments to producers; Q;. Output produced in time period V, Pg,/, The 
"Policy" Price of the commodity in period /; Fixed reference price based on the years 1986-88, generally the average f.o.b. unit value 
for the commodity in a net exporting country and the average c.i.f unit value for the commodity in a net importing country in the base 
period, measured in domestic currency; The consumer price of the commodity; and D,; Budgetary-financed assistance to consumers. 
Sources'. Bray, C., T. Josling and J. Cherlow (1992), "Adjustments for Set-aside Acres in Agricultural Trade Agreements: An Example from 
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 40(1): 25-35; Cahill, C and W, Legg (1990), 
"Estimation of Agricultural Assistance Using Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Theory and Practice," OECD Economic Studies, 
13 (Winter 1989/90): 13-43; Krucger, A. O., M. Schiff, A. Valdés (1991), The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policies, Vol. I-V, 
John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD; Roningen, V. O. and P. M. Dixit (1991), Measuring Agricultural Trade Distortions: A 
Simple Approach, Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division, Economic Research Service, USDA, Staff Report AGES 9145, December 1991, 
Washington, D.C.; Schwartz, N. E. and S. Parker (1988), "Measuring Government Intervention in Agriculture for the GATT Negotiations" 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70 (5): 1137-1145; Josling, T. and S. Tangermann (1989), "Measuring Levels of Protection in 
Agriculture: A Survey of Approaches and Results," in Allen Maunder and Alberto Valdés (cds.) Agriculture and Governments In an 
Interdependent World, Aldershot; Gower Publishing Company. 
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The effective rate of assistance, ERA, like the NRA, extends the ERP concept to 
include all other assistance to output and inputs, represented by ô in Table III.3. The 
difference between the value added at border and domestic prices, then, is expressed as a 
percentage wedge, measuring the assistance to the production activity rather than to the 
product itself. The consideration of policy effects on the overall activity in the given 
commodity provides a clearer indication of the extent to which it would attract resources 
from other sectors. Since policies such as investment subsidy for agriculture do not affect the 
value added, these are not reflected in the calculations of ERP or ERA}'^ 
Some other variants of NRP, the nominal rates of protection due to direct and indirect 
policies (NPRo and NPRj) were recently proposed in a comprehensive manner in a World 
Bank investigation by Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1991). These measures recognize the 
essential differences between the policies that affect the agricultural prices (of both inputs 
and outputs) directly and those more general macroeconomic policies that affect producer 
returns indirectly but in a significant way (Krueger, 1989)." The NPR^ adjusts the domestic 
and border prices for differences in transportation and storage costs and other quality 
differentials while the NPR, also considers the effects of the economy-wide policies, such as 
exchange rate distortions and protection awarded to non-agricultural sector, on the 
agricultural producer incentives. The total nominal protection rate includes both direct and 
indirect components discussed above. The NPRj, thus, considers the agricultural protection 
in a general equilibrium framework. Since the general equilibrium effects may be rather 
significant in countries where agriculture constitutes a high proportion of labor force and the 
gross domestic product, NPR-p may be a useful measure. However, the exclusion of income 
support policies limit the usefulness of these measures, especially in case of industrialized 
countries. 
However, the ERP measure would include the deflcicncy payments if these distort the output price (see Table 111.3). 
Krueger also emphasizes that indirect interventions in agriculture seem to be much more important than the direct support policies. 
Discrimination against agricultural commodities in policies external to agricultural has a greater impact on agricultural incentives than do 
policies aimed directly at agriculture. This is mainlytrue in case of developing economies of the Third World. 
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An alternative producer protection measurement concept, the producer subsidy 
equivalents (PSEs), was first used in Australia in the mid-1960s. The PSEs, and their 
consumer counterpart, the consumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs), were later formally 
advanced by Tim Josling of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations, in the early 1970s (FAO, 1973 and 1975). The PSE concept has been further 
refined, extended and used in various forms and several versions of these measures exist. For 
example, the FAO, the OECD, the USDA and IIASA (International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis) have developed their own estimates of PSEs and CSEs of selected 
countries (Gardner, 1991). The OECD uses these measures to monitor the level of 
government intervention in member countries while the USDA calculates the PSE and CSE 
estimates for a number of industrialized and developing countries. The usefulness of PSE 
and CSE estimates is manifest in their ability to summarize the effects of a multiple policy 
interactions into a single monetary estimate that can be readily used for comparison of 
protection levels across commodities and countries (Bray et al., 1992). The flexibility of 
these measures to include or exclude any number of policies affords them a further added 
usefulness in that these can be tailored to meet the different objectives of any specific 
investigation. 
A PSE is defined as the level of subsidy that would be necessary to compensate the 
agricultural producers if all farm policies were removed. Similarly, a CSE is defined as the 
amount of compensation to be given to the consumers to keep their incomes unchanged after 
removing all agricultural programs. Unlike the measures discussed earlier, the PSE and CSE 
concepts focus on income transfers to producers and consumers from the government 
programs. The estimation of PSEs includes the effects of a number of diverse agricultural 
policies that directly and indirectly affect the producer incentives. As is evident from Table 
III.4, the policy coverage under PSEs extends to direct payments to farmers, input market 
distortions, marketing assistance and economy-wide policies. The government outlays to 
assist agricultural production in the long-run, such as expenditures on research and extension. 
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Table III.4: Policy effects captured by alternative protection measurement concepts 
Policy measure' Producer 
NPC NRP NRA NPRO NPR, NPRT ERP PSE 
Consumer 
NRPC CSE 
Market Price Support 
Border Measures 
Domestic Price Support 
Market Board & State Trading 
Other Output Price Policies 
Direct Payments 
Deficiency Payments 
Disaster Payments 
Crop Insurance 
Producer Levies 
Income Stabilization Funds 
Input Assistance Poiicies 
Primary Input Policies 
Intermediate Input Policies 
Marketing Assistance 
Advisory and Inspection 
Transportation 
Infrastructure Assistance 
Research and Extension 
Land Improvement 
Irrigation 
Economy-wide Policies 
State and National Policies 
Taxation and Other Policies 
Consumer Assistance Policies 
Consumer Price Policies 
Consumer Food Donations 
Other Consumer Subsidies 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
3 
4 
X X 
X X 
X X 
X X 
1 Border Measures also include the efTccts of tariffs, quotas, variable levies, export subsidies. Other output policies may include price 
premium, two-tiered pricing systems and price stabilization schemes. Primary inputs may include purchased inputs such as fuel, fertilizer, 
chemicals and disease control measures. Examples of an intermediate input subsidies would include feed subsidies on meat production. The 
estimates of CSEs as calculated by OECD (1991) have explicitly assumed the equivalence of producer and consumer prices and have used 
the farmgate or producer prices in their calculations of CSEs, However, since it is observed that, at times, the producer and consumer prices 
may differ significantly, it is more appropriate to recognize the differences in the two and use the observed consumer prices in the estimation 
of CSEs. Other consumer subsidies include both direct and indirect transfers to consumers. It may be noted that USDA, ERS calculations of 
CSEs (1990) do not make any distinctions between these direct and indirect transfers. 
2 The ERP calculations include the deficiency payments in case where such payments directly affect the input prices or the production of 
output. 
3 State and national policies include programs administered by state, provincial or national governments which tax or subsidize agricultural 
producers, such as state programs in the U.S., provincial programs in Canada and national programs in the E C. The USDA (1990) 
calculations of PSEs include the effects of these policies in case of the U.S. and Canada only. 
4 Other economy-wide policies such as taxation and exchange rate policies have an important but indirect impact on agricultural returns. 
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land improvement, conservation programs, development of irrigation facilities, etc., are also a 
part of the PSE calculations. The USDA estimates of PSEs also incorporate the indirect 
effects of exchange rate distortions, so prevalent in developing countries. The PSEs account 
for non-border policy measures which are not included in the NRP and ERP calculations. 
Thus, the policy coverage of NRA is wider than that of NPC and NRP, but shorter than ERP 
and ERA (not shown in Table III.4) which, in turn, include the effects of a lesser number of 
policies than covered by the PSEs. In short, the calculations of NRP and ERP measures 
require similar amounts of information as do PSEs whereas the estimates provided by NRP 
and ERP measures are neither as complete nor as flexible as those provided by the PSEs 
(Tangermann et al., 1987).'® 
Among the measures discussed above, NPC, NRP, NRA, NPRC, NPR^, NPRj^ ERP 
and ERA, aptly capture the effects of border measures (such as tariffs, quotas, variables levies 
and export subsidies), domestic price support policies and distortions created by the national 
marketing board activities and state trading operations as well as the effects of other policies 
that distort domestic producer and consumer prices (Table III.4). The NRA includes the 
effects of more policies (such as deficiency payments and producer levies) than the NRP and 
NPC measures. But the NRA falls short of the NPR^ concept in terms of policy coverage 
which also includes effects of economy-wide policies. However, these measures would 
underestimate the overall protection levels where policies such as direct payments, input 
assistance (besides ERP and ERA), marketing and infrastructure assistance, which do not 
affect the domestic prices directly, are an integral part of the national protectionistic policies. 
Figure III.9 provides policy-wise producer protection expenditures captured by 
Source; OECD (1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; 1979-90, OCDE/OD (91)128, 
Paris; Webb et al. (1990), Estimâtes of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government Intervention in Agriculture, 
1982-87, USDA, ERS Statistical Bulletin No. 803: Washington, D.C.; USDA, ERS (1988), Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: 
Analysis of Government Support, Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division, StafTReport AOES880802, December; Washington, D.C.; 
Schwartz, N. E. and S. Parker (1988), "Measuring Government Intervention in Agriculture for the GATT Negotiations^meWcow 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70 (5); 1137-1145; Cahill, C. and W. Legg (1990), "Estimation of Agricultural Assistance Using 
Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Theory and Practice," OECD Economic Studies, Winter 1989/90: 13-43. 
However, although the A^ÎPmeasurcs partially make up for the shortcoming byvirtue of the ease of their calculations, the ERP 
measure is neither complete nor easy to calculate. The ERP calculations are quite stringent since they involve estimating NRP 
for the final commodity,AWC for all intermediate inputs, and technical information on input-output coefllcients, which are 
notoriously difficult to obtain on a representative basis (Schwartz and Parker, 1988). 
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$ Millions 
Policy Measures ' 
•Others 
tBiSub-National 
Eîpençral Semccs 
•Direct Payments 
Qlnput Subsidies 
•Market Price Support 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
a The Market Price Support policies define the wedge between the domestic producer price and the world reference 
price. These policies may include trade distorting measures such as tariffs and quotas and other domestic price 
supports. Direct Payments include deficiency payments, disaster payments, diversion payments, etc. General Services 
include services such as transportation subsidies, and other services provided to the domestic wheat producers. Other 
policy measures may include assistance to long-term production, such as conservation programs, research and 
extension and structural programs. 
Source; The estimates of disbursement under various policies are obtained from OECD (I991^a6/es of Producer 
Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: /P7P-9,COCDE/GE(91)128, Paris. 
Figure III.9: Policy-wise producer protection expenditures captured by alternative 
measures of support for United States: All commodities, 1979-90 
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alternative measures of support for the United States for the agricultural sector for the period 
1979-90. The figure also illustrates an appealing visual comparison of the extent of the 
policy coverage in case of NRP, ERP and PSE. While all three measures account for the 
market price support component of the overall policy intervention, the NRP excludes the 
input subsidies, direct payments, general services, sub-national policy programs, besides 
other miscellaneous policies. The ERP, on the other hand, includes input subsidies but fails 
to account for the effects of the rest of the policies.'^ The PSE concept, therefore, is more 
comprehensive in its policy coverage as compared to the alternative measures of protection. 
The estimates provided by consumer subsidy equivalents are superior to those provided by 
the NPRC measure since CSE calculations also incorporate direct and indirect consumer 
assistance policies.'® However, the protection measures discussed thus far ignore the effects 
of supply-control policies. The above variant of PSEs concentrates only on the producer 
income transfers to gauge the extent of government intervention and ignores the trade 
distortionary output effects of the policies. 
The relatively recent contributions in the measurement of producer protection levels 
have been the introduction of aggregate measures of support being considered in the GATT 
(AMS^ to account for the trade distortionary effects of agricultural policies." The ongoing 
GATT negotiations have favored another variant of PSE, the AMSQ concept, in order to 
define a base level of protection for each country on which to define the future protection 
reduction targets. TheAMS^ expresses the price wedge as the difference between the 
domestic "policy" price of a commodity for 1986 and the average world reference price of 
that commodity for the years 1986-88. The AMSQ concept mainly focuses on the 
supply-control policies by evaluating the level of distortion by maintaining the current output 
levels in the absence of current farm support programs. 
" ERP calculations, at times, may include direct payments such as deficiency payments that translate directly Into output price effects. 
" The USDA, ERS calculations, however, mal(e no distinction between the direct and indirect assistance to the consumers, as is 
evident from Table III.3. 
" Since trade distortionary implications of agricultural policies are not indicated by the PSÇs Ronlngen and Dixit (1991) 
have proposed the "trade distorted by support" measure (TDS ) to "measure the change In the volume of net trade from 
existing levels If a country completely eliminates all support to the commodity." 
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The next subsection further elaborates trade distortionary effects of domestic policies. 
It provides a comparative analysis of two variants of PSEs, one that accounts for the income 
transfers to domestic producers, thus gauging the extent of government intervention, and the 
other that measures the trade distortionary effects of agricultural policies. The section also 
highlights the choice of PSE as the dependent variables for the empirical part of this study. 
III.2.2 Choice of a measurement concept 
The discussion in the previous section highlights the distinction in the meaning and 
policy coverage of various measurement concepts used in the studies aimed at determining 
the extent of government intervention or the trade distortionary impacts of intervention. The 
analysis suggests that the producer subsidy equivalents, with the widest coverage of 
agricultural policies, are the most comprehensive and flexible means of gauging the effects of 
government intervention in agricultural markets. The present study, therefore, uses PSEs as 
an approximation of producer protection levels across selected countries. 
PSEs have been quoted as having the attraction of pragmatism (MacLaren, 1991) 
while Cahill and Legg (1990) singled out PSEs on the basis of their practicality over a 
number of other measurements. The flexibility of the PSE approach is manifest in its ability 
to include or exclude any 'desirable' policies, in its potential to handle supply-control policies 
(through a modified version), and in its additivity property that allows aggregation across 
commodities to arrive upon a comprehensive protection index for the overall agricultural 
sector (Tangermarm et al., 1987). The data needs for calculating PSEs are also manageable 
(Josling and Tangermann, 1989). The PSEs have been widely used by organizations such as 
OECD and USD A and this approach has also found favor with GATT's Uruguay Round 
negotiations since it summarizes the effects of a number of agricultural policies into a single 
monetary or percentage unit that can be readily used to make comparisons across 
commodities and countries (Bray et al., 1992).^° 
The PSEs may be expressed cither as a percentage of the value to producers, in monetary units per ton, or in total monetary value of 
transfers. 
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Gardner (1990a) cites various problems in using NPCs and NRPs as a measurement of 
protection levels. First, since the overvaluation of currencies is common in developing 
countries, the conversion of domestic and world prices into a common currency tends to 
underestimate the actual level of taxation. Second, since input subsidies are also common in 
some developing countries, the actual level of taxation would be lower than the NPC and 
NRP estimates. Third, in case of a large country, the internal prices of a commodity may 
also influence the world prices.^' Finally, the measurements regarding the world price are not 
based upon the price that would have existed in the international market in the absence of 
farm policies. However, all of the alternative measures are equally vulnerable to the choice 
of world price (Tangermann et ah 1987). 
The main assumptions underlying the calculations of FSE and CSE concepts include: 
partial-equilibrium framework; homogeneous goods with no substitution possible in 
production or consumption; prices of non-traded goods and other sectors held constant; 
domestic and foreign goods considered to be perfect substitutes; and a small country case. 
These concepts do not account for social costs and benefits. Nevertheless, as MacLaren 
(1991) points out, "one of the practical reasons why the methodology [of FSE and CS£] has 
been used in the Uruguay Round is that it is a partial-equilibrium approach that can be used 
on a commodity-by-commodity and country-by-country basis on price, quantity and trade 
data which are readily available." He further contends that "while these assumptions are not 
satisfactory from a theoretical point of view, they do allow consistently calculated values of 
transfers to be placed before negotiators." 
Regarding the partial equilibrium framework employed in the FSE concept, it is noted 
in Josling and Tangermann (1989) that "general-equilibrium-adjusted rate of protection in 
agriculture is probably only marginally different from the rate of protection measured in the 
traditional partial approach" (p. 345). They further opine that the rate of protection based on 
general equilibrium framework tends to be less than that estimated using the partial 
Some adjustments in this case are suggested by Josling and Tangermann (1989) that would mostly benefit in the framework 
of studies of trade models dealing with the effects of liberalization rather than the studies on the extent and reasons of 
government intervention. 
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equilibrium approach. One other assumption in the calculation of PSE is the notion that a 
dollar in government expenditures results in a dollar increase in producers' income. 
In short, the benefits of using subsidy equivalents for measurement of protection 
levels include being simple and flexible; a wider policy coverage; and enabling cross-country 
and cross-commodity comparisons on individual and aggregate basis - the additivity property 
(Ballenger, 1988). Overall, the extent of distortions captured by PSEs and CSEs can be up to 
30 percent more than captured by other alternative measures (Schwartz and Parker, p. 1143). 
However, all of the measures of protection discussed above suffer from two problems; 
ignoring general equilibrium effects; and being based on small country assumption. 
The basic definition of PSEs, with its emphasis on income transfers to agricultural 
producers, is more suitable for gauging the extent of government intervention. This measure 
aptly suits the purpose of an investigation where the focus is on analyzing the income 
redistribution effects and determinants of government intervention in agriculture across 
countries. However, where the focus is on measuring trade distortions and effects of 
liberalization by looking into how much the output of a sector is influenced by a policy, this 
measure seems to be less satisfactory (Hathaway, 1987). For example, a country can switch 
to a policy that further distorts producer incentives without changing the actual transfers to 
producers. As originally proposed, the PSE approach was designed to capture income 
transfer effects and not the distortions to production caused by domestic farm policies. This 
inability has resulted in the development of a variant of the PSE, the 'trade distortion 
producer subsidy equivalent (PSEn^, that focuses primarily on the output distorting effects of 
policies. The advocates of PSEs in multilateral trade negotiations have favored using the 
PSEju which would capture the effects of a policy switch that distorts output. The original 
version of the PSE in this case would stay the same since income transfers remain 
unchanged. These two variants of PSEs, as well as NRP measure, are compared below under 
a small country case (i) where the producer incentives are influenced through indirect 
government outlays, and (ii) where producer incentives are influenced without involving 
budgetary expenditures. 
Consider the case of a closed small country where supply of the commodity in 
question is represented by the curve S and the domestic demand by D, as shown in 
Figure III. 10, panel A. Suppose that the domestic price is maintained at P^, to support the 
domestic farmers, which is above the world price . The output produced is OQ,. If the 
government supports the agricultural sector by subsidizing research and extension activities, 
this would shift the supply curve in the long run to 5"', with the new output level OQ;. The 
gross total value of the NRP measure, in this case, is OPjbQ; - OPyjaQj = PJPjba. The 
similar estimate of PSE is OP^bQ; - OP^Q; plus the indirect government expenditures on 
research and extension, given by the area PJPpCb. In order to compare these estimates with 
the absolute trade distortion effects captured by the PSEjn, the policy incentive price needs to 
be identified that would elicit the same amount of output (OQ2) in the absence of the indirect 
subsidy. The incentive price that would support OQ2 level of output at the old supply curve 
would be Pp. The trade distortionary effects captured by this measure extend the price wedge 
to OPpCQi- 0P^Q2 = PJPpCa. 
In this case, it is apparent that the NRP and PSE capture the same extent of the market 
price support but the PSE also incorporates the government outlay on research and extension 
in its calculations. Therefore, the distortionary effects captured by the PSE are higher than 
those captured by the NRP measure. The overall estimates of the distortion provided by the 
trade-distortion and the government-intervention variants of PSE are similar in this case 
although the market price support measured by the PSEi^ is relatively higher than the PSE by 
the area PjPpCb, which is also the amount of government expenditures. 
However, in the case where the policies that influence output but do not involve 
government expenditures, the similarity of the estimates provided by the two PSE measures 
would cease to exist. In other words, the policies that result in a shift of the supply curve but 
do not enter the regular calculations of PSE, the estimates of the distortion provided by the 
two PSE measures would no longer be identical. For example. Bray et al. (1992) show that 
in case of supply restraint programs like the flex acres in case of the U.S., the resulting 
estimates of the trade distortion and government intervention PSEs would be different." 
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Consider initially that the world price, P„, is allowed to prevail in the domestic market 
and the total output produced is OQi. Further, consider a case where the government policies 
result in a disincentive for producers that shifts the supply curve back from S to 5'' (Figure 
III. 10, panel B). The shift due to the disincentive policy reduces the domestic output to OQ2 
at the world price. In this case, the policy incentive price that would restrict the output to 
OQ2 without the policy, will be Pp. Here, the NRP and PSE measures would show zero 
distortions since the price wedge is nonexistent and there are no government outlays. The 
PSErof however, would capture the negative trade distortionary effects of this policy on the 
producers and would be equal to the area OPpCQi • OPJjQj = - PpPJbc. 
Price Price 
Quantity 
(B) 
Quantity 
(A) 
Figure III.IO: Comparative analysis of policy effects captured by PSE and PSE^g 
In contrast, now consider the case where the government maintains the domestic price 
at higher than the world price level at Pj, resulting in the domestic output OQ3 along the 
supply curve S (Figure III. 10, panel B). The shift in the supply curve to S' due to the policy 
discussed above would, in this case, decrease the domestic output to OQ,. Here, the effects 
" In order to qualify for assistance under the U.S. government's set-aside program (which is aimed at restricting production acreage 
under the grain support program), a certain percentage of a producer's base acreage must be left fallow. The normal flex acreage 
is about IS percent of the base, with an additional 10 percent under optional flex acres. Producers do not receive deficiency 
payments on these flex acres althoughalternative crops may be planted on this land. For a detailed discussion, see Note 3 in 
Bray e/a/. 
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of this policy would provide different estimates of the three measures of support. The 
numerator of NRP as well as PSE estimates would be PJ*^a which represents the market 
price support or the wedge between the domestic and the border price. The policy incentive 
price that would maintain the output at OQi without the policy, would be the same as the 
world price P„. The trade distortion measuring definition of PSE - the PSEro - would in this 
case be zero. The effects of a decoupled payment, a payment that is unrelated to the output, 
would also be similar. 
These examples appropriately illustrate the differences in the policy coverage 
between NRP and the two variants of producer subsidy equivalents. The PSE focuses on the 
income transfers to the producers while the PSEro captures how the output of the commodity 
is influenced by the distortionary policy, highlighting the trade distortionary effects of the 
policies. Therefore, the above discussion suggests that for studies aimed at measuring the 
extent of government involvement in a given sector and its effect on the producers' income, 
the appropriate measure would be the PSE. On the other hand, in the case where the interest 
is to analyze the effects of policies on the trade distortions in the commodity markets, as is 
the case in the current GATT negotiations, the PSEjo would provide more consistent 
estimates. 
In international trade forums, the main focus is on how the government policies 
distort the incentives for domestic production and on the adverse effects of the distorted 
supply on the trading partners of a country. In such negotiations, the extent of government 
outlays and the transfers to the domestic producers seem to be much less of a concern. In 
case where negotiations are based upon the estimations of the distortion provided by the 
producer subsidy equivalent measures, the trade distortionary version of this measure would 
provide more meaningful information. The use of PSEjo has recently received considerable 
support in trade negotiations (Bray, et al. 1992; Meilke and Warley, 1989; Rossmiller and 
Elliott, 1989; Tangermann, 1989; Tangermann, a/., 1987). The measures proposed earlier 
by the Canadian government (trade distortion equivalent, TDE) and the E.G. (the support 
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measurement unit, SMU) also represent the constant output version of the producer subsidy 
equivalents (FAPRI, 1992; Colman, 1991; lATRC, 1990). 
The emphasis of aggregate measure of support (AMS) is on finding a commonly 
agreeable definition of the measurement concept and, later, on gradual reduction in the 
support levels as measured by this concept. The AMS is calculated on a product-specific 
basis for each product that receives the market price support and other specified assistance 
while the non-product-specific support is combined into a single composite monetary 
estimate. The AMS calculates the market price incentives by using the wedge between the 
hypothetical policy price (or the applied administered price) for the commodity for 1986 and 
the average of the fixed external reference price for the years 1986-88. The wedge is 
multiplied by the quantity of output eligible to receive the policy price in that period to obtain 
the resulting base for future negotiations on trade liberalization and reductions in government 
support. Since the focus here is on trade distortion and not on domestic expenditures on farm 
programs, unlike PSE, the budgetary outlays made to maintain this gap, such as buying or 
storage costs, are not considered in the AMS calculations. 
As the focus of this study is to theoretically and empirically identify and analyze the 
determinants of government intervention across industrialized and developing countries, the 
obvious choice of a measure rests with the original concept of PSEs which measures income 
transfers. 
The empirical analysis in the present study uses the estimates of producer subsidy 
equivalents as developed by USDA (1990) and OECD (1991). Although there are some 
differences between the estimates calculated by these two organizations, they are broadly 
comparable (Blandford, 1990). The following discussion highlights the compatibility of 
using these two data sets in the empirical analysis in this study since both account for similar 
policies and provide similar estimates of the extent of government intervention. 
Table 111,5 highlights the policies covered under the two data sets. Generally, the 
USDA and OECD calculations of support to domestic producers can be summarized into six 
similar broad categories; market price support, direct income enhancing policies, programs 
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Table III.5: Policies covered under PSE calculations by OECD and USDA 
Policies USDA OECD 
Market Price Support 
Direct Income Support 
Research and Extension 
Producer Levies 
Primary Input Policies 
Intermediary Input Policies 
Infrastructure Support 
Exchange Rate Controls' 
Marketing Assistance^ 
Sub-National Policies' 
Administrative Costs 
Social Security Benefits 
Subsidies to Agribusiness Sector 
General Income Tax Policies 
Voluntary Export Restraints'* 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
1 The effects of exchange rate distortions are captured primarily in the estimates of PSEs in case of developing countries only 
where substantial differences exist between the officiai and unofficial exchange rates. Moreover, the relatively large size of the 
agrarian sector in these countries implies that exchange rate distortions would translate into greater impacts on the overall 
agricultural sector than would be the case in industrialized countries. 
2 The OECD calculations aggregate all other support that does not directly related to producer income but constitutes budgetary 
expenditures into a composite "general services" category. 
3 The sub-national policies in case of USDA calculations include such policies for only two countries, namely, the United States 
and Canada. 
4 Voluntary export restraints agreements can be interpreted as implicitly included in their eOects on border measures. 
Sources: Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; Government 
Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, USDA, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April; Washington D C.; OECD (1991), Tables of 
Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; 1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; USDA, ERS (1987), 
Government Intervention In Agriculture; Measurement, Evaluation, and Implications for Trade Negotiations, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 229, April; Washington, D C.; Josling, T. and S. Tangermann, (1989), Measuring Levels of 
Protection in Agriculture; A Survey of Approaches and Results," in A. Maunder and A. Valdés (eds.), Agriculture and 
Governments in an Interdependent World; Proceedings of the AT* International Conference of Agricultural Economists, August, 
Dartmouth; Broolifield, VT. 
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assisting variable costs of production, marketing assistance services, programs affecting 
long-term agricultural production and controlled exchange rate distortions (also, see Table 
III.4). Market price support policies include border measures and price stabilization schemes 
designed to raise (or lower, in case of some developing countries) domestic producer prices. 
Since the higher prices are untenable to be sustained in an open economy, the border 
measures also follow restriction on competition in domestic markets by applying trade 
restrictions. The direct payments to producers, or producer levies which have negative 
effects on production, are also included in the PSE calculations, as mentioned earlier. Input 
and marketing assistance policies, such as transportation subsidies, also lower producer costs 
although their effect on producer revenues are ambiguous. These policies are included as 
indirect protection policies in both USDA and OECD calculations. 
Long-term production assistance policies included in the calculations cause fewer 
trade distortions in the short-run than do market price support policies. However, certain 
long-term and other policies may fall under different categories in these data sets due to their 
effect on current output. For example, the electricity subsidy to Indian farmers is counted in 
the USDA calculations as an input subsidy rather than under the infrastructure support, as 
mentioned in the government outlays. 
The USDA calculations, in addition to the OECD classification, also include the 
effects of exchange rate distortions in case of developing countries but accounts for the 
effects of sub-national policies in case of United States and Canada only. None of these 
calculations include the cross-commodity effects of protection awarded to an agricultural 
commodity. Nor are the effects on producer incentives of subsidies to the agribusiness sector 
(the food processing industries, for example) included in these estimates. The administrative 
costs as well as the social security benefits and general economy-wide taxation policies are 
also excluded. The reduction in incomes due to policies that control supplies such as 
uncompensated acreage reduction programs in the United States (as discussed in the case 
illustrated earlier) and the dairy production quotas in B.C. and Canada, are also not included 
in these estimates. The overall product-specific as well as aggregate estimates of producer 
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and consumer protection levels provided by these organizations are similar to a great extent 
as is shown in Figure III.l 1. Therefore, the estimates from these sources can be merged to 
enhance the coverage of countries and commodities in the present study. The USDA data are 
shown only for the period 1982-87. 
There have been relatively few quantitative studies on the determination of 
government intervention in agriculture in a product-specific framework." Majority of these 
studies have adopted an aggregative approach to analyzing agricultural protection. Since 
most protectionistic policies are based upon individual commodities and vary significantly 
across commodities, aggregating the effects of policies designed to influence different 
commodities individually would obscure the significance of the results. For example, the 
Indian government provides subsidies to oilseeds while it taxes the cereal producers. Table 
III.6 shows the commodity-wise protection awarded as well as the effect of aggregating the 
protection level for all these commodities. The table shows that while individual 
commodities may be rather heavily taxed or subsidized, the aggregate agricultural protection 
levels, as are used in most earlier studies, reflect only mild interventions in such cases. For 
example, the aggregate PSEs for 1984 show zero level of government support while there 
was substantial taxation (com, cotton-long, sorghum, soybean and wheat) or subsidization 
(cotton-medium, peanuts, rapeseed and rice) of individual commodities in that year. 
Therefore, the aggregate estimates may lead one to believe falsely that the government 
intervention is rather less pervasive in some cases while the opposite might be the case. The 
aggregation across commodities, thus, obscures these differences (Herrmann, 1989). This 
certainly poses a problem in cases where governments subsidize certain commodities, while, 
at the same time, tax others. Such policies are widespread in developing economies for 
reasons such as food security for poor consumers or national concerns, among others. 
Results of studies that include developing countries in their analysis of cross-country 
agricultural protection using the aggregate protection levels may be adversely influenced by 
this problem. Therefore, the present analysis would adopt a product-specific approach to the 
" See Table II, 1. 
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PSE (%) 
I I USDA 
•B OECD 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Source; The PSfi wheat figures are from OECD (1991), The Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subslcfy 
Equivalents: 1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; and Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, USDA, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, 
April: Washington D C. 
Figure III.ll: Comparison of wlieat PSEs of United States as estimated 
by OECD and USDA 
Table III.6: Standard deviations of product-specific and aggregateiWEy for India 
(in percent) 
Commodity 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Std. Deviatior/ 
Com -12 -7 -38 -56 -10 4 59.08 
Cotton, Long -2 -23 -19 -5 23 -36 53,7 
Cotton, Medium 22 -15 2 2 23 -11 50.31 
Peanuts 6 28 25 18 -3 -29 59.29 
Rapeseed 28 32 23 1 24 57 80.65 
Rice -20 2 5 -8 10 4 12.29 
Sorghum -39 -31 -32 -40 -23 -10 50.3 
Soybeans -14 -12 -45 -36 -25 11 61.54 
Wheat -6 3 -7 -19 -1 7 12.25 
All Commodities -11 2 0 -12 5 2 0 
1 The standard deviation of PSEs of various commodities represent deviations across the years in individual PSEs from the weighted 
average in that year. 
Source; PSE figures are talsen from Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Penn ( 1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents; 
Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, USDA, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, 1990; Washington D C. 
» 
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study of the extent of government intervention in the agricultural sector. A graphical 
comparison of the ability of selected measures to capture the market distortions is presented 
below under different policy scenarios in a trade theoretic framework. 
III.3 Comparative Graphical Analysis of Measurement Concepts 
This subsection provides a comparative analysis of selected measurement concepts 
within a theoretical framework. The analysis compares the Marshallian producer surplus 
measure with NRP and PSE estimates for small and large country cases under a variety of 
policy scenarios. The commodity in question is assumed to be staple food commodity 
(normal good). 
III.3.1 Measuring Market Distortions in Case of a Small Country 
Consider a small country with supply and demand of a staple agricultural commodity 
shown by S and D, respectively (Figure III. 12). The assumption here is that the country's 
share of the world market for that commodity is too small to influence the world market 
prices. In addition, this particular commodity constitutes an insignificant part of the domestic 
economy to have any effects on the foreign exchange rate. In the absence of any 
distortionary policy, the world price, , prevails in the domestic market. At this price, 
domestic production is OQi and domestic consumption is OCj and the QjCj quantity is 
imported. Here the gross returns to the producers are OQ/bP,^, which, after taking into 
account the variable production costs, result in the producer surplus equivalent to the area 
aP,,b. 
Now suppose that the government decides to increase the producers' income by 
providing them a direct subsidy per unit of production such that the market price still stays at 
Farmers are promised the difference Pp - P„ as deficiency payments per unit. The 
domestic production increases to OQ2 and, since consumption remains at the same level, 
imports drop to g^C,. Farmers' gross income now is OPpdQi and the producer surplus is 
" Assuming tliat tliis policy does not shift the supply curve but rather results in increase in the quantity supplied, 
» 
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C j C ,  
Figure III.12: Measuring distortions in a small country case 
aPpd. This involves the cost to the government equal to the area PJ*,4j which clearly is 
higher than the gains to the domestic producers by the area bdj. 
In order to determine the extent of market distortions captured by the NRP and PSE 
measures of protection, the estimates provided by these measures can be compared with the 
change in producer surplus. To facilitate such comparisons, the change in producer surplus 
may be converted into the percentage change (%APS) at (i) border value, using the base of 
the nominal protection rate; and (ii) market value, using the base of producer subsidy 
equivalent. 
Arnn QPd-QPw OPwJQl - OPwJQl ^ 
= e-f. = —5^ = 
The NRP measure is not capable of capturing the market distortions that do not affect 
domestic prices. Here, while producers evidently gain due to this direct transfer, the NRP 
fails to capture this gain. Therefore, in this case, NRP underestimates the actual market 
distortions. 
» 
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On the other hand, PSE does consider the transfers to producers such as deficiency 
payments as: 
p a p  _  Q P d - Q P w H D + n Q  _  OPwJQi - 0PwjQ2+ PwPpdj _ P^Ppdj 
~ ' QPd+D Q OPy,jQ2 + P^Ppdj OPpdQi ' 
whereas, 
%APÇ| — 
' Markt:lPrlces OPpdQi ' 
Clearly, PSE overestimates the gains to producers by the area bdj which represents extra cost 
associated with producing quantity QiQz domestically rather than importing it. This brings 
forth the weakness associated with the calculating the extent of distortion using the PSE. The 
PSE measures the effects of some government programs by the level of government 
expenditure, which may bear little relationship to its effect on market distortion (Schwartz 
and Parker, 1988). Comparing these three measures, it is evident that, 
PSE > %^S\g„f,i^fPfjce!i > prices > NRP. 
Now, suppose that the government provides a price subsidy which raises the producer 
price to Pp rather than providing a direct income transfer to the farmers as in the previous 
case. Here, the estimates of NRP and comparative producer surplus would be: 
j^pj^ ^ pdj 
OP^jQi OP^jQi ' 
%APiS'l = 
«WerPr/ce OPwjQl ' 
NRP overestimates the percent change in producer surplus at border price by the area bdJ. 
The PSE measure also overestimates the percentage change in producer surplus at market 
prices but underestimates the same at border prices: 
_ OPpdQi - OP^jQi _ PwPpdj 
OPpdQi OPpdQi ' 
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%APS\ Market Price 
P wPpdb 
OPpdQi • 
Therefore, 
NRP > %APS\B„^ir Prices > • 
Clearly, in case of price induced producer subsidy, NRP overestimates the distortion by a 
larger amount as compared to the PSE, which is contrary to the assertions made in Schwartz 
and Parker (1988) that "For... the price induced producer subsidy, the PSE is identical to the 
NRP." " 
Now consider a case where the government institutes a tariff on the imports of the 
commodity that raises the domestic price to P^from P„. The government uses all of the tariff 
revenue, oenk, to further assist the domestic producers by providing a price subsidy of PpP,. 
These trade distortions cause changes in real economic variables. Consumption now is OC2 
down from OC,, domestic production is OQ3, and imports drop to QsC^, representing 
restrictions on market access. The policy also results in price-induced income effects. 
Consumer surplus decreases by the area P^PpCC whereas producer surplus now is equal to 
aP,f. This revenue-neutral tariff plus the producer subsidy policy results in net economic loss 
to the domestic economy equal to the triangles bjk (which represents the additional cost 
associated with producing quantity Q/Qj domestically rather than importing it) and nec (since 
consumers buy C1C2 less in quantity and pay higher per unit price for it). 
In this case, the comparison among the NRP, PSE and percentage changes in producer 
surplus at border and market prices yields: 
It may be stated, therefore, that the market distortion captured by the NRP and PSE measures 
would provide identical estimates of the level of distortion both in the case of a price subsidy 
or import tariffs. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the absolute differences in the two 
Pv/Ptjb pÇ!p — 
Bonlerprice " OPwkQi ^ ~ OPf/Qi > %APS\ 
_ PwP(/b 
Marketprice OPJQ3 
" Although the absolute measures of PSE and NRP would provide identical estimates in this case, converting them into 
percentages, the two measures yield different results. Since in most ofthe studies, the PSEs andNPRs ore used in 
percentage terms, the above conclusion seems more meaningful. 
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estimates would be contingent upon the size of the direct payments since the direct payments 
enter both the numerator and the denominator of the PSE. This aspect is discussed further at 
the end of this subsection. 
Since these distortions also affect the domestic consumer prices, their effects on 
domestic consumers can be approximated using the NPRC and CSE measures which can 
further be compared with the respective percentage change in the consumer surplus; 
and 
\Tnnf~i _ -[OPpeC2 - 0PwnC2 ] _ - PyPpen 
~ OPwnCi ~ OP^nCt 
O Z A / ^ C l  PwPpec 
Sonferpr/ce OPs^nCi 
Here, l^PRC underestimates the (absolute) amount of market distortion affecting consumers. 
CSE, on the other hand, also underestimates the percentage change in consumer surplus at 
market prices: 
_ - [ OPpeCi - OPwnCi ] __ -PwPpen 
0PpeC2 OPpeCi ' 
and 
o/Ar'çl -
Marketprke OPpeC2 ' 
Comparing both the results together, it is obvious that, 
%àCS\ price ^ ^^"^C^lMarkel price ^ NPRC > CSE, 
if the area P^^PpCn < enc. If the area PJ^pCn > enc, then 
>IV/?/* > %^CS\MAFIFG,CSE. 
NPRC thus seems to overestimate the market distortions as compared to the CSE measure 
although NPRC underestimates the distortion as compared to the consumer surplus at border 
prices. 
All of the above cases implicitly assumed the case of industrialized countries where 
domestic prices are usually kept at levels higher than the international prices so as to support 
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the domestic producers. Such policies adversely affect consumer welfare as is depicted by 
the negative values obtained in the case of the above measures. 
Next, assume the case of a small poor agrarian economy where the aim of the 
government is to provide consumers with cheap food and, therefore, they institute policies 
that keep the food prices at levels below the international market. The earlier assumptions 
regarding the ineffectiveness of the country to influence the border prices or of the particular 
commodity to influence the foreign exchange rates are still in effect. 
Let be the price of the commodity in the world markets (Figure III. 13). At this 
price, assuming no distortionary policies in the domestic economy, output OQi is produced, 
of which the quantity OC, is consumed domestically and the remainder, C,Q, is exported. 
The international price is higher than what would ensure the domestic consumer sufficient 
consumption of the commodity. Therefore, the government imposes an export tax equivalent 
to the amount PJ*,i per unit of output which decreases the domestic consumer and producer 
price toP,,. 
The export tax thus induces changes in real variables. Domestic production decreases 
to OQ2, domestic consumption increases to OC2 and exports are now C2Q2. The 
price-induced income effects of this policy would result in the loss in producer surplus equal 
to the area P,^yjce, of which consumers gain PJ'Jjd, and the government earns the area dfge 
in export revenues. In net national economic welfare terms, the deadweight loss is equal to 
the triangles bfd and egc. 
The estimation of the market distortion from the producers' point of view may be 
approximated using the NRP, PSE, and producer surpluses at border and market prices: 
_ OPjeQi-OPwgQi _ -Pt/Pwge 
%APS\ 
PSE = 
OPwgQi OPwgQi 
- PjPwce 
Bonierprice 0PwgQ2 ' 
OPdeQi - OPwgQi - PjPwge 
OPjeQ2 OPjeQi 
and 
» 
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Vo^PS\ Markelprtce 
- P,lPwCe 
0P,ieQ2 ' 
Both NRP and PSE are smaller than the percent change in producer surplus at border 
and market price, respectively, by the area egc. However, although the absolute estimates of 
NRP and PSE are identical, in percentage terms, the NRP estimates underestimate the 
distortionary effects by less than the PSE\ 
%APS\Markelprice ^ price > NRP > PSE. 
Evaluating the distortionary effects of the export tax on the consumers using NPRC, 
CSE and consumer surplus measures yield the following: 
and 
NPRC = [OP,idC2 - OPwfCi] 
0PwfC2 
PjPwfd 
OPw/C2 ' 
%AC5l PdPwbd 
CSE = 
Border price OPwJCj ' 
- [0P,idC2 - 0P„fC2] PdPwfd 
OPddC2 
%ACiS'l ^farkciprlce 
OPddC2 ' 
P,lPwbd 
0PjdC2 ' 
Price 
Quantity 
Figure 111.13: Measuring distortions in a small developing country case 
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NPRC overestimates percent change in consumer surplus at border price by the area bfd. 
Similarly, CSE also overestimates the percent change in consumer surplus at market price by 
the area bfd. However, the estimate for CSE for this policy is greater than that for NPRC. In 
short, for the case of an export tax, CSE and NPRC provide identical absolute estimates yet 
differ in percentage terms: 
It should be noted that the market distortion captured by the NPRC and CSE measures may 
also provide identical estimates of the level of distortion in case of any policy instruments 
that affect domestic prices only. However, any policy that does not affect consumer prices 
would result in different estimates of these measures. In that case, CSE would approximate 
the distortion levels more precisely than NPRC which would fail to account for income 
transfer measures, like food stamps, as is explained below. 
Further assume that the government redistributes some part or all of its export tax 
revenues to provide an income support to the poor consumers, which shifts the demand curve 
out to the right to D, (Figure III. 13). Consumer and producer prices remain below the 
international prices at Pj. Consumption now increases to OC3 while output remains at OQ2 
and, therefore, exports decrease to C3Q2. Consumer surplus is now Pjhj while the producer 
surplus remains unchanged at nP^e. 
In this case, on the producer side, since there is no further change in producer price 
and output, the earlier results for the PSE, NRP, and producer surpluses at border and market 
prices would remain unchanged. The direct income transfer to the consumer would, 
however, change the estimates of protectionary effects on the consumer side, since: 
CSE > %ACSUi,e,pHce > NPRC > 
NPRC - [OPj jC i -OP^ iC j ]  OPwiCi  OPwiCs ' 
PjPwiJ 
YoACSl Bonlerprlce ~ 
ahjd 
OP^iCj ' 
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/~<vp _ iQc ' f c~Qc 'Pw)+(Dc+ Ic  )Qc  - [OPdjC'i ~ OPwiCj] +dfij _  PdPwi j  +  à f i j  
Qc Pc + Dc.Qc ~ OPjjCi+dfij ~ OPdJC3+dfiJ ' 
and 
OA\nQ\ — 
Marketprtce " OPdjCi + dfiJ ' 
Here CSE estimates are higher than those provided by the NPRC because NPRC fails to 
capture the income transfer subsidy to consumers. Since NPRC accounts for only the wedge 
between the domestic and border prices but not the direct transfers to consumers, CSE 
provides a better measure of how government policies influence incentives for consumers. 
This finding is also consistent with the earlier studies.The comparisons among the NRP 
and CSE with consumer surpluses at border and market prices yield ambiguous results: 
NPRC > %^CS\„arderprice W «Tca P,,PJd > ohmb', 
CSE > %^CS\Marhi price W area PjPJj > ahmb; 
and NPRC > %àCS\Markeiprice W area > ahmb. 
Tables III.7 through III.9 provide calculations of NRP, PSE, NRPC and CSE to 
support the above analysis in case of small country. The small wheat importing 
industrialized countries like Norway and Switzerland have market price support {MPS) 
greater than zero with different levels of direct and indirect producer support. In case of 
absolute measurements (considering only the numerator of NRP and PSE), the existence of 
direct or indirect payment would result in higher estimates of PSE. But where the percentage 
addition to numerator is smaller than the denominator, the PSE estimates would be lower 
than the NRP. For example, in Table III.7, the NRP estimates for Norway for the year 1980 
are smaller than those provided by the PSE measure, while the reverse is true for the year 
1990. In case of developing countries, like Nigeria and India, where MPS and direct 
payments are zero, NRP would be zero. Here, PSE would provide more accurate measures of 
distortion since it would capture any positive or negative indirect support, and thus would be 
significantly different from the NRP estimates. 
See, for example, Josling and Tangermann (1989), Schwartz and Parker (1988), and Gardner (1989b). 
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Table III.7: Extent of distortions captured hy NRP and PSE: 
Small importing countries 
Year World 
Reference 
Price' 
Domestic 
Producer 
Price' 
Domestic 
Production' 
Direct 
Payments' 
Indirect 
Payments' 
NFS' 
(Percent) 
PSE 
(Percent) 
(K) (Pu) (Q) (D) (I) Q{Pd-Pw)/P.-Q Q{Pa-P„}+EM-I/Pa<H-D 
Norway (Wheat) 
1980 963,7 1086 63 28 20 
«11086-963,7). 13 
(63x963.7) 
0.063 n086-963.7»+28+20_i,8 
(0.063x1086)+ 28 
1990 802,9 3189 224 46 24 224{3189-802,9>=297 
(224x802.9) 
0.224(3189-802.9)+46+24 
(0.224x3189)+46 
Switzerland (Common Wheat) 
1980 392,1 966 372 12 30 372{?eM?2,l}o,46 
(372x392.1) 
0.372/9fifi-mn+l2+30_f„ 
(0.372x966)+ 12 
1990 277.9 1029 530 -33 51 530{ 1029-277,9} OÎ70 
(530x277.9) 
0.S30n029-277.9».33+.Sl 
(0.530x1029)-33 
Nigeria (Wheal)"^ 
1982 280 280 26 0 -0,91 0,026{2?0-280>-o 
(0.026x280) 
0,026(280-280}+0-0,91=.,M 
(0.026x280)+ 0 
1986 520 520 15 0 1.95 0,015(520-520} = 0 
(0.015x520) 
0,015{520-520}+0+1,95 = 25 
(0.015x520)+0 
India (Wheat)'' 
1982 1565 1565 36,000 0 -17580 
(36x1565) 
.36{l565-i5<?5}+0-i7580^-31,20 
(36x1565)+0 
1986 1744 1744 44,000 0 -24360 44(1744-1744) =o 
(44x1744) 
44(1744-1744)+0-24360=.31.75 
(44x1744)+0 
1 World reference price is in domestic currency per ton, after adjustment for transportation costs. 
2 Producer price is in domestic currency per ton. 
3 Domestic production is in 1000 tons. 
4 Direct Payments are in millions of domestic currency, The direct payments may include deficiency or disaster payments, area and hedge 
payments, diversions, levies/fees, and double harvest promotions, among others, 
5 Indirect Payments are also in millions of domestic currency. The indirect payments may include assistance through input subsidies, 
and general agricultural services like credit and rural electrification, in case of developing countries. 
6 The formula used above has been modified by multiplying and dividing it by the domestic production, Q, to facilitate graphical 
comparisons with the graphical analysis of PSE estimates. 
7 The world reference prices in case of Nigeria and India have been extrapolated from the USDA (1990) data set. 
Source: Own calculations using the data from OECD (1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 
1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; and Webb, A,, M, Lopez and R, Penn (1990), Eslimales of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents; Government Intervention In Agriculture, 1982-87, U.S.D.A., ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, Washington, D.C, 
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Table III.8: Extent of distortions captured by NRP and PSE: 
Small exporting countries 
World 
Reference 
Price' 
Domestic Domestic Direct Indirect NPPf" 
Producer Production' Payments^ Payments' (Percent) 
Price' 
(Percent) 
Year (P„) (Pd) (Q) (D) (I) Q{Pd-Pw>/P»-Q Q{PD-P„}+D+I/PJ<J+D 
Austria (Wheat) 
1980 2731.5 3362 
1990 1519.8 3623 
Sweden (Wheat) 
1980 810 
1990 400 
South Africa (Wheat)^ 
1982 286 
1986 360 
India (Rlce)^ 
1982 2619 
963 
1361 
286 
360 
1201 
1404 
1193 
2165 
2420 
2285 
-127 
-241 
II 
402 
286 
134 
48 
-38 
80.6 
205.6 
120I(3362-2731.S>-TT 1201 <3362-2731.5 >-1274-286-^7 
(1201x2731.5) (1.201x3362)-127 
1404(3623-1519,8). 13, 1,404(3623-1519,8)-24l+l34.w 
(1404x1519.8) (1.404x3623)-241 
1193(963-810}-.19 
(1193x810) 
2165(1361-400) 
(1265x400) 
2420(286-286} oQ 
(2420x286) 
22851360-360) 
(2285x360) 
1193(963-810}+11+48=2, 
(1193x963)+ II 
2165(1361-400)+402-38-f3 
(1265x1361)+402 
2420(286-286)+0+80.6.,; 
(2420x286)+ 0 
2285(360-360}+0+205,6.2: 
(2285x360)+0 
2090 53248 0 22,267 53248(2090-2619) _ 53248(2090 - 2619)+22.267- . 
(53248x2619) (53248x2090) 
1 World reference price is in domestic currency per ton, after adjustment for transportation costs. 
2 Producer price is in domestic currency per ton. 
3 Domestic production is in 1000 tons. 
4 Direct Payments are in millions of domestic currency. The direct payments may include deficiency or disaster payments, area and hedge 
payments, diversions, and levies/fees, among others. 
5 Indirect Payments arc also in millions of domestic currency. The indirect payments may include assistance through input subsidies, 
and general agricultural services. 
6 The formula used above has been modified by multiplying and dividing it by the domestic production, Q, to facilitate graphical 
comparisons with the graphical analysis of PSE estimates. These estimates have been calculated using the data given in the table. 
7 The PSE estimates are calculated using the data set and in some cases may not necessarily match those provided in OECD (1991), 
8 The world reference prices in case of South Africa and India have been extrapolated from the USDA (1990) data set. 
Source: Own calculations using the data from OECD (1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 
1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; and Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents; Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, U.S.D.A., ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, Washington, D C. 
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Table 111.9: Extent of consumer market distortions captured by NRPC and CSE: Case 
of small importing countries 
World Domestic Domestic Direct Indirect NRPC" CSE 
Reference Consumer Consumption' Payments'' Payments' (Percent) (Percent) 
Price ' Prlce^ 
Year 
(P>v) (P.) (Qc) (DJ (I.) 
-[Q.{P. - PJ/P.^.] -[Q.{Pc - PJ+D.+I./P.. Q.] 
Poland (Wheat) 
6573 8538 0 84746 ^ 
(8538x16499) (8538x6573) 
1987 16499 6573 8538 0 84746 48538(6573-16499)1 •[8S38(6573.16499>+847461 -
India (Wheat) 
1984 2152 1932 43719 0 33009 
-f43719(l932-2l?2>kio -[43719 {1932-21g2}+33(?Q9Uii 
(43719x2152) (43719x1932) 
Note; USDA, ERS calculations do not distinguish between direct and indirect payments to consumers, 
1 World reference price is in domestic currency per ton, after adjustment for transportation costs, 
2 Consumer price is in domestic currency per ton. 
3 Domestic consumption is in 1000 tons, 
4 Direct Payments are in millions of domestic currency. The direct payments may include food stamps, among others, 
5 Indirect Payments are also in millions of domestic currency. 
6 The formula for NRPC has been modified by multiplying and dividing by the domestic consumption level to facilitate comparisons with 
the C5£ estimates. 
Source: Own calculations using the data from Webb, A,, M, Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents: Government Intervention In Agriculture, 1982-87, U S,D A,, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No, 803, April, Washington, D.C. 
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The greater the level of direct and indirect transfers, the more significant would be the 
difference in the estimates provided by these measures (Table III.8). In Sweden, for example, 
the NRP for 1990 is 240 percent while the PSE is only 73 percent. In case where MPS is not 
zero but there are no direct payments, such as in case of India, the absolute NRP estimates 
would exceed those of PSE. The differences among the estimates provided by consumer 
protection measurement concepts are similarly different (Table III.9). If domestic consumer 
price is less than the border price and there are some direct or indirect payments, the CSE 
would always be larger than NPRC. 
It may be useful to further analyze the case where the staple food commodity 
commands a large percentage of consumers' budget. In that case, the change in prices will 
have real income effects. This is particularly true in case of poor developing economies. 
This case may be studied using the compensated demand analysis instead of the standard 
Marshallian demand curves. 
III.3.2 Measuring Distortions in Case of A Large Country 
Large industrialized exporting countries in wheat (the United States, the European 
Community, Australia and Canada) have also relied, besides other measures, upon export 
subsidies to safeguard the interests of their domestic producers. The European Community 
has become a net exporter of most commodities, from being a net importer during the 1960s, 
by the extensive use of variable levies and export subsidies. Export subsidies alone 
accounted for about 30 percent of the total support provided to grain farmers. The 
Community provided its wheat growers $7,086.5 million through its trade measures designed 
to protect the domestic producers from world price fluctuations (OECD, 1991). The 
Australian Wheat Board, on the other hand, manages the marketing of 80 percent of total 
Australian wheat production, which is sold in international markets. Domestic prices of 
wheat have exceeded export prices, resulting in an assistance of about $7 per ton to the 
domestic producers (USDA, 1987). The recent policy trend in the case of United States is to 
rely more on export subsidies and deficiency payments (Gardner, 1990a). The Canadian dairy 
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industry is characterized by extreme political involvement and protection and the Canadian 
dairy farmers received about $1782 million in 1990 in market price supports including 
export subsidies (OECD, 1991). The following case analyzes the distortions caused by such 
subsidies in large exporting countries which face an upward sloping excess demand curve 
(ED) by the rest of the world (Figure III. 14). 
Let the world price be at which the domestic production is OQ, and domestic 
consumption is OCF The quantity C,Q, is exported which equals OX, in panel (B). 
Domestic producers lobby for higher output prices and the government agrees to provide an 
export subsidy of per unit of output. This raises the domestic price to Pj and also 
induces changes in real variables. Domestic consumption decreases to OQ and domestic 
production increases by Q1Q2. Exports are now C2Q2, which is equal to OX2. The consumer 
surplus 
decreases by the area PJP,ida whereas the producer surplus increases by PJPjcb, resulting in 
a net gain of adcb, which is equal to the area ghP,f^m. panel (B). 
The increase in exports shifts the excess supply in the world market to ES,, thereby 
decreasing the world price to . The cost to the government of exporting country is given 
by the amount of exports times the difference between the domestic price and the new world 
price. Hence the cost of the policy is kdcm, which is equivalent to the area JhPJ^w^ in panel 
(B). Of this cost, the producers' gain is adcb (or ghP^P^. The lower prices in the world 
markets increase the consumer surplus of the importing countries by the area jgPJ*wi, 
leaving the net economic loss to the world of jhg. Of this loss, the exporting country bears 
the portion ihg, which equals the sum of the two triangles eda and bcf'm panel (A), while the 
rest, area jig, is borne by the rest of the world. 
The distortions in the exporting country's economy caused by the export subsidy can 
be approximated by NRP and PSE and compared with the distortion estimates provided by 
the Marshallian producer surplus measures. In absolute values, the NRP and PSE estimates 
would be identical and would overestimate the distortion. However, in percentage terms, the 
estimates of distortion obtained using the NRP would be higher than those obtained from 
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PSE. Moreover, both these estimates would exceed the producer surplus estimates by the 
area PJbcm. Overall, the NRP would overestimate the distortion by a larger amount as 
compared to the PSE, which would overestimate the distortion at market prices but would 
underestimate it at the border prices. 
The analysis reveals that the large exporting country loses by maintaining domestic 
prices above the world price levels and the domestic economy witnesses the redistribution of 
income from consumers and taxpayers to the domestic producers and foreign importers. 
Compared to a small country case, when a large country raises its domestic prices above 
international prices, it depresses the international prices and the cost to the domestic economy 
is much higher than reflected in the gains to the domestic producers. The level of the 
distortion due to the export subsidy in case of large exporting country, as measured by the 
NRP and PSE, reveals that both these measures clearly overstate the actual extent of 
distortion. 
The differences in the estimates provided by these measures are also substantiated in 
Tables III.10 through III.12 As discussed earlier, in case where MPS is zero but producers 
are given positive direct payments, the PSE estimates would always be greater than NRP 
(B) World Market Price (A) Domestic Market 
ED 
E: 
Quantity 
O C, C, Q. Q 
Figure III.14: Measuring distortions in a large exporting country case 
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since NRP would be zero, as is the case of United States (wheat) for the year 1990 (Table 
III. 10). On the contrary, when MPS is positive but there are no direct or indirect payments, 
the PSE estimates would be smaller than those of NRP because in these countries, domestic 
prices are maintained above the world prices. In low-income countries like Argentina which 
tax domestic farmers and provide no direct payments but provide positive indirect subsidies, 
the numerator of PSE would be smaller resulting in different estimates. 
Likewise, in case of large importing countries with significant positive price wedge, 
the NRP estimates would far exceed those of PSE (Table III. 11). The NRPC and CSE 
estimates would be negative in case of large industrialized countries that maintain higher 
consumer prices as compared to the world prices (Table III. 12). The higher this wedge, the 
smaller would be the CSE as compared to the NRPC. 
III.4 Measurement of Protection Levels Under Price Discrimination^^ 
In many countries, the governments set up agencies that have monopoly control in 
important foodgrains and manage domestic supply and international trade in order to 
influence domestic prices (Anderson and Tyers, 1992). For example, the Japan's Food 
Agency, Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), and the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) are 
engaged in such efforts. The Australian Wheat Board (AWB) has had a monopoly on 
marketing of wheat overseas and domestically. The board has long been administering 
domestic wheat prices above the international levels. Although the domestic wheat 
marketing has almost been deregulated since 1989, the AWB still exercises monopoly power 
over the marketing of wheat exports, which constitute about 80 percent of the total 
production (Edwards, 1990). In the case of many developing countries, government 
agencies, such as Food Corporation of India and National Logistics Agency of Indonesia, 
also hold monopoly power to maintain control over domestic prices and engage in 
international trade. These agencies, however, maintain domestic prices below the 
international prices in order to ensure accessibility to cheap food for poor people. 
" Although some studies have analyzed price discrimination, the following discussion represents the first systematic demonstration 
of price discrimination in the context of extent of distortion captured by alternative measures of protection. 
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Table III.IO: Extent of distortions captured by NRP and PSE: 
Large exporting country 
Year World 
Reference 
Price' 
Domestic Domestic Direct Indirect 
Producer Production' Payments' Payments' 
Price' 
NPPf' 
(Percent) 
PSE 
(Percent) 
(Pw) (Pd) (Q) (D) (I) Q{Pd-Pw)/Pw-Q Q{Pd-P„}+D+I/Pj.Q+D 
U.S.A. (Wheat)' 
1980 144 144 64,6 596 767 fi4.fin44.l44) 
(64,6x144) 
64.6(144-144)+596+767 _h 
(64.6x144)+596 
1990 80,6 96 74,7 2403 620 74,7(96-80,6) 
(74,7x80,6) 
74.7(96.80.6)+2403+620 
(74,7x96)+ 2403 
E.G. (Common Wheat) 
1980 125.7 164 50,2 0 638 50.2(164-125.7) 
(50.2x125,7) 
50.2(164-125,7)+0+ 638 
(50,2x164)+0 
1990 107.1 171 72,8 -244 793 
.72,8(171-107,1) =60 
(72.8x107.1) 
72.8(171-107,1)-244+793 =43 
(72.8x171)-244 
Canada (Milk) 
1980 161,7 282 7.95 149 207 7,95(282-101,7) .74 
(7,95x161,7) 
7,95(282-16l,7)+149+207 =55 
(7,95x282) + 149 
1990 158,8 418 8,02 121 566 8,02(418-158,8)= 116 
(8,02x158,8) 
8.02(418-158.8)+ 121+566 
(8.02x418)+ 121 
Argentina (Wheat)^ 
1982 0,3 0,24 8,3 0 0,18 8.30 (0.24-0.30) _ 8.30 (0.24-0.30)+0+0.18 _ 
(8,30x0,30) (8.30x0.24)+ 0 
1985 54,18 31.4 13,2 0 77.17 
(13.2x54,18) (13.2x37,4)+0 
1 World reference price is in domestic currency per ton, afler adjustment for transportation costs. 
2 Producer price is in domestic currency per ton. 
3 Domestic production is in million tons, 
4 Direct Payments are in millions of domestic currency. The direct payments may include deficiency or disaster payments, area and hedge 
payments, diversions, levies/fees, and double harvest promotions, among others. 
5 Indirect Payments are also in millions of domestic currency. The indirect payments may include assistance through input subsidies, 
marketing subsidies and general agricultural services like research advisory etc, 
6 The formula for NRP has been modified by multiplying and dividing it by the domestic production, Q, to facilitate graphical 
comparisons with the graphical analysis of PSE estimates. 
7 The world reference price for 1980 was extrapolated from the OECD (1991) data set. 
8 The world reference price for Argentina was extrapolated from the USDA (1990) data set, considering trade policy transfers as the wedge 
between the domestic and world reference prices. 
Source: Own calculations using the data from OECD ( 1991 ), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 
1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; and Webb, A,, M, Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents; Government Intervention In Agriculture, 1982-87, U.S.D.A,, ERS, Statistical Bulletin No, 803, April, Washington, D,C, 
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Table III.ll: Extent of distortions captured by NRP and PSE: 
Large importing country 
Year World 
Reference 
Price' 
Domestic 
Producer 
Price' 
Domestic 
Production' 
Direct 
Payments^ 
Indirect 
Payments' 
NPRf-
(Percent) 
PSE' 
(Percent) 
(P„) (Pu) (Q) (D) (1) Q{Pd-Pw}/Pv.<? Q(Pd-P„}+D+!/Pa<?fD 
Japan, (Wheat) 
1980 47 178 583 24 22 583(178-47) =279 
(583x47) 
S83fl7847H 24000+22000 
(583x178)+24000 
1990 24.8 154 946 12 22 946(154-24,8) =521 
(946x24.8) 
946f154.24.8H 12000+ 22000 _ m 
(946x154)+ 12000 
Japan. (Rice) 
1980 128.8 295 9751 322 314 9751 { 295-128,8} =129 
(9751x128.8) 
9.751 (295.128.8)+322+314 
(9.751x295)+322 
1990 61.4 275 10350 234 238 10350( 275-61,4) =348 
(10350x61.4) (10.35x275)+234 
Japan (Beef) 
1980 304.6 1565 418 0 72 418( 1565-304.6) 
(418x304.6) (418x1565)+0 
1990 236 1526 551 0 37 551{ 1526-236} =547 
(551x236) (551x1526)+0 
1 World reference price is in thousands of yen per ton, aflcr adjustment for transportation costs. 
2 Producer price is in thousands of yen per ton. 
3 Domestic production is in 1000 tons. 
4 Direct Payments are in billions of yen. The direct payments may include deflciency or disaster payments, area and hedge payments, 
diversions, levies/fees, and double harvest promotions, among others. 
5 Indirect Payments are also in millions of domestic currency. The indirect payments may include assistance through input subsidies, 
and general agricultural services. 
6 The formula used for /VRP has been modified by multiplying and dividing it by the domestic production, Q, to facilitate graphical 
comparisons with the graphical analysis of PSE estimates. 
7 The PSE estimates are calculated using both the data set and in some cases may not necessarily match those provided in OECD (1991). 
Source: Own calculations using the data from OECD (1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 
1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; and Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents; Government Intervention In Agriculture, 1982-87, U.S.D.A., ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, Washington, D C. 
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Table III.12: Extent of consumer market distortions captured by NRPCand CSE 
Year World 
Reference 
Price' 
Domestic Domestic 
Consumer Consumption' 
Price' 
Direct 
Payments' 
Indirect 
Payments' 
NRPC^ 
(Percent) 
CSE 
(Percent) 
(Pw) (Pc) ra; (D.) (I.) 
-[Q,{Po-Pw)/P,/3=] •[Q.{Pc-Pw)+D.+I./P.-Q.] 
aSJ. (Wheat) 
1987 70 109 29507 0 0 
-f29507{109-7011=.s6 
(29507x70) 
-f29507{ 109-70)]-.36 
(29507x109) 
E.C. (Sugar) 
1987 148 896 9540 0 0 
•r9540{896-148}]o.5os 
(9540x148) 
-f9540{896-148»]=.83 
(9540x896) 
Japan (Beef and Veal) 
1987 381500 2209420 880 0 -838190 -188012209420.381 SOOVl 
(880x381500) 
= -479 
.r880(2209420.381500>-8381901 
(880x2209420) 
= -83 
Note: USDA, ERS calculations do not distinguish between direct and indirect payments to consumers. 
1 World reference price is in domestic currency per ton, after adjustment for transportation costs. 
2 Consumer price is in domestic currency per ton. 
3 Domestic consumption is in 1000 tons, 
4 Direct Payments are in millions of domestic currency. The direct payments may include food stamps, among others. 
3 Indirect Payments are also in millions of domestic currency. 
6 The formula for NRPC has been modified by dividing and multiplying it by the domestic consumption in order to facilitate graphical 
comparisons with the CSE estimates. 
Source: Own calculations using the data from Webb, A., M. Lopez and R. Penn(I990), Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents; Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, U.S.D.A., ERS, Statistical Bulletin No. 803, April, Washington, D.C. 
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In the case of industrialized countries where domestic prices are usually maintained 
above the world price level, these agencies may engage in price discrimination. Assuming 
that the world market price of an agricultural commodity is determined competitively, it 
becomes important to analyze the effects of the distortions caused by the actions of these 
agencies.^® It is of further interest whether such policies may result in biased estimates of 
protection levels using the NRP and PSE measures. 
Consider the case where the monopolist is facing a perfectly elastic demand in the 
world markets but a downward sloping demand in the home market (Figure 111.15)." First, 
assume that the world market price, ^ w,, which is also the competitive marginal revenue, is 
such that domestic marginal revenue curve, M/l, is everywhere below Ph,, . The total output 
produced at this price is OQ, but, since no domestic buying occurs, all of this output is 
exported. In this case, the total revenues for the monopolist are ^8/- Of this area, Ofa 
Q1 represents the total variable costs and the Marshallian producer surplus is given by the 
area /a. Moreover, since no domestic price exists at which any buying may occur, the 
NRP and PSE may not be defined. 
Now assume that the world market price drops to Pwi and, thus, it becomes feasible 
for the monopolistic agency to engage in price discrimination. The total output produced in 
this case would be OQ2 at point c where the foreign marginal revenue curve intersects the 
marginal cost curve, MC, Of this total output, the monopolist will be able to sell OQj in the 
domestic market at price Pd^, which is higher than the world price. The remaining output, 
gjgj, will be exported. The producer surplus is fPd^ bdc, which is equivalent to the areas 
fP^^^ c + Pwj Pdx bd. As > Pwi, the producer receives an increase in revenue equivalent to 
Pw2 Pd\ bd due to price discrimination. These estimates of producer surplus in the commodity 
market can now be compared with the estimates of distortion provided by the NRP and PSE. 
Here, two scenarios can be analyzed. First, the case where trade is ignored and only domestic 
Price discrimination is generally defined as tiie situation wiiere any product produced under single control is sold at 
different prices to different buyers (Robinson, 1938). 
" It is being assumed liere tiiat botii markets are separable witli no arbitrage possibilities, different price elasticities exist, and in cases 
discussed below, tiiat the domestic government bars imports from impinging upon the monopolized domestic market with no 
similar restrictions by other countries that might affect this country's exports. 
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consumption is considered, and, second, where both domestic consumption and exports are 
considered. In the first case, the estimates of NRP and PSE would be: 
NPR = 
PSE = 
OPdibQ3-OP^^dQ3 
OPy,2 dQi 
OPd^ bQi - OPW2 dQi 
OP^^dQi • 
Pv /^Pd^  bd  
OPd^bQi OPd^bQi • 
The total producer surplus, considering total output, OQ2, is equal to the area fPd^ bdc. Here, 
the NRP and PSE estimates clearly understate the total producer surplus at border and market 
price, respectively, by the area fPy,^ c. Nevertheless, the NRP estimate is consistent with the 
change in the producer surplus at border price due to price discrimination by the monopolist, 
which creates the wedge Pw^Pdi and the change in producer surplus is Pw2Pd\ bd. The 
estimate for PSE would compare similarly with the change in producer surplus at the market 
price. 
$/Unit 
R 
k 
MC 
3^ 
\ e 
i 
j 
c 
^MR ^ ^A R  
Quantity 
O Q, Q, Q, Q, 
Figure III.IS Comparison of measures of protection under price discrimination 
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Next, when trade is considered, the NRP and PSE measures would overestimate the 
above change in producer surplus by the area bdhc. 
NPR = 
PSE = 
OPd^Qih-OQtcP^^ P^^chPd^ 
OQihPd^ - Ogzcf Pw2chPd. 
0Q2hPdi OQihPd^ ' 
However, the overestimation is less in case of FSE as compared to the NRP estimates when 
trade is considered. If, due to increased competition in the international market, the world 
price falls down to somewhere between and/, the domestic consumer welfare would 
increase. The increase in consumer surplus would clearly be much higher in the case where 
no price discrimination occurs. The PSE and NRP estimates would still be biased upwards. 
The monopolist would lose due to falling world prices. The monopolist would be able to 
recover some of the loss by exercising price discrimination in the domestic market as 
compared to the case where world price was allowed to prevail in the domestic market. 
Next, suppose that the world market price is too low, say at P^^, such that P^^ is less 
than the monopolist's average total cost at all levels of output. In this case, the domestic 
monopoly situation prevails and no trade occurs. The monopolist would operate at g where 
monopolist's marginal cost and marginal revenue curves intersect and would charge the 
maximum price that the consumers are willing and able to pay {Pd^ ) for the output 
The producer surplus will then be /Pdi eg and both NRP and PSE would overestimate the 
distortion in domestic markets by the areaP,»,,^".^' The percent PSE would, however, 
overestimate the distortion by less amount than the percent NRP estimate: 
_ OPd^eQ^-OP^^jQi _ 
OPw^JQa OP^^JQi ' 
OPd2eQ4-OPwyiQA Pw^Pd^ej 
- QP - OPd, e04 • 
It may be noted that the world price may decrease further with no change in the domestic price and output. 
" However, it must be noted that the foreign price component in this case is arbitrary and could be anything. 
Although the example above illustrates an extreme case, it is not far from the situation 
in some industrialized countries where domestic producers face very low international prices 
yet manage to get a higher price domestically for their output. In some cases, the controlling 
agencies may also establish export subsidies which compensate the producers for 
overproduction which is then exported at the international prices. The cases where such 
subsidies are provided are relatively complicated to analyze. However, two such cases are 
discussed below where domestic consumers and producers are subsidized by way of direct 
payments. 
Consider first the case of a direct consumer subsidy. The world price is f*, and 
domestic production is OQi, of which OQ2 is consumed domestically at price Prf, and the rest, 
Q2Q1, is exported (Figure III. 16). A per unit subsidy equivalent to nh would shift up the 
curve AR„ to AR, and MR„ to MR,, as shown in the figure.^^ The total domestic production 
remains unchanged at OQj since the monopolist's MC curve and the foreign MR curve do not 
change. However, due to increased demand in domestic market, it becomes profitable for the 
price discriminating monopolist to sell more output in the domestic market at a higher price, 
Pd2 • Since the domestic sales increase to OQ^, exports drop to Q3Q1. At the total output 
produced, the PSE (and NRP) overestimate the distortions by the area bhgc. Note, however, 
that without the subsidy, the PSE overestimate was equivalent to the area aijc. Whether the 
overestimation is less or more now, depends on whether the area aikb is more or less than the 
area khgf. It may be further noted that the demand and MR curves may shift in such a way as 
to leave the domestic price unchanged after the subsidy. In that case, the PSE estimates 
would be less biased by the area aikb as compared to the case without the subsidy. 
Since PSE is the summation of two types of government policies, the wedge between 
the border and domestic prices, and the direct and indirect transfers to agricultural producers, 
the absolute estimates of PSE and NRP do not differ in the case where income transfers are 
made to consumers only. The CSE, on the other hand, would capture these budgetary 
transfers from the government to consumers, and would, therefore, provide relatively 
" It may be noted here that an ad valorem subsidy would alter the slopes of the AR and MR curves between the pre- and 
post-subsidy scenarios. The overall policy eflects in this case can be shown analogous to the per unit subsidy case 
analyzed below and are not discussed separately. 
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accurate estimates as compared to the NPRC: 
NPRC = "63-Of. 60, NPRC PwPj^hb OPwbQj ' OPw bQi 
CSE 
0Pj2 - 0P» bQi +mPj2 hn PwPj^ +"1^1/2 hn 
OPj^hQi OPj^hQi 
The NPRC measure fails to capture the direct consumer transfers. Therefore, the NPRC 
underestimates the distortion compared to CSE by the amount of government expenditures. 
The consumers now consume higher quantities but also the domestic price has risen from Pdx 
XoPdi- Therefore, the consumers gain the area but lose the area f Therefore, 
the overall effect on consumers is ambiguous. Moreover, the comparison of CSE and NPRC 
with the consumer surplus at border and market prices, respectively, is also inconclusive. 
Now, assume that instead of consumer subsidy, the government provides specific 
input subsidy to farmers which shifts the marginal cost curve down to MC, (Figure III. 17). 
The output increases to OQ2. However, since domestic demand remains unchanged, the 
$/Unit 
MC 
0 
O Q, Q, Q, 
Figure III.16: Comparison of measures of protection under 
price discrimination with consumer subsidies 
Quantity 
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domestic component of price discrimination is unaffected and the consumers still consume at 
OC,. Exports increase to C,Q2 from C/g,. The producer surplus increases by the area fdbg to 
fPasag. The numerator ofATîP measures the area Whether the area % is 
greater or less than the area fdbg would depend upon the elasticities and the extent of the 
shift. Compared with the no input subsidy case, the overestimation by NRP here would 
increase by the area bhkg. The PSE, which would also include the amount of government 
expenditures, nP„gm, would provide even more inflated estimates of the distortion. The 
comparison of these measures with the respective percent change in producer surplus would 
still be ambiguous. 
$/Unit 
MC 
O C Q, Q, Quantity 
Figure III.17: Measures of market distortion under price discrimination 
with input subsidy 
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In short, the graphical analysis in this section examines how different interventionary 
policies distort producer and consumer incentives. Under highly simplistic assumptions, the 
analysis compares and contrasts the level of distortion captured by different methods of 
measurement. It is revealed that the market distortion captured by the NRP and PSE and 
NRPC and CSE measures would provide identical estimates of the level of distortion where 
the market distortion is translated into the wedge between the border and domestic prices. 
There are certain policies that result in distortions that do not affect the wedge. In that case, 
PSE or CSE estimates would be closer to the actual effects whereas the NRP and NRPC 
would fail to account for them. There are certain policies whose effects and the direction of 
change would not possibly be captured by any of these measures. In such cases, empirical 
examination of the effects becomes desirable. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide an analytical overview of the political 
economy market of agricultural protection. A political market framework has been advanced 
along with some contrasting patterns of protectionistic policies across industrialized and 
developing countries highlighting several determinants of agricultural protection. A 
comprehensive comparative analysis of different measurement concepts and their respective 
policy coverage is discussed. Finally, a graphical exposition of the policy effects captured by 
some selected measurement concepts is provided under many different scenarios and market 
conditions. The choice of the measurement concept to be used in the empirical analysis that 
emerges from the analysis apparently favors the producer subsidy equivalent on the basis of 
its comprehensive and wider coverage of different policies and its suitability to analyze the 
extent of goverrmient intervention. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical models developed in this chapter incorporate two analytical 
viewpoints. The self-interest of individuals seeking personal benefits is combined with the 
larger societal goals representing altruistic motives." The self-interest elements are the 
mainstay of the producer model. The consumers seeking government intervention in the 
agricultural sector to reduce the risk of food insecurity are viewed from the larger societal 
perspective. It is, therefore, assumed here that consumers and producers are the demanders of 
political action in an attempt to maximize their utility or profit. The political supply of 
intervention from the policy makers is assumed to respond to both these groups. 
The next section provides a schematic overview of the factors influencing the 
government intervention in the agricultural markets. The benefits of price stabilization to 
consumers seeking to reduce the food insecurity risk are modeled in Section IV.2. Section 
IV.3 develops a theoretical model of producers seeking government intervention in order to 
maximize their profits subject to the political resource contribution. The politician welfare 
function which incorporates the interests of both consumers and producers is developed in 
the final section. 
IV. 1 The Conceptual Framework 
Based upon the political market framework developed in Section III.l, a schematic 
overview of the interaction among different interest groups influencing the interventionaiy 
policy outcome is formulated in this section. Following Berry (1989), an interest group is 
defined here as "an organized body of individuals who share some goals and who try to 
influence public policy" (p. 4). Stevens (1993) points out that the broadest definition of an 
interest group includes both voluntary and involuntary memberships. Groups differ in terms 
of their interest, size, resources and political influence and orientation. The unifying element 
" Much of the public choice literature tends to emphasize narrow self-interest as the primary motivation for individual behavior 
of economic agents. Quiggen (1987), Paarlberg (1989) and others have suggested the need to emphasize a broad spectrum of 
motivators including a degree of altruism. 
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within a group is the existence of some degree of shared interest. Interest groups may be 
formed by citizens with a common cause. Groups interested in the policy outcome in the 
agricultural sector include farmers, farm input suppliers, agribusiness firms, research, 
development and extension organizations, consumers, bureaucrats, lobbying organizations 
and politicians, to name a few. In the theoretical framework developed in this chapter, the 
interests of all these different groups are summarized in three distinct groups: consumers, 
producers and the policy maker. 
This may all seem a simple way of viewing a complex interaction in the political 
market of agricultural policy formulation. Nonetheless, this allows the formation of a 
conceptual framework with comprehensible exposition that can be further analyzed. The 
interactions among these groups are depicted in the schematic diagram presented in Figure 
IV. 1. 
Consumers 
v*= V(.) 
Perceived Benefits 
from Food Security 
I 
Politician 
U» = U(v»,7t«,m) 
—? 
Policy 
Intervention 
I 
Producers 
7l* = 7t(.) 
Perceived Benefits 
from Political Resource 
Contribution 
Net Benefits | Net Costs 
Producers DC Consumers 
Consumers LDC Producers 
Figure IV.l: Interactions in the political market for agricultrual protection 
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It is postulated that the perceived benefits from improved food security through 
stabilization of food prices translates into preferences of the consumers. These perceived 
benefits constitute the demand for intervention from the consumers. Since incomes and the 
size of risk in relation to income vary from society to society, this generates varying degree 
of demand from consumers across countries. Producer group, on the other hand, contributes 
resources to lobby the government in seeking agricultural subsidies to enhance their profits. 
The level of contribution would also differ across countries depending upon factors such as 
the size of the producer group, their incomes and their ability to control free-riding by the 
members. The effectiveness with which the producer interest group can exert political 
pressure then depends upon the perspective gains to the members of the group. Therefore, 
the overall demand for government intervention in the agricultural sector is created by the 
relative influence of these two groups in a given society. 
The political leadership is assumed to form policy preferences by taking into account 
the marginal effects of policy outcomes on the utility of consumers and the profits of 
producers. The society's preferences are then transformed into programs and policies to the 
extent permitted by the available resources, including fiscal resources and bureaucratic 
capacity. The factors and relationships that determine the degrees of subsidies or taxation to 
any group would depend upon the compatibility or conflict between the interests of these two 
groups and the government's treasury position. 
The extent of consumer subsidies or taxation decided by the policy maker depend 
upon the constraints within which the consumers operate, such as their income levels, Engel 
coefficients, and the degrees of risk aversion. The consumers in low-income countries 
(LDCs), with high share of food in household consumption expenditures and high 
coefficients of relative risk aversion, are more prone to immediate (short-run) food insecurity 
risks. In order to mitigate the threat of food shortfalls and to ensure stable consumption 
patterns, the prices of food in these countries are kept at below the international levels. 
Countries that provide low food prices to urban consumers, often require producers to bear 
most of the cost by holding crop prices at lower levels than would be the case in the absence 
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of intervention. Such policy outcomes, though providing tangible benefits to consumers, 
increase the risks of long-run food security by depressing domestic production incentives. 
These policies, thus, run counter to the long-run interests of the society. In countries where 
consumer incomes are sufficiently high, with considerably lower Engel coefficients, this 
objective translates into enhancing production through providing incentives to domestic 
producers. 
Small affluent producer groups which can form a common position and mitigate the 
free-rider problem, are able to exert relatively more political pressure and be the beneficiaries 
of subsidies, as is the case in developed countries The relatively large producer 
groups in LDCs encounter substantial organization costs and free-riding problems. These and 
other factors forestall them from constituting effective demand for protection and receiving 
any favorable outcomes from agricultural policies. 
It may be noted that the interests of the producer and consumer groups may not 
always be in conflict with each other. Giving subsidies to producers may also be in the larger 
societal interest. Thus, although the consumers in developed countries are explicitly taxed to 
pay for the farm programs, their acquiescence to the farm programs may not be represented a 
conflict of interests (Foster and Rausser, 1992). The factors discussed above are explicitly 
incorporated into the theoretical models of the consumer, producer and policy maker in the 
following sections. 
IV.2 Consumer Model 
This section highlights consumers' willingness to have government intervention in the 
agricultural sector, especially for staple food commodities. The PEAP literature cites several 
reasons as to why consumers in industrialized countries acquiesce to costly farm programs. 
These may include the relatively high cost of organization and collective action, greater 
free-rider problem, geographical dispersion, low per capita benefits and high cost of 
" It can be argued that public policies are often rather designed to benefit the poorer sections of the society, as is the case in the 
consumer group. However, such altruistic motives may not be the basis of policy intervention in all cases. For example, the 
bulk of the benefits in the United States and the European Community goes to the largest farmers (Meyers and Josling, 1990). 
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becoming informed, and high per capita cost to farmers of subsidizing the consumers. On the 
other hand, consumers in developing nations are the beneficiaries of government intervention 
in the farm sector due to their relatively small size, better organization, high marginal 
benefits and low cost per capita to producers. 
This section proposes an alternative hypothesis to explain this phenomenon. 
Consumers accept government intervention in the agricultural sector because of the benefits 
of food security accruing to them.^^ The argument relates to the paradigm of the social 
concerns approach that groups seeking risk insurance are protected by the government (see 
Chapter II). The SfVG approach is applied in that the governments in both industrialized and 
developing countries institute farm policies due, in part, to the consumers' food security 
concerns. This altruistic motive has largely been ignored in the PEAP literature so far. This 
section stresses the need for an analysis which quantifies the linkages between food security, 
price stabilization and PEAP policies. The consumer model establishes these linkages 
explicitly. The focus of analysis is not on the efficiency of price stabilization policies or food 
aid or development strategies. Rather the emphasis is to stress that there is a role of food 
security perceptions of consumers which affects the political leaderships' decision-making 
process in instituting farm policies.^® 
Foster and Rausser (1992) point out that, "seemingly inefficient policy that appear to 
harm consumers could be, in fact, a rational component of a larger portfolio of policies 
ultimately benefiting consumers at the expense of producers" (p. 18). Gardner (1990b, p. 30) 
also proposes a hypothesis that, "... non-farmers acquiesce to farm programs because they 
believe the programs guarantee food availability at reasonable prices.... Farm programs 
constitute consumer insurance or stabilization programs." He elaborates that there is a 
perception in the industrialized countries that an economically healthy agriculture is a kind of 
food-supply insurance. Tyers and Anderson (1992) also admit that there is a case of public 
" This argument is postulated to transcend across developing as well as Industrialized countries, albeit with varying degrees. 
In a discussion with Luther Tweeten on this topic, he suggested that the food security perception in the minds of consumers 
may justify the agricultural intervention from their point of view. 
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interest for domestic price stabilization if at least some agents are risk averse and price 
fluctuations impair their welfare. 
The government involvement in the agricultural sector across both industrialized and 
developing countries may, therefore, also be in response to food consumers' concerns 
regarding stable prices and consistent food consumption patterns (Miller, 1986; Bigman, 
1985). Consumers' contribution to the demand for government intervention in the 
agricultural sector in the presence of stochastic prices and supply is modeled below. 
The model below addresses price stabilization from the perspective of an individual 
consumer. However, the results may easily be generalized at more aggregate levels. The 
commodity in question is taken to be a staple food commodity (for example, wheat)." The 
consumer prefers a smooth consumption pattern over an erratic one. In a stochastic 
environment where production and prices are fluctuating, the consumer is interested in 
meeting a target level of consumption. An element of risk here is the existence of the 
possibility that prices might increase to a level such that it may not be feasible, given the 
income of the consumer, to meet the target level of consumption of this particular 
commodity. During the periods of excessively high prices, the inability of the consumer to 
meet this consumption level results in extreme distress.^® To avoid such an occurrence, the 
representative consumer is modeled to be interested in price stabilization being introduced, 
thus altering the probability distribution of prices. Tyers and Anderson (1992) also point out 
that the consumers prefer prices of necessary products to be "more rather than less stable over 
time." The consumer's benefits of price stabilization are measured similar to Newberry and 
Stiglitz (1981, Chapter 9). Specifically, the theoretical model incorporates the following 
features: 
1. The consumer wants to avoid excessively high food prices and the associated 
shortfalls in the target level of consumption of the staple commodity. 
" In this discussion, reference to food and the consumption of this particular stapic commodity are used interchangeably. 
" For present purposes, no distinction is made between extreme food supply shortfalls and risk of high prices. 
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2. To avoid food shortfalls and associated excessively high prices, the consumer 
is willing to accept government intervention in the market for staple 
commodity and have the price stabilization introduced. 
Assume the consumer derives utility from the consumption of two commodities, q, 
and q2, whose prices are pi and p2, respectively. Let q, be the staple food commodity in 
question (wheat) and q2 be a composite bundle of other commodities. Also, assume that pi 
and P2 are random. Let the income of the consumer be_y and ^1 and q2 be the minimum 
target consumption levels of qj and q2, respectively. It can also be assumed that both goods 
are substitutes to a certain extent only after the minimum requirements of both have been 
met, that is, the feasible domain is restricted to the shaded area of Figure IV.2 (A). The 
minimum requirements of q, and qj would define a new origin. The tangency of indifference 
curve ICi to the budget constraint AB gives the optimum consumption bundle E. 
If the consumption of qi falls below the target level 9i then extreme discomfort 
occurs. In other words, given the consumers' income, extremely high prices that limit the 
consumption below g'l result in discomfort to the consumer. Let these critical prices be 6, 
and 0^. Consumer wants to avoid the situations wherep, > ô, orp2> 
(A) (B) q 
A 
Feasible 
Domain Feasible 
Domain 
Figure IV.2: Feasible domains restricted by the minimum requirements 
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Since prices are random, there is a possibility that prices could be so high/' There is 
an incentive, therefore, on the part of the consumer to have price stabilization introduced and, 
thus, be assured to meet the target level of consumption. Since the objective here is to 
analyze the effects of shortfalls in food consumption only, for the rest of the analysis, it may 
be assumed for simplicity that gz = 0 and that p2 is non-random. The assumption may 
change the feasible domain as shown in Figure IV.2, panel (B). 
Let u be the consumer's utility function in a stochastic environment with following 
properties: 
u{q \ , q2 )  i f  q \  ^  h  
U — A 
vo if q\ < q\ _ 
where, 
(§ )>»•  for  
and 
~ ® ^ 1 j / = 1, 2. 
Here, v„ indicates the distress level of utility. For example, v„ = -oo indicates an extreme 
case when qx <q\. Note that v„ < u(qi, q;, implying that the utility fimctionis 
discontinuous at q i  =q i .  In other words, the consumer's income must be at least (pi - gi). 
Accessibility to adequate supplies of the staple food is, thus, defined where the level 
of consumer's income and prices are such that the consumer is able to consume at least the 
target amount . If p\ >y/q\,, then the consumer cannot consume even the minimum 
required quantities of#,. The food insecurity (FIS) risk can, therefore, be defined as the 
probability that the value of minimum consumption (pi #1) exceeds the consumers' income 
0), that is, 
FIS = Vx{p\-q\ >y}. 
" For example, shortfalls in food supplies as a result of famines, natural disasters or embargoes may cause the prices to be 
excessively high in the short-run. 
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Or, in other words, if p \  >y  I  q \  then <q\  .  Therefore, food insecurity can also be 
defined as the probability that prices will exceed the level that permits access to consumer to 
the minimum required quantities of q , ,  i.e., 
FIS = Pr{ p, >y/q\}. 
The probability of excessively high food prices and the corresponding food shortfalls 
may be considerably diminished through price stabilization and income enhancing programs 
for farmers that may alleviate uncertainty in food production (Hinchy and Fisher, 1988; 
Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988b). "A minimum-price program, for example, would encourage 
producers to increase production; and the additional supply would be beneficial for the 
consumers" (Bigman, 1985, p. 16). However, in countries with low-income population 
characteristics (such as high share of food expenditure), stabilization policies aimed at 
encouraging food production through higher food prices are likely to result in reductions in 
the real incomes of food consumers (Schultz, 1978; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988, p.241). 
Consequently, policies that raise food prices through encouraging production by providing 
incentives to farmers are generally adopted in countries where consumers are relatively more 
affluent (Miller, 1986). On the other hand, food policies that stabilize food prices at a level 
that ensures accessibility to food for consumers with low purchasing power generally prevail 
in low-income countries (Krueger, 1992; Bigman, 1985; Chisholm and Tyers, 1982; Ahmed 
and Mellor, 1988). Nonetheless, such stabilization policies for poor consumers often lower 
average prices received by farmers, thus further depressing domestic production (Krueger ef 
al., 1991; Roumasset, 1982; Edirisinghe, 1982). Therefore, consumers' food concerns affect 
domestic food pricing policies in both developing and industrialized countries. 
In terms of indirect utility function, v (p i  , p2 ,  y ) ,  which is twice differentiable within 
the feasible region with (d v/dp) < 0, (d v/dy) > 0, and (d^v/dy^) < 0, where i = 1,2: 
v(p\,p2,y) if < i  
Vo if ^ 
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Note that pi is random and the probability that p, >y/q\ 0. Now, let /(pi) be the 
probability density function ofp, (Figure IV.3), with mean p\ and variance Then, 
E{p \ ]  =  \p - f i p \ )  dp i  =  P i -
Therefore, using the above analysis, we can write 
y/g. 
E{y] = J v(')J(pi)dpi + j V o J (p \ )dp i  
0 y/q^ 
or, since v^ is constant. 
y/g. 
£[v] = \ v ( - ) j (p i )dp i  + Vo{ \ -F (y /h ) } -
Note that Kr)  = ] j<PÙdp ,  =  
y Ik, 
In order to receive the distribution of prices that avoids the risk of consumption shortfalls by 
completely stabilizing the prices and, thus, eliminating the probability that prices may be 
f(Pj) 
(P.=5| ) 
Figure IV.3: Probability density function 
The probability density function need not be normally distributed. It is assumed so here in order to enhance 
comprehensibiiity. 
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higher than the critical level {p, > ô, ), the consumer is modeled to be willing to pay a 
fraction T of his income. The fraction would be equivalent to the cash value of benefits to the 
consumer of the elimination of randomness in prices. Foster and Rausser (1992) point out 
that the consumer willingness to pay for price stabilization is indicative of the benefits that 
accrue to them. They contend that "... price-distorting compensation schemes may be 
nothing more than the cheapest means of securing public interest policies" (p. 3). The 
distortion in domestic prices stimulates supply which ensures long-term food security to 
consumers. Foster and Rausser conclude that price-distorting farm programs are useful to 
consumers because they counter the farmers' opposition to supply-enhancing policy which 
would, in the absence of a subsidy, lower the returns to farmers. 
In the situation where the price of q, is completely stabilized at, say, p\, the utility 
function would become 
E[y]  =  v (p \ , p2 , y -b )  =  j  v ( . - ) J (P i )dp \  +  V o  J l ] ,  
which is similar to Newberry and Stiglitz's framework where the consumer is willing to pay 
some amount b from the income in order to have the price of qi completely stabilized at p 
However, the consumer may be interested in a price stabilization policy that 
eliminates the probability of prices being higher than the critical level.Moreover, the fiscal 
costs associated with such a policy may be prohibitively high and the only practical 
approach, therefore, may be to alter the distribution of prices such that the probability of 
prices being higher than the critical level is reduced (Bigman, 1982). Also, all the consumer 
may want is to make sure that the probability of p, being greater than ylq\ is eliminated. 
This may amount to implementing pricing policies that alter the distribution of p, so that the 
prices don't go higher thany^'i • It can, then, be assumed that the policy(ies) pursued results 
in original density function, ffp, ), being replaced by another probability density function 
Following Newberry and Stiglitz, the actual value of p', would depend on the type of stabilization policies pursued. 
" Price stabilization may be the outcome of different agricultural policies pursued by the government. For the present purposes, 
it is suffice to assume a policy that eliminates the probability of the critical region. 
I 
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where, 
00 
f gip\)dp\ = 0. 
yikt 
Thus, the prices are not completely stabilized but made 'less' random in the sense that 
Pr /">(!:)} = »• 
In this case, then, the expression for the indirect utility function becomes 
y'h r  / X ,  y'h 
£[v]= J v0 )g(;7i)f/pi+ V o  1-G (^^J =  \  V o (p\ , P 2 ,y-b)g{p{)dp\ 
0 I ' 0 
Note that now 
yik\ 
] g i P \ ) d p \ =  Pr{/7,<( |^))  = 1.  
Using Taylor series approximation on both sides of the expected utility function, 
E[v (p,,p2.y)] = v(p\,p2.y-b). 
and taking expectations, the following expression is obtained for the cash benefits to the 
consumers of price stabilization, b. Alternatively, the expression of gains that would accrue 
from partial stabilization of the domestic market is:"*^ 
b = -('/2)(^,y/p,)[(&,i/p,)o^p, - 2(5,j/p2)ppi.p2 <ypi <^p2 + 2(R,-^) Ç>p,.yOp,ay]-q, (p\-p\) 
where, 
= variance of price of commodity, i=l, 2, 
P/ = budget shares of the first good, 
= consumer's relative risk aversion for income variability, 
T| = income elasticity of demand, 
Bij = cross price elasticity of the /"• commodity with price, 
Cpi = standard deviation of the price of the commodity, 
= standard deviation of income, 
Ppi,p2 ~ correlation coefficient between the two prices, and 
Ppi y = correlation coefficient between the price of g, and income. 
" Analogous to food security, a cose may also be made here for consumers' social preferences to pay to support farmers because 
of the perceived virtues of country life. 
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However, the focus here is on the benefits to consumer of the price stabilization for the staple 
commodity. Therefore, the cross effects between q, and q; can be ignored to obtain 
manageable expression for 
b = ('A) p/ yf P/ (Rc- r\)-e„] o\, /p/ - p, (R,- n ; /p,. 
(In the above expression, G,, is assumed to be positive.) Using the implicit function theorem, 
the consumer benefits can be expressed in terms of price and income elasticities of demand, 
Arrow-Pratt's coefficient of relative risk aversion, Engel coefficients, and the income of the 
consumer. Ignoring the subscripts, then, 
b'= T /p, e, R,, y, n, W 
where, w is a vector of other exogenous variables. These are the parameters changes in 
which would have substantial impact on the determination of domestic protectionistic 
policies. The proportion of expenditure on food, represented by p, tends to vary significantly 
across industrialized and developing countries. In poor countries, about half of the 
consumption expenditure is spent on food whereas in industrialized countries, this share is 
less than what is spent on manufactured items. 
The stabilization policies are observed in both developing and industrialized countries 
due to the risk preferences of economic agents (Tyers and Anderson). Many studies have 
calculated the coefficient of relative risk aversion, Rc. Its values have been estimated to vary 
with income and with the size of risks in relation to income, from zero for risk neutral agents 
to two for sizable risk. Income and price elasticities of demand also vary significantly across 
rich and poor countries and may have important bearing on domestic farm policies. The 
econometric significance of these variables in the deteimination of agricultural protection is 
tested in the next chapter. 
Moreover, there are also significant differences in consumer incomes across 
industrialized and developing countries. Also, the minimum requirements of the staple food 
" Moreover, the dependent variable used in the analysis, the producer subsidy equivalent, assumes that no substitution 
possibilities exist in consumption and production among commodities. This implies that these calculations ignore the 
cross-commodity effects. To keep the empirical analysis consistent, it would be useful to ignore such effects in the 
theoretical model as well. Some other authors also adopted similar assumptions about the cross-commodity effects (see, for 
example, Tyers and Anderson, 1992, p. 413). 
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KP.) 
Figure IV.4: Cross-country variations in stabilized distributions 
commodity may differ due to demographic and dietary patterns. The differences in the level 
of all these variables would then imply that there may exist a range of the critical prices (y/ 
q\) across countries, as shown in Figure 1V.4. 
In this figure, (y/qi )\ may represent the critical price range in the case of the 
representative consumer in industrialized (rich) countries whereas (y/q 1)2 indicates the same 
for the representative consumer with low income in developing countries/^ The consumer in 
a developing country would prefer to have the lower distribution of stabilized prices, l(pj, 
because of the constraints imposed by the variables identified above. The consumer in an 
industrialized country may be willing to settle for the higher distribution, h(pi). This may in 
part explain the difference in prices across countries.''® 
Given the above analysis of consumer behavior across industrialized and developing 
countries, it may be possible to infer the signs on the coefficients associated with these 
variables with respect to the level of benefits accruing to the consumers. Due to the 
complexity of deriving comparative static results directly from the structural equation, some 
The above analysis and its results may easily be generalized to more aggregate levels representing the consumers in a given 
country, without loss of generality. 
An extension of the analysis may be to look at the cross-sectional differences among families regarding their age, number of 
children, opportunity cost of work, political participation and incomes, within a given country. 
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plausible assumptions about the signs of the partial derivatives can be made. As the share of 
food in household expenditures, p, increases, the per capita benefits of price stabilization 
would also increase. A casual observation of the cross-country food consumption patterns 
also reveals that the consumers' stake in low prices increases as their spending on food items 
increases. Countries with very high Engel coefficients tend to subsidize consumption to 
ensure short-term food security. In the industrialized countries, however, the relatively low 
Engel coefficients enable consumers to support domestic production through higher prices 
and thus ensure long-term stability of food supplies. This result is also supported by 
Balisacan and Roumasset who conclude that the share of food in household budget of 
consumers is the main determinant of protection levels. Moreover, as the per capita income, 
y, grows, budget share for food expenditures falls. Consequently, the consumers' welfare 
becomes less sensitive to changes in prices of food. 
The poor consumers in developing countries may be expected to be more risk-averse 
as compared to their counterparts in the industrialized countries. This view is also shared by 
Tyers and Anderson in their model where they assign a value of /lc=2 to the consumers in 
developing countries and Rc =1 in industrialized countries. For more risk-averse consumers, 
then, the stability in prices would be more beneficial than it would be to the less risk-averse. 
Similarly, higher income elasticity (T)) and price elasticity (E) of demand will increase 
marginal gains to consumer from reduction in consumer prices. This result is also supported 
by Miller (1991). 
This section, therefore, proposes an alternative hypothesis which suggests that 
agricultural taxes and subsidies are part of a larger portfolio of policies than analyzed in the 
literature on political competition among groups. An attempt is made to explicitly explain 
the viewpoint expressed by Gardner and Foster and Rausser. It is shown that the consumers' 
food security concern may, in part, explain the divergent patterns of agricultural protection 
across industrialized and developed countries. This alternative hypothesis is also analyzed 
empirically in the next chapter where consumer characteristics of the commodity have been 
explicitly incorporated into the analysis. However, it may be noted that the source of farm 
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subsidies to producers (consumers) are invariably the consumers and taxpayers (producers). 
Hence, in the short-run, their interests can run counter to the immediate benefits accruing to 
each other. Therefore, if these variables are viewed against producer protection levels, the 
opposite signs would be expected in the above relationships. 
IV.3 Producer Model'" 
In this section, a behavioral model of agricultural producers is developed following 
the CHG approach in the PEAP literature. Farm groups generally find it easier to organize 
than consumers since they are more homogeneous and less vulnerable to free-rider effect 
(Moyer and Josling, 1990). Producers with a common interest, therefore, combine together 
to form an organization to protect their interests. The activities of farmers towards this 
common purpose are modeled below to influence the outcome of farm policies. 
The political power of the producer group depends upon the attributes such as their 
membership size, their efficiency at overcoming the free-rider problem and their incomes. 
The investment in political influence by farmers for the purpose of securing protection (A), 
their relative group size («) and the level income (w ), have been modeled explicitly into the 
traditional theory of profit maximizing firms."*® An important element of this framework is 
the resource contribution in generating political pressure which is, in part, constrained by the 
level of their incomes. The investment in political resource contribution may be in the form 
of time, money and political support. Therefore, the demand for protection from farmers 
represents, at the margin, the preparedness of the group in seeking a policy change to offer 
political leaders various forms of political support (Anderson and Tyers, 1989, p. 179). 
The quantity (q ) and market price with goverrmient intei*vention (p ) in the model 
refer to a staple food commodity (for example, wheat).'*" A well behaved cost function c(q) 
is assumed which is continuous, and twice differentiable. Assuming a profit function (TT) that 
•" An earlier version of this model has been published In the Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, 30 (4); 297-310. 
" The model assumes that producers maximize their profits without taking into account the demand for agricultural protection 
coming from consumers. This is commonly referred to as the Nash-Coumot behavior in the public choice literature. In case 
where only one group spends resources in political lobbying, the interaction term regarding the effects of level of 
expenditures of one group on that of the other can be ignored. 
Note that since only one output commodity is considered, therefore, q here corresponds to the q, in the consumer model. 
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satisfies continuity, twice differentiability, and convexity (in prices) properties, the 
farmer's maximization problem, with the introduction of his contribution for lobbying, is 
modeled as follows: 
T^i=P<lrc(q) i = (1) 
Given the profit maximizing objective, any individual farmer can choose how much 
to produce and how much to contribute towards lobbying. If the individual contribution 
towards lobbying is zero, this problem reduces to the familiar profit maximization case. The 
price of the output is hypothesized to be influenced by the farmers' lobbying activity in the 
following manner: 
P = P (2) 
where, p is the mean of free-market price without intervention (which may also be the world 
price mean), x > 0 is the increase in price (subsidy) due to lobbying and x < 0 implies taxation 
of producers.'" The amount of political support supplied in response to a given expenditure 
of time and resources by the group, k = Lki, depends upon a number of characteristics of 
1=1 
the group. These may include factors such as n, w, and other exogenous variables 
(agricultural productivity, for example) captured by 0. 
The amount of political support received by the group is shown in the literature to 
be positively related to the level of contribution. Miller (1991) argues that a group's political 
expenditures would be positively related to the marginal benefits received. Peltzman (1976) 
contends that the probability of support by beneficiaries would rise with per capita marginal 
benefits received by the group but at a decreasing rate. The greater the increase in producers' 
benefit, the more political contribution, k, they would be willing to make to the regulators. 
The political contributions in the model are net of organizational costs incurred by the group. 
The relationship between the size of the group and its political infiuence has been 
explored by Olson, Becker and Peltzman, among others. Increase in the number of farmers. 
The theory developed here focuses on a homogeneous commodity (q) with no substitution, and a small country case - in 
which the world price of the commodity is considered as given. In this case, the border price can be substituted for the 
free-market price. Moreover, the calculations of the dependent variable used in the empirical analysis are also based upon 
these assumptions. These assumptions, therefore, facilitate maintaining consistency throughout the study. 
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n, has two offsetting effects. An increase in n would increase the total contributions. On the 
other hand, it would also accentuate the free-rider problem and would reduce the per capita 
gains associated with any given wealth transfer. Moreover, the costs of organization would 
probably rise with the size of the group. In large groups, a greater proportion of political 
contributions must be devoted to the administrative matters and enforcing participation by 
group members. This, in turn, would reduce the amount available for political lobbying. 
According to Olson, as the number of farmers decreases, it becomes easier for them to 
organize political lobbying, increasing their effective demand for protection. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that as the number of farmers increases relative to number of non-farmers, 
the subsidies provided to the group decreases. 
Another pattern of the political economy of agricultural protection across countries is 
that protection afforded to farmers is positively correlated with average per capita incomes 
(Anderson and Hayami; Bale and Lutz; Binswanger and Scandizzo; de Gorter and Tsur). It is 
assumed, therefore, that as the income of the group increases, the resource contributions may 
rise, thereby increasing the effective demand for protection. The analysis here does not 
consider the altruistic or egalitarian motives as a reason for the redistribution of income from 
consumers to farmers following the structural adjustments in a growing economy as 
contended by Honma and Hayami (1986a and 1986b) and de Gorter and Tsur (1991). That 
the farm programs are instituted to benefit the poor farmers is contested by Tyers and 
Anderson (1992): "[T]he claim that agricultural protection and food prices are needed in 
industrial countries to transfer income to poor farmers looks hollow when the majority of 
such transfers from consumers goes to the wealthiest 20 percent or so of the farmers" (p. 81). 
Therefore, the political power of the group is instead hypothesized here to be positively 
associated with its income. The higher the marketable surplus of the farmers, the higher their 
stake in seeking political intervention, and the more would be the contribution towards 
lobbying. 
Based on the above discussion, the farmer's profit function can be rewritten as 
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Max nt = [p + X (k,w,n,9) ]q,- c(q) - k, (3) 
The optimality conditions for output and resource contribution are given by the first 
order conditions for (3): 
q, : dn,/dq, =p +x (k,w,n,Q) - c'(qi) = 0 (4) 
ki : dn,/ dk, = q, {( dx/dk) . (dk/dk)} -1-0 (5) 
or q, (dx /dk) = I (6) 
The equation (4) represents the trivial profit maximization condition that the optimal 
output level is given by the equality between the output price and the marginal cost. The 
equation (6) states that the total increase in the value of output from lobbying should equal 
one. Note that (dx/dk ) represents per unit increase in price (subsidy) due to the last dollar 
spent on political activity. Therefore, alternatively, the condition implies that producers 
spent on lobbying as long as the last dollar spent brings about an increase in income of one 
dollar. Olson's framework, however, evaluates only the cost to different groups in seeking 
political protection and does not evaluate potential benefits. In the above framework, 
benefits to producers are explicitly incorporated since condition (6) reflects increased 
marginal gains with respect to a unit increase in price. 
Since imposing symmetry implies that (&Ti/dkidq,) = (d^n/dqidk,), hence, by the 
second order conditions, the Hessian can be written as 
7t 
71 
'.9/9f 
Uqiki 
n 
{dx/dk) 
(dx/dk) 
qi (d^x/dk^) (7) 
The profit maximizing conditions would imply that the Hessian is negative definite 
(sufficient condition) which would imply the following : 
•c"(qi) < 0 which implies c"(qi) > 0, 
qi (d^x /dk') < 0 which implies ë^x/dk^ < 0, 
and that {-c"(q) q/d^x/dk^) - (dx/dk)^} > 0. (8) 
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The producers' maximization problem gives the following expressions for the optimal 
output and contribution decisions upon invoking the implicit function theorem: 
9,] ==qi(p, w, ri,Q), 
K = k, (p, w, n,Q). 
Thus, the output produced and resources contributed by farmers in a country would 
depend on, among other things, the mean of the free-market price, and the income and 
number of farmers. The indirect profit function, therefore, using the implicit function 
theorem, would yield the expression, n* = %(p,w, n,Q). Comparative statics analysis is 
used next to determine the resultant expressions for the choice variables gi and k. 
Propositions (1) through (6) below analyze the effects changes in parameters on key policy 
issues. 
Proposition 1: dq,/dw > 0provided /dkdw > 0 i.e., an increase in income will result in 
more output forthcoming from the producers. 
The proof of proposition 1 can be established by first presenting the total 
differentiation of (4) and (6), with respect to the income (w), in the following form: 
- c"{qt) dxtdk 
dxtdk qt{ô\ldk^) 
By the implicit function theorem and using Cramer's rule, the effect of income on 
output can be represented as: 
-(dx /dw) q, (d^x/dl^) + (dx/dk) q, (d^i/dkdw) 
dq/dw= (10) 
-c"(q) q0T/dl<^) - (di/dk)^ 
which is positive if d'x /dkdw > 0. Thus, as the income of the farming group increases, the 
farm output also increases. 
dq -(dx/dw) dw 
dkt -qi{d\ldkdw) dw 
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Proposition 2 : An increase in the income will result in more resource contribution 
forthcoming from the producers i.e., dk/dw > 0. 
Using (9) and Cramer's rule, the proof of direct relationship between income and 
resource contribution can be derived as : 
c"(gi) q, (d^ x/dkdw) + ( dx/dk) ( dx/dw) 
dk/dw = > 0 (11) 
-c"(q) qi (d^T /dk') - (dx /dkf 
The implication of (11) is that the individual contribution moves in the same direction 
as that of the income. This suggests that the overall contribution will be more in the 
industrialized countries as compared to the developing countries and, therefore, may result in 
higher subsidies to producers. 
Proposition 3 : An increase in the mean of market price in the absence of intervention will 
result in more output forthcoming from the producers i.e., dq/dp > 0. 
The proof involves the following expression derived from totally differentiating (4) 
and (6) with respect to the mean of the price: 
where, n, = 1, and n, = 0. 
Using (12) and Cramer's rule, the change in output due to change in p can be derived 
as ; 
•qj (&x /dJ^) 
dq/c^ = > 0. (13) 
-c"(qi) qi (&x /dk^) - (dx /dkf 
dqi -"i^i.qipdp 
dki _ -T^l.kip dp _ 
(12) 
Proposition 4 : An increase in the mean of market price in the absence of intervention will 
result in more resource contributions forthcoming from producers i.e., dk/clp > 0. 
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Likewise as above, using (12) and Cramer's rule, the effect of change in the mean of 
price on contribution can be summarized as : 
(ôx /dk) 
dk/dp- = > 0. (14) 
-c"(q) q, (d^z/dk^) - (dx /dk/ 
The connotation of (14) is that as the mean of the free-market price rises, the 
individual firm's contribution also rises. As p goes up, the producer surplus also goes up, 
which increases the willingness of the producers to increase their contribution for lobbying. 
This is noticeable in case of industrialized countries where higher producer surplus results in 
increased contribution towards lobbying efforts. 
Proposition 5 : (a) dq/dn > 0 provided /dkdn) > 0 and (b) dq/dn < 0 provided 
(ë'x/dkdn) < 0 i.e. an increase in the lobbying group size may have either effect on the 
output forthcoming from the producers. 
Proposition 5 can be trivially proved by the following result of total differentiation of 
(4) and (6) and using n, = dx/dn, and %, = g, (ô^x /dkdn), 
-(dx /dn) qi (d^x /d/^) + ( dx/dk) q, (& x/dkdn) 
dq/dn = , (15) 
-c"(q) qi (d^x /dl^) - (dx /dk/ 
which is positive if (^x/dkdn) > 0, and negative otherwise. There is a tradeoff between the 
group size and contribution in their effect on the level of subsidy obtained. As the number of 
farmers increases, the subsidy provided to the farmers falls as discussed above. On the other 
hand, an increase in contribution towards lobbying may increase the effective demand for 
political intervention, resulting in higher subsidies. If this interaction results in positive 
subsidies, then the increase in the number of farmers would increase the output. Therefore, 
the effect of the group size and contribution on the subsidies provided decides the 
relationship between the number of farmers and the output forthcoming from them. 
> 
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Proposition 6 : (a) dk,/dn > 0 provided (&x/dkdn) > 0 and (b) dk/dn < 0 provided 
(ë^i/dkdn) > 0 i.e., an increase in the size of the lobbying group may have either effect on the 
resource contributions forthcoming from the producers. 
Equation (15) and Cramer's rule yield the following result : 
c"(q) g I (ô^x/dkdx ) + (ôz /dk) (dx /dn) 
dk/dn= , (16) 
-c"(q) q, (d^x /dJâ) - (ôx /ôkf 
which is positive if {dx /dn), (d^x/dkdn) > 0, and negative otherwise. The implication is that 
the effect of n on the contribution also depends on the effect of the trade-off between k and n 
on T, Therefore, if the resultant effect increases the subsidies provided, then the number of 
farmers would be positively related to the amount of contribution forthcoming from them. 
The model presented above points out that the number of farmers, their incomes, the 
mean of free-market prices and productivity are some of the important factors impacting the 
political resource contributions. These factors, therefore, influence the effective demand for 
protection coming from agricultural producers. Since there is significant variation among the 
number of farmers, their incomes and productivity across industrialized and developing 
countries, the demand for protection would also vary across these countries. The empirical 
test of the comparative static analysis would suggest whether the self-interest is the primary 
motivational force that explains preferences across industrialized and developing countries. 
The politician's optimization problem, taking into account both consumers' and producers' 
interests is discussed next. 
IV.4 Politician Model 
The factors affecting the demand for agricultural protection from consumers and 
producers can, at best, provide only a partial explanation of the prevalent government 
intervention. Therefore, the supply of government intervention from the politicians also 
merits examination. On the supply side of the political market, or what many would refer to 
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as the political side, one of the most significant conceptual framework has been developed by 
Downs (1957). In Downs' conceptualization of political market supply, politicians pursue 
policies so as to maximize their chances of remaining in office. Individuals and groups who 
expect to gain from a particular policy seek its adoption by investing in lobbying and 
propaganda to the point where they perceive the expected net benefits from further 
expenditures to be zero. In essence. Downs' framework determines the supply by evaluating 
the costs and benefits to the government at the margin of any particular policy decision. 
In a case of distortionary policy, the supply curve represents the marginal political 
cost of providing an extra unit of protection. The demand curve represents, at the margin, the 
preparedness of groups seeking a policy change to offer political leaders various forms of 
political support. The prevalent levels of agricultural protection across industrialized and 
developing countries indicate that the patterns on the supply side of the political market vary 
across countries. The factors and relationships that determine the degrees of subsidies or 
taxation to any group would depend upon the compatibility or conflict between the interests 
of these two groups, the bureaucratic capacity, and the government's treasury position. 
The cost of providing protection would also depend upon amount of production 
(consumption) if producers (consumers) are subsidized since protection may also be provided 
on per unit basis (USDA, 1990; OECD, 1991). Other factors such as dead-weight loss 
associated with the transfers also affect the costs of any policy (Gardner, 1987). The 
politician's model that follows incorporates these features. The policy maker chooses the 
level of policy instrument so as to maximize an objective function defined over producers' 
and consumers' objective functions and the budgetary position of the treasury. The 
conceptual framework in this model follows from the premise that the government forms 
preference over the welfare of consumers and producers. The theoretical model developed 
here is an extension of the one proposed by Riethmuller and Roe (1986) and later modified 
by Lopez (1989). 
Government is assumed to choose the level of policy instrument, x (subsidy if 
positive or tax otherwise), so as to maximize an objective function defined over the indirect 
» 
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utility fonction of consumers, the indirect profit function of producers and the cost of the 
policy. A government/politician's optimization problem is defined as: 
Max U= U(v', n*, m) 
T 
where, U is the politician's utility function for the staple food policy-making assumed to be 
separable, additive and strictly concave in its arguments; v* is the indirect utility function 
obtained from the consumer model above; and n' is the producer's indirect profit Amction 
from the producer's choice problem. The vector of costs associated with the policy, m, may 
include variables associated with the government's budgetary position. It is further assumed 
that the politician's preferences in the staple commodity policy are separable from other 
concerns. The first-order condition for utility maximization is given by 
dU dU ÔV* , dU ÔK* , dU dm ^ 
ft = + + 
The right hand side of this equation describes the effects of the policy on the consumer's 
utility, producer's profits and the cost of the policy, respectively. The condition shows that 
the politician chooses the level of the policy instrument, x', such that marginal benefits from 
the policy equal the marginal cost. To illustrate the effect on domestic consumers and 
producers assume that the cost of the policy, m, is constant. Then, the above equation implies 
that 
-ôU/dv* I _ dnVdx 
dU/dn* SvVôT ' 
In other words, the politician will set the policy instrument level where the marginal rate of 
substitution of consumer's interests for producer's interests is equal to the trade-off between 
the producer's and consumer's interests due to change in the policy instrument. 
Using the implicit function theorem, the politician's choice variable can be stated as a 
function of exogenous variables: 
X* = T (p, R„ T], G,j/, p, w, M, 8, m, T ). 
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The hypothesis is that the politician chooses the instrument x* taking into account the 
variables associated with both consumers' and producers' interests and the cost of the policy. 
Here, p, G, T| and)/ represent the consumer's budget share of the commodity, relative risk 
aversion, the price and income elasticities of demand, and income, respectively, as derived 
from the consumer model. The variablesp, w, n and 0 are the exogenous variables derived 
earlier from the producer model depicting the free-market price of the commodity, the 
income and numbers of producers, and other variables, respectively. Finally, ^ reflects the 
vector of other exogenous variables. 
If the politician's preferences are formed only over the producer's interests, the above 
expression for the optimal policy instrument reduces to: 
x* = i(p, w, n, 0, Q ), 
where Q includes other exogenous variables from producers' model as well as the factors 
affecting costs of the policy. On the other hand, if the politician's preferences are defined 
over the consumer's interests only, the following result is obtained: 
T *  = T((3„R. , T i , G ,  y, r ) .  
where, the F vector represents the residual exogenous variables associated with the costs and 
consumer's optimization. 
In conclusion, the theoretical models developed above explain the process of choice 
of intervention policy adopted highlighting the fact that the choice of policy instrument 
depends on the interests of both consumers and producers. Since these variables differ 
significantly across industrialized and developing countries, therefore, the choice of the 
optimum policy t* would also differ significantly across these countries. In the next chapter, 
these reduced form equations will be subjected to empirical testing using cross-country data 
from industrialized and developing countries. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the comparative static results of the theoretical models are subjected 
to empirical verification. A number of alternative estimation techniques and model 
specifications have been used to analyze the cross-country determinants of agricultural 
protection. The analysis is performed with a view to include the largest possible sample of 
countries for which the data on the dependent variable are available. In order to have a 
balanced data set compatible with the software, the period over which the analysis could be 
performed was restricted to the years 1982-87." 
The determinants of farm policies identified in the consumer and producer models are 
tested for complementarity as well as for relative superiority. Of special interest is the 
consumers' food security issue. An attempt is therefore made to analyze these concerns and 
their significance in explaining the protection levels across industrialized and developing 
countries. The analysis is analogous to testing the validity of the SWG approach discussed 
previously. The variables explaining significant variation in the protection levels are also 
analyzed in terms of their impact on the probability of domestic agricultural producers being 
subsidized. Each section in this chapter is supported by a brief explanation of the procedures 
involved in the estimation. 
The next section describes sources and approximation of dependent and independent 
variables included in the study. The section also highlights some issues involved in pooled 
cross-section time-series estimation. Some prominent determinants of international 
agricultural protection have been identified in Section V.2. The results are provided along 
interest-group. The relationship between the economic development of a country and the 
level of farm subsidies are also analyzed in a dynamic framework. Empirical specification 
and test results of pair-wise non-nested J tests for the superiority hypothesis are provided in 
" The data on producer subsidy equivalents for wheat are available up to 199! for ! I industrialized countries. However, similar 
data were not available for all sample developing countries beyond tlie year 1987. The econometric software package --
SHAZAM " that was used throughout the analysis requires that the pooled cross-section time-series data set should not be 
unbalanced, hence limiting the time period. 
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Section V.3. Section V.4 outlines the empirical models and provides the results of the nested 
tests for the complementarity hypothesis. Probit estimation technique is employed in the 
final section. 
V.l Data and Estimation Techniques 
This section provides the sources and definitions of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. The ordinary least squares (OLS) and pooled cross-section time-series estimation 
techniques are used for analyzing the cross-country agricultural protection levels. Some 
issues involved in the pooled estimation, such as the problems of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, are also addressed. In addition, the common problem of simultaneity in the 
quantitative studies on agricultural protection is also analyzed. 
V.1.1 Data and Scope of the Study 
The dependent variable in the empirical analysis - the level of government 
intervention in the wheat sector - has been approximated by the Producer Subsidy 
Equivalents (PSE)" The data on subsidy equivalents have been collected from two sources, 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), as discussed in Chapter III. The USD A (1988), 
Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government Intervention in 
Agriculture, 1982-86) provides the PSE data for 17 countries covering the period 1982-86. A 
much broader sample of countries and commodities is available in USD A (1990: Estimates 
of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government Intervention in Agriculture, 
1982-87). Moreover, data for some additional developing countries were also obtained 
through personal communications with USD A officials.^'' The OECD data are for eleven 
industrialized countries, including the European Community, for the years 1979 to 1990 
" It may be noted that since tlie PSE estimates incorporate a wide range of policies and since the present analysis Is 
commodity-speciflc covering a short period of time, the problem of resultant bias in comparison of these estimates over time 
and across countries has been substantially reduced. 
" The data for Algeria, Colombia, Morocco and Zimbabwe were obtained from Dr. Karl Mabbs-Zeno. His help in this regard 
is duly acknowledged. 
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{Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 1979-90), The 
two sources provide overlapping data for 11 industrialized countries. In that case, the OECD 
data are selected. In addition, the PSE figures for these countries for the year 1991 (used in 
Chapter III) are collected from Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade: Monitoring and 
Outlook, 1992. 
The analysis is performed across 30 industrialized and developing countries or group 
of countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, the European Community {Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom and, after 1986, 
Portugal and Spain) Egypt, Finland, India, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
States, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. The results have been reported separately for all countries 
as well as for industrialized countries in case of the producer model. 
A large number of explanatory variables are used in the trial tests and their acronyms, 
units of measurement, and sources are given in Table V.l. The figures available in domestic 
currency units were translated into a common currency (the U.S. dollar) using the exchange 
rates listed in the International Financial Stat is tics.The data on national income statistics 
have been taken from two sources: the International Financial Statistics; and the World 
Development Report. The data from both sources have been used interchangingly in the 
models. 
The data on income and price elasticities of demand for wheat as well as the price 
elasticity of supply are taken from Tyers and Anderson (1992). The income elasticity of 
demand for "food" is computed by averaging the data on income elasticities of demand with 
respect to six primary food commodities - Rice, Wheat, Sugar, Dairy Products, Ruminant 
and Non-Ruminant meats ~ available in the same source. 
" It may be noted that when comparing a statistical series for variables expressed in value terms, the use of one currency unit 
rather than the other may alter the apparent trend. 
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Table V.l: Definitions, units and sources of explanatory variables 
Variables Acronym Units' Source^ 
Exchange Rate EX RATE Domestic Currency per U.S. $ IFS 
Consumer Price Index INXCP 1985=100 IFS 
Wholesale Price Index INXWSP 1985=100 IFS 
Total Exports EXPORTS Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Total Imports IMPORTS Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Trade Balance TRADBAL U.S. $ (Millions) IFS 
Merchandise Exports f.o.b. MEXPORTS U.S. $ (Millions) IFS 
Government Finance GOVTFIN Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Exports of Goods and Services EXPORTGS Domestic Currency (millions) IFS 
Private Consumption PRIVCONS Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Gross Domestic Product GDP Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Gross Domestic Product at 1985 Prices GDP85 Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Gross National Product GNP Domestic Currency (Millions) IFS 
Population POPN Millions IFS and WDl 
Gross National Product per Capita GNPC U.S.$ WDR 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita GDPC U.S.$ Computed 
Value Added in Agriculture VADAG U.S. $ (Millions) WDR 
Value Added in Manufacturing VADMN U.S. $ (Millions) WDR 
Share of Agriculture in GDP GDPAG % WDR 
Share of Industry in GDP GDPIN % WDR 
Share of Agriculture in GDP Relative to 
Industry 
GDPAGIN GDPAG/GDPIN Computed 
Share of Manufacturing in GDP GDPMN % WDR 
Share of Services in GDP GDPSRV % WDR 
Working Population POPWK % WDR 
Share of Agriculture in Labor Force LFAG % WDR 
Number of Farm Workers LFAGN Millions Computed 
Growth Rate of Agricultural Labor Force GRLFAG % Computed 
Share of Industry in Labor Force LFIND % WDR 
Growth Rate of Industrial Labor Force GRLFIND % Computed 
Share of Agriculture in Labor Force Relative 
to Industry 
LFAGIND LFAG/LFIND Computed 
Share of Food in Household Consumption 
Expenditure 
ENGEL % WDR 
158 
Table V.l: (contd.) 
Variables Acronym Unils^ Source^ 
Share of Cereals in Household Consumption 
Expenditure 
CEREALS % WDR 
Total Calorie Intake per Capita per Day CALORIE Calories FAO-1 
Total Protein Intake per Capita per Day PROTEIN Amount FAO-1 
Protein Intake From Meat PROTMEAT % FAO-1 
Calorie Intake from Wheat CALORIEW Calories FAO-1 
Share of Wheat in Total Calorie Intake CALWHT % Computed 
Total Arable Land Area AREA 1000 Hectares FAO-2 
Area Under Wheat AREAWHT 1000 Hectares FAO-2 
Share of Wheat in Total Area Cultivated AREAWPER % Computed 
Wheat Production PRODNW 1000 Metric Tons PS&D View 
Lagged Wheat Production PRODNWL 1000 Metric Tons Computed 
Wheat Consumption CONSNW 1000 Metric Tons PS&D View 
Lagged Wheat Consumption CONSNWL 1000 Metric Tons Computed 
Imports of Wheat IMPORTW 1000 Metric Tons PS&D View 
Exports of Wheat EXPORTW 1000 Metric Tons PS&D View 
Ending Stocks of Wheat STOCKSW 1000 Metric Tons PS&D View 
Yields of Wheat YIELDW Tons per Hectare PS&D View 
Import Dependence in Wheat IMPDEPW IMPORTW/(PRODNW+IMPORTW) Computed 
Self-Sufficiency Ration in Wheat SSRATIOW PRODNW/(PRODNW+IMPORTW) Computed 
Self-Sufficiency Rate in Wheat SSRATEW PRODNW/CONSNW Computed 
Variance of Production - 1 VARPRODI {{PRODN, - PRODNAva)/PRODNAva}' Computed 
Variance of Production - 2 VARPR0D2 {(PRODN, - PRODN,.,)/PRODN,.|}' Computed 
Factor Ratio FACTOR {Land per Farm Woker/Average 
Capital Endowment per Worker} 
Computed 
Productivity Ratio PRODUCT {Labor Productivity in Agriculture/ 
Labor Productivity in Industry} 
Computed 
Income Elasticity of Demand- Wheat n Number T&A 
Income Elasticity of Demand- Food 11 all Number Computed 
from T&A 
Price Elasticity of Wheat Demand E Number T&A 
Price Elasticity of Wheat Supply Number T&A 
Relative Risk Aversion & Number T&A 
Domestic Producer Prices of Wheat Pd,. Domestic Currency per Ton OECD;USDA 
Domestic Producer Prices of Wheat- Lagged Domestic Currency per Ton OECD;USDA 
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Table V.l: (contd.) 
Variables Acronym Units' Soured 
World Price of Wheat Pw,l Domestic Currency per Ton OECD;USDA 
World Price of Wheat - Lagged Pw,l-I Domestic Currency per Ton OECD;USDA 
Trend Variable TREND Time Period (Years) -
Dummy: Japan DUMMY1 =1 if Japan, 0 otherwise Created 
Dummy: EFTA^ DUMMY2 =1 if EFTA country, 0 
otherwise 
Created 
Dummy: Income DUMMY3 = 1 if Low-Income; 2 if Middle 
Income; 3 if Industrialized 
Created 
Dummy: Industrialized and Developing DUMMY4 =1 if Industrial Country; 0 
otherwise 
Created 
Dummy: Middle-Income DUMMY5 =1 if middle-income country, 0 
otherwise 
Created 
1 The variables in domestic currency units were translated into a single common currency (the U.S. dollar) using the exchange rate figures 
from the IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
2 IPS; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues; WDR; World Banic, World Development Report, 
various issues; FAO-I: Food and Agricultural Organization, fWO XeafAoot, various issues; FAO-2: Food and Agricultural 
Organization, Food Balance Sheets: Averages l984-86\ PS&D View: Webb, Alan and Karl Gudmunds, PS&D View '91, and PS&D View 
'92, Economic Research Division, United States Department of Agriculture, November 1992, Washington, D.C.; T&A; Tyers, R. and K. 
Anderson, (1992), Disarray in World Food Markets; A Quantitative Assessment, Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of 
Cambridge; OECD: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents, 1979-90, OCDE/GD (91)128, Paris; USDA: Webb, A. J., M. Lopez and R. Penn (1990), Estimates of 
Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government Intervention in Agriculture, 1982-87, Economic Research Service, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Statistical bulletin No. 803, April, 1990; Washington, DC. 
3 The European Free-trade Association (EFTA) includes Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. However, since the 
relevant data for Iceland were not available, the EFTA dummy was defined only for the rest five countries. 
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The study uses the Arrow-Pratt's coefficient of relative risk -aversion (Rc) to account 
for consumers' risk-aversion. It relates to the elasticity of the marginal utility of income. Its 
values are found to vary with income and size of risk in relation to income. Newbery and 
Stiglitz (1981, Ch. 7) and Tyers and Anderson (1992, Ch. 3) report that the risk-neutral 
individuals have values of /?<, close to zero while corresponding values for risk-averse 
individuals range up to 2. The country sample, therefore, was divided into three income 
groups: high-income (with a per capita gross national product above $2,500); middle-income 
($1000 to $2499); and low-income (below $1,000). Following Tyers and Anderson, a value 
of Rc = 2 is assigned to consumers in low-income countries; Rc = 1.5 for middle-income 
countries; and Rc= I 'm case of high-income countries. 
To account for the comparative advantage in agriculture, two proxy variables are 
created: the factor ratio (FACTOR) and the productivity ratio {PRODUCT). The factor ratio 
is defined as the ratio of agricultural land per farm worker to the average capital endowment 
per worker. The capital endowment, following Honma and Hayami (1986a and 1986b), is 
approximated by the national income per capita. The productivity ratio is defined as the ratio 
of labor productivity in agriculture to labor productivity in the industrial sector. 
A number of binary variables have also been used in the trial runs. Some unique 
effects on agricultural policies are captured by various intercept and slope dummies for 
Japan; Northern Europe (EFTA); industrialized and middle-income countries. To capture the 
income differentials across industrialized, middle-income and low-income countries, a 
dummy variable, DUMMY3, was created. A trend variable (TREND) is used in some 
regression models. It may be noted that not all the variables defined in Table V.l have been 
reported in the final results presented in this chapter. 
V.1.2 Pooled Cross-Section Time-Series Estimation 
Let there be N cross-sectional units, each with T observations in the time-series, thus 
providing NxT total number of observations. The present data set uses a sample of 30 
countries with six time-series observations, providing a total of 180 observations of each 
I 
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variable. Assuming that the cross-section parameters remain constant over time, the data can 
be combined to obtain more efficient estimates of the parameters, which is called pooling the 
data. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, pp. 253-261) describe various techniques for pooling 
cross-section time-series data including performing OLS regression on the entire data set, 
changing cross-section and time-series intercepts by using dummy variables, and specifying 
error-components and time-series autocorrelation models. 
Since the stochastic term in a cross-section time-series model might possibly include 
both time-series-related and cross-section-related disturbances as well as a combination of 
both disturbances, modeling in such a setting requires fairly complex specifications about the 
nature of disturbance terms. According to Kmenta (1986), while using pooled cross-section 
time-series data, the model may be specified to have both cross-sectional heteroscedasticity 
and time-series autoregression. 
A regression equation that has time-series and cross-sectional observations may be 
written as: 
= Yo + Y/ A/ + 12^11.2 + Yi Aj + Ik^K + 
where, i=l,..., N denotes countries; t=l T denotes time; and k=l,... ,K denotes 
independent variables. x„ are the observations on the dependent variable across time and 
countries. The represent explanatory variables and y's are the coefficients. In the 
cross-sectional data, the main focus of the analysis is usually on heteroscedasticity, that is, 
different stochastic processes applying to different cross-sectional units. The variance of the 
error term Hj,is not constant across observations and the error structure in this case is unique 
for each cross-section unit. For example, and E[\x^yi^ ,] = csj'y.s with 
A number of tests are available for checking the data for heteroscedasticity. The 
White's (1980) General Test is commonly used for detecting heteroscedasticity in a 
cross-sectional data. In this case, the OLS estimates would be biased. A two-step Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares {GLS) estimation technique may be used to account for 
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heteroscedasticity (Greene, 1990, p. 465). The problem of autocorrelation, found in the 
time-series data, may be checked by the Durbin-Watson test and can be dealt with by 
specifying a GLS estimation. 
In the quantitative studies on the determinants of agricultural protection, the most 
frequently encountered econometric problems are those of multicollinearity and simultaneity. 
For example, in the model, 
= On + CLj GNPC +.. .  4- a* GDP AG i,/c + M/n 
the per capita gross national product (GNPC) and the share of agriculture in gross domestic 
product (GDPAG) may be correlated with each other especially in an agrarian economy. In 
the near multicollinearity case, the estimation would yield high values of the coefficient of 
determination (R^) but the parameter estimates would be statistically insignificant. The 
results would also be sensitive to small changes in the model specification. The estimation 
may be improved by enlarging the sample size or imposing restrictions on the coefficients. A 
stepwise regression may also be used. 
The problem of simultaneity may exist when, in the above model, the GDPAG might 
be influenced by the level of the dependent variable. Honma and Hayami (1986a), in their 
seminal work on the structure of agricultural protection in ten industrialized countries, point 
out that "some of the explanatory variables used in the analysis are not really independent of 
the dependent variable." They cite the example of protection preventing the share of 
agriculture in the total economy from declining. Many other quantitative studies on the 
determination of agricultural protection, for example, Honma and Hayami (1986b), Fulginiti 
and Shogren (1992), and Fulginiti (1992) also report the problem of simultaneity and suggest 
caution while interpreting the results of their analyses. 
The following model illustrates the simultaneity problem in estimating the effects of 
explanatory variables on the protection awarded to wheat farmers: 
T = a, + a2LFAG + GDPAGD + n 
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Here, a second equation needs to be estimated to test for the simultaneity between the 
dependent variable and the GDPAGD. In the first stage, the GDPAGD is regressed on the 
share of agriculture in the labor force (LFAG) and the import dependence of the country in 
wheat (IMPDEP) and the residual variable, ê is calculated (/-statistics in parentheses): 
8 = GDPAGD - 21815 - 162.05 LFAG + 168.83 IMPDEP 0.033 
(4.78) (1.42) (-2.21) 
In the second stage, to correct for the simultaneity, the estimated residual is added as a 
regressor in the original model; 
T = 68.804 - 0.871 LFAG + 0.001 e - 0.001 GDPAGD 0.359 
(7.87) (-7.23) (2.91) (-2.48) 
Subsequently, the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate on ê is equal to zero may be 
tested using the t-statistic. The results above imply that the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at one percent level of significance. A plausible reason for the significant coefficient 
may be that the above model suffers from the excluded variables problem. Another way to 
deal with the problem of simultaneity may be to include the lagged values of the variables in 
the estimation. 
V.2 Determinants of International Agricultural Protection 
In this section, an attempt is made to empirically validate the results of the consumer, 
producer and policy-makers' models developed in the previous chapter. The purpose is to 
ascertain whether the variables identified in these models can be supported by empirical 
evidence. The goal is to provide an econometric analysis with substantial theoretical 
justification. The next subsection tests the significance of consumers' food security concerns 
in the determination of agricultural protectionistic policies. The theoretical results of the 
producer model are similarly tested in the subsection V.2.2. The complementarity of the two 
models as reflected by the political preference function is ascertained in the part V.2.3. The 
final subsection highlights the relationship between the level of protection and the income 
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structure of the country. The subsection also chalks out the dynamic adjustment path of the 
growth of protectionism vis-a-vis economic development. 
V.2.1 Empirical Validation of the Consumer Model 
In this subsection, the results are reported regarding the empirical test of the influence 
of consumer concerns on the protection accorded to wheat farmers across selected countries. 
The objective is to analyze whether the consumer food security hypothesis is validated by the 
empirical evidence. The OLS, GLS and pooled estimation techniques are used to fit the 
regression models. The main variables identified in the theoretical model regarding the 
consumer's food security concerns included the share of food in household consumption 
expenditures, income and price elasticities of demand, relative risk aversion and the 
consumer's income. These variables, along with few other explanatory variables, such as 
import dependence and self-sufficiency rate, are included in the regressions so as to provide 
a closer approximation of the consumers' concerns. 
An important variable of consumer concerns is the share of food in household 
budgets, indicated by the Engel coefficients. The correlation between the Engel coefficients 
and the farm sector protection depicted in Figures III.8 and III.9 indicate the possibility of a 
non-linear relationship. In order to examine the correct nature of this relationship, three 
plausible alternatives of the Engel coefficients - linear, log-linear and quadratic — were 
tested for model specification. The results are provided in Table V.2. 
The table shows that no general conclusion could be reached since in each of the 
models the null hypothesis could not be rejected. This implies that all three model can 
provide identical specification of the true nature of the relationship. Therefore, all three 
alternative specifications of Engel coefficients are used in the regressions: linear (model 7), 
quadratic (models 1,3,5,6 and 8) and log linear (model 2) in Table V.3. All of these 
specifications indicate the expected negative correlation between the Engel coefficients and 
the protection levels. The coefficient estimates are mostly statistically significant at one 
percent level. 
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Table V.2: Test for the model specification for the Engel coefficient variable 
Hypothesis 
Testl^ 7^5/2' 
{-Statistics Decision t-Statistics Decision 
Linear vs. Quadratic 0.53 Could Not 0.42 Could Not 
Reject Reject 
Linear vs. Log 0.3 Could Not 0.61 Could Not 
Reject Reject 
Log vs. Quadratic 0.7 Could Not 0.3 Could Not 
Reject Reject 
1 The models are tested using the Davidson and MacKinnon's pair-wise J tests which are discussed In detail in Section V.5. The 
test statistics under the column Test I are for the null hypothesis that the first listed model in the comparison is the correct model. 
The test statistics under the Test 2 column are for the null hypothesis that the second listed model in the comparison is correct. 
The critical value at the 1% level of significance is 2.60. 
In poor countries, food accounts for about half of the household expenditures. As the 
proportion of personal disposable income spent on food decreases, the protection awarded to 
the agricultural sector rises. Higher the share of the commodity in total household 
expenditures, the greater will be the stake of consumers in food security. These results are 
also supported by Balisacan and Roumasset (1987). Hayami (1990) and Honma and Hayami 
(1986b) contend that the reduction in resistance against agricultural protectionism would be 
reinforced by the Engel's law. Honma and Hayami (1986a) conclude that: 
"As the share of food in total consumption expenditures declines, the effect of high food prices on the 
cost of living becomes smaller. Therefore, agricultural protectionism becomes more tolerable to 
consumers as their incomes rise. At the same time, it becomes tolerable to business interests, because 
the effects of high food prices on the cost of living and hence on the labor wage rates declines", (p. 120) 
Another important variable identified in the theoretical model of consumers, the 
income elasticity of demand (T)), also had the expected negative sign and was statistically 
significant in all the regression models. High income elasticity may also be expected to 
increase the marginal gains to consumers from food security. Income elasticity of demand 
for wheat in the sample countries varied from -0.25 to 1.00. The highest income elasticities 
were observed in the case of low income countries. Consequently, the consumers in these 
countries might be expected to oppose the protectionistic policies that support the 
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Table V.3: Results for consumer interest models, 1982-87 
Independent 
Variables 
( I )  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimation 
Technique', Pool Pool GLS OLS OLS OLS Pool Pool 
Engel Coefficient 7.248* 
(4.70) 
- 5.937* 
(4.27) 
- 6.247* 
(4.52) 
5.742* 
(3.83) 
-0.968* 
(-3.51) 
5.063* 
(2.98) 
(Engel Coefficient)^ -0.072* 
(-4.54) 
- -0.072* 
(-4.26) 
- -0.062* 
(4.25) 
-0.059* 
(-3.58) 
- -0.044** 
(-2.35) 
In Engel - -27.817* 
(-3.77) 
- - - - - -
Income Elasticity-
Wheat 
- -60.478* 
(-4.18) 
-75.303* 
(.5.20) 
-29.787" 
(-2.43) 
-22.775** 
(-1.98) 
-25.817** 
(-2.17) 
-56.558* 
(-3.60) 
-51.388* 
(-2,68) 
Income Elasticity-
Food 
-34.175 
(-0.95) 
-
- - - - - -
Price Elasticity-
Wheat 
- - - - - - - -19.250 
(-1.05) 
Relative Risk-
Aversion 
-108.430* 
(-3.93) 
-
- -49.311* 
(-5.70) 
-78.638' 
(-3.70) 
-76.878* 
(-3.47) 
- -121.69* 
(-4.03) 
Per Capita Income 
- - 0.006* 
(5.76) 
-
- - - -
Per Capita GDP 
Non-Farm 
0.002* 
(4.14) 
- -
- 0.004* 
(4.32) 
0.004* 
(4.38) 
- -
Self-Sufficiency Rate -0.079* 
(-3.754) 
-0.061** 
(-2.53) 
-
-
- -0.067* 
(-3.34) 
-
Import Dependence - -
- 0.221* 
(3.18) 
- 0.142"* 
(2.04) 
- -
Dummy: Japan - - - - 46.610* 
(3.84) 
- - -
Intercept 53.851* 
(2.55) 
140.52* 
(6.108) 
-83.838* 
(-2.785) 
93.069* 
(8.64) 
-1.400 
(-0.05) 
1.632 
(0.06) 
76.473* 
(9.93) 
106* 
(5.53) 
Adjusted R' 0.42 0.36 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.48 0,34 0.37 
DF 174 176 174 176 173 173 176 174 
Note: All models use data from 30 industrialized and developing countries. In case of models estimated using tiie pooled cross-section 
time-series teclinique, the cocfTicient of determination is the Buse R-Square. The Buse Raw Moment R-Square was substantially higher in 
these coses (not reported). The Self-SufTicicncy Rate for wheat and Import Dependence are as deflned in Table V.l. 
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agricultural sector more strongly. As Tyers and Anderson (1992) point out, the larger the 
percentage by which the real incomes of consumers are affected, the more vigorously would 
they oppose or support a distortionary policy. The income elasticity of food also had the 
correct negative sign but was not significant possibly due to aggregation. 
The price elasticity of demand for wheat is also found to be negatively related to the 
protection level awarded to wheat farmers (Model 8). As the per capita incomes of the 
non-farm population increase, consumer welfare becomes less sensitive to changes in the 
prices of wheat. The higher the price elasticity of demand, the higher the consumers' 
marginal gains from reduction in prices. When the demand is relatively elastic, members of 
the non-farm population will have greater demand for political power to resist production 
subsidies (Miller, 1991). The demand for food becomes less price elastic with the rise in per 
capita incomes (Sanderson and Mehra, 1990). Some other studies have also referred to the 
importance of the price elasticity of demand in the determination of agricultural protection 
levels and lower price elasticities are shown to be associated with more intervention 
(Gardner, 1983 and 1987). However, many quantitative studies on the determinants of 
agricultural protection have not included the price elasticities of demand in the analysis for 
lack of reliable estimates. The results presented here, thus, represent a first such attempt to 
explicitly include the income and price elasticities of demand in a cross-country analysis. 
The relative risk aversion of consumers (R^) is also found to be negatively correlated 
with wheat protection levels. The coefficient estimates are highly significant in all the 
models. Low income consumers in developing countries, therefore, are more risk averse 
relative to their well-to-do counterparts in industrialized countries. Due to the relatively large 
risk-aversion coefficient, producer prices tend to be kept at lower level in developing 
countries. This supports the public interest interpretation (the SJVG approach in the PEAP 
literature) of the motives for government intervention in the agricultural sector. The lower 
prices afford poor consumers the access to available food supplies. In this process, they tend 
to focus on immediate food needs. The long-term food security, on the other hand, may be 
achieved through enhancing production by providing price incentives to producers. Thus, 
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there is an obvious conflict between the short-term and long-term security food goals 
(Pinstrup-Andersen, 1993,1987; Reutlinger, 1987). This is possibly due to the differences in 
the relative risk-aversion and other consumer characteristics across developing and 
industrialized countries as discussed above. 
Two variants of consumers' income have been used in the regression analysis: the per 
capita gross national product (Model 3) and the gross domestic product per capita of 
non-farm population (Models 1, 5 and 6). Both variants have the expected positive sign and 
are statistically significant at one percent level. The results provide support for the 
conclusion reached above. The richer the consumers, the lower the proportion of income 
spent on food and, thus, lower the resistance to increasing protection levels. The results 
support the view that the society has an income elastic demand for assisting farmers. The 
findings corroborate those reported by Honma, Hayami, Tyers, Anderson, de Gorter and 
others. 
Other measures of consumers' food security concerns may be provided by the rate of 
self-sufficiency and import dependence of wheat. The higher the consumption of wheat 
relative to its domestic production, the lower will be the self-sufficiency of the country. The 
self-sufficiency rate had the correct negative sign and was significant at one or five percent 
level. In countries with excess supply of wheat relative to its demand, the producer support 
tends to be lower. Krueger (1992) and Krueger et a/. (1991) have also reported that the 
self-sufficiency in staple food commodities and price stbilization are the prime motives of 
government intervention in developing countries. 
On the other hand, the higher the ratio of domestic consumption to production, the 
higher will be the imports of the commodity. Subsequently, the higher will be the import 
dependence which is defined as the percentage share of imports in the sum of wheat imports 
and domestic production. Moreover, the higher the dependence on imports, the higher the 
risk that, in a given year, the demand for that commodity might exceed the total availability. 
Consequently, consumers might be willing to support the production of the commodity by 
providing incentives to domestic producers to ensure uninterrupted supplies. This contention 
r 
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is supported by the results where import dependence is observed to be positively correlated 
with the producer protection levels. Domestic production of wheat is subsidized both across 
industrialized and developing countries where wheat is an importable commodity. The 
results also corroborate earlier findings (Herrmann, 1989) that as the extent of import 
dependence of wheat increases, the level of protection provided to the wheat producers also 
rises. 
A dummy variable was used in model (5) to account for the excessively high 
protection levels in Japan. Hayami (1990) and Miller (1987) point out that achieving food 
security has been one of the most important responsibilities of the Japanese government. The 
producer subsidy equivalents received by Japanese wheat producers were to tune of 99 
percent during 1987. The dummy variable is significant at one percent level affirming the 
contention that protection levels in Japan are relatively higher than other countries included 
in the sample. 
In terms of the goodness of fit, a more desirable measure than the commonly used 
coe f f i c ient of determination (R\ namely, the adjusted coefficient of determination (R^), has 
been selected.'® The analysis improves upon earlier works in the PEAP literature in a number 
of ways. First, the empirical model for the first time explicitly incorporates the food security 
concerns of consumers in the determination of farm policies. Second, the analysis is based 
on a well-founded theoretical framework whereas most of the earlier quantitative works are 
based on ad hoc specifications of their empirical models. Third, a more comprehensive 
measure of producer protection levels has been used. Fourth, the present study represents a 
first systematic analysis of a much broader coverage of industrialized and developing 
countries. Finally, the overall results of the analysis are very robust in that up to 51 percent 
variation in producer support is explained by consumer food security concerns alone. All the 
variables suggested by the theoretical model (except the price elasticity of demand for wheat) 
The ordinary is sensitive to the number of independent variables included in the model. When new variables are added to 
the regression model, R'always increases while the adjusted R' may rise or fall. Pindyct: and Rubinfeld (1991) provide an 
example of a model estimated with 25 observation with a reported R'of 0.80 with 17 independent variables. However, the 
adjusted R' with the same model was 0.40. Obviously, a more accurate picture of the limitations of the model is provided by 
the adjusted R'. 
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are highly statistically significant in explaining the protection levels. In contrast, the earlier 
studies using the variables form both consumer and producer groups, reported values 
between 20 to 35 percent only with many variables showing insignificant contribution in 
explaining the protection levels (see for example, Herrmann, Miller, Gardner etc.). 
V.2.2 Empirical Validation of the Producer Model 
The empirical analysis in this subsection is designed to test the comparative static 
results of the theoretical model of producers. Unlike the previous subsection, no altruistic 
motives are considered in the determination of protection levels. The analysis in this case, 
therefore, is based on the CHG paradigm that producers unite towards a common purpose. 
Some important variables identified in the producer model that influence the producer 
protection include the size and wealth of the farming group and the price elasticity of supply. 
These variables, along with their variants and appropriate proxies, have been included in the 
in the analysis. The regression models for comparisons across industrialized and developing 
countries are estimated using the pooled cross-section time-series estimation (Table V.4). 
Some additional results are also provided in Table V.5 for industrialized countries alone 
using both the OLS and pooled estimation techniques. 
The group-size effects on producer protection levels have been approximated by the 
share of agriculture in the labor force as well as the number of farmers in models (1), (2), (4) 
and (7).^^ As expected, the coefficients had negative and statistically significant sign, except 
for the absolute number of farmers. The results indicate that as the size of the agricultural 
labor force decreases, it becomes easier for farmers to unite and successfially lobby the 
government for securing protection. 
Unlike Miller (1991) and Fulginiti (1992) and Fulginiti and Shogren (1992), the 
analysis provides conclusive results which are statistically significant. These results confirm 
the group-size theories proposed by Olson and Becker that small groups tend to be more 
" A more appropriate variable would be the actual number of wheat farmers. However, unavailability of reliable data on this 
variable across the selected 30 industrialized and developing countries constrained the analysis to use these proxy variables. 
I 
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Table V.4 Results for producer interest models across industrialized 
and developing countries, 1982-87 
Independent Variables 0) (2) (3) (4) (V (6) (7) 
Share of Agriculture in Labor 
Force 
-0.971* 
(-6.99) 
-0.021= 
(-1.20) 
- -1.01* 
(-6.26) 
• - -1.259* 
(-10.0) 
Relative Share of Agriculture 
to Industry in Labor Force 
- - - - •11.304* 
(-3.77) 
• -
Share of Agriculture in GDP 
(log) 
- - -11.850** 
(-2.52) 
- - -22.423* 
(-5.92) 
-
Factor Ratio -7.909* 
(-4.11) 
-7.525* 
(-3.93) 
-5.898** 
(-2.25) 
-7.836* 
(-3.58) 
-6.177* 
(-2.87) 
-7.692* 
(-3.48) 
-11.122* 
(-6.05) 
World Price (Lagged) -0.028 
(-1.34) 
-0,029 
(-1.37) 
- - - -0.038*** 
(-1.72) 
-
Japan Dummy 52.233* 
(7.17) 
48.077* 
(5.58) 
61.322* 
(5.928) 
56.246* 
(6.87) 
59.068* 
(6.52) 
- 43.083* 
(6.71) 
EFTA Dummy 20.468** 
(2.60) 
20.163** 
(2.30) 
26.823** 
(2.32) 
21.563** 
(2.45) 
27.499* 
(3.03) 
21.624* 
(2.62) 
-
Industrial Countries' Dummy 
X Esp' 
- - 19.170*** 
(1.67) 
- - -
-
Income Dummy 
- 23.306* 
(5.03) 
- - 5.631 
(0.86) 
- -
Intercept 59.306* 
(7.98) 
-16.847*" 
(-1.72) 
42.491* 
(2.92) 
55.930* 
(6.67) 
28.108*** 
(1.79) 
84.288* 
(7.66) 
71.951* 
(12.67) 
R" 0.72 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.67 0.38 0.66 
DF 174 173 174 175 174 175 176 
Note; All models ore estimated using the pooled cross-section time-scrles technique for 30 Industrialized and developing countries. The 
coefTicient of determination is the Buse R-Square. The Buse Raw Moment R-Square was substantially higher in all cases (not reported). 
Factor Ratio is as defined In Table V. I. 
1 Esp; Price Elasticity of Wheat Supply 
2 Labor Force in Agriculture (Numbers) 
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successful relative to large ones in obtaining political favors. As the number of members in a 
group increases, the effectiveness of the group decreases due to several factors such as the 
free-rider problem and large organization costs. In addition, another proxy used for the 
group-size was the share of agricultural in the labor force relative to the share of the 
industrial sector. The overall relationship between the relative size of farm population and 
the rate of agricultural taxation is positive (Model 5). This is consistent with earlier studies 
showing that the politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size of the 
groups taxed to pay their subsidies (Becker, 1983). The results indicate that relatively fewer 
farmers will be subsidized since it is in the interest of the support-maximizing politician as 
discussed in Chapter III. 
Another important variable affecting the level of protection awarded to wheat 
producers across countries is the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product. This 
variable provides a close approximation of the wealth of farmers identified in the theoretical 
model. The variable is included in the log form to account for the possible non-linear 
relationship.'® The coefficients have the hypothesized negative sign and are significant. The 
more the importance of agriculture in the national economy, the lower would be the level of 
support provided to commodity growers. The result reinforces the above findings regarding 
the influence of group-size on protection levels. In developing countries, where agriculture 
constitutes a larger portion of the gross domestic product, the farm group is usually larger 
than the non-farm group. 
Factor ratio is used in the analysis as an index of the comparative advantage in 
agriculture. It is defined as the ratio of arable land per farm worker to the average capital 
endowment per worker in the society. The significant negative coefficients obtained in the 
regressions corroborate the findings reported in Honma and Hayami (1986a and 1986b) that 
as the comparative advantage shifts away from agriculture, the farmers are able to garner 
increased protection from imports. The world price of wheat (lagged one year) also has the 
" Lagged values of this variable could not be used since there is hardly any change in this variables reported in the data from 
year to year. 
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expected negative sign. This suggests that the higher the mean of the free-market price, the 
lower would be the support needed to enhance farm incomes. 
According to Tyers and Anderson (1992), a one percent increase in the prices of 
agricultural commodities relative to those of non-farm products, will boost real farm incomes 
in rich industrial countries by 2.3 percent. The same increase in prices would lower incomes 
of industrial capitalists and of non-farm workers by only 0.3 percent and 0.1 percent, 
respectively. This generates an increased demand for farm protection in industrialized 
countries relative to those in developing countries. Gardner (1987) hypothesizes a negative 
correlation between supply elasticity and the producer gains from farm programs in the 
United States. However, this result could not be supported by the cross-country empirical 
evidence as shown by the positive sign on the slope dummy of price elasticity. It may be due 
to the inclusion of EFTA countries in the analysis where the supply elasticity is high (around 
0.9) and the average protection levels are also considerably higher than in other industrialized 
countries. The dummy variable used to identify the EFTA countries was significant and so 
was the dummy used for Japan. An income dummy was also used to capture the income 
differential across industrialized, middle income and low income countries. This variables 
was also found to be positively correlated with the level of protection awarded to wheat 
farmers. 
Essentially similar results are obtained for the eleven industrialized members of the 
OECD (Table V.5). However, a few additional variables are specified in this case, such as 
the growth rates of agricultural and industrial labor force, total wheat exports, the area under 
wheat cultivation and the lagged domestic prices. The signs of these coefficients are all as 
expected and significant. Where wheat is an exportable commodity (for example, the United 
States and Australia), the protection awarded to wheat farmers is relatively lower than in the 
countries that import wheat (for example, Japan and Norway). The results are similar to 
those obtained by Krueger (1989) in case of developing countries that export commodities 
are "rather heavily" taxed. Also, countries deficient in the land under wheat cultivation, tend 
to support their domestic producers. 
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Table V.5 Results for producer interest models: Industrialized countries, 1982-87 
Independent Variables 0) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) 
Estimation Technique Pool Pool OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Pool 
Share of Agriculture in 
Labor Force 
-6.218* 
(-3.47) 
- - - - - - -
Share of Agriculture in 
GDP 
- -2.863** 
(-2.16) 
- - - - - -
Share of Ag. Relative to 
Industry in GDP 
- - -181.19" 
(-5.33) 
-133.43* 
(-3.59) 
-159.59* 
(-3.70) 
- - -
Growth Rate in Labor 
Force in Agriculture 
- - - - - -27.638* 
(-6.22) 
-15.697* 
(-5.01) 
-18.909* 
(-4.75) 
Growth Rate in Labor 
Force in Industry 
- - 10.663* 
(2.69) 
- 12.438* 
(3.90) 
- - -
Factor Ratio -12.705* 
(-5.33) 
-11.251* 
(-5.44) 
-8.963* 
(-5.75) 
- -11.237* 
(-5.84) 
- -3.691* 
(4.83) 
-5.955* 
(-4.12) 
Exports - - - -0.0001* 
(-3.19) 
- - - -
Area Under Wheat - - - - - -0.002* 
(-5.68) 
- -
Domestic Price (Lagged) 
- - - - - - 0.073* 
(5.50) 
0.038* 
(2.82) 
Dummy; Japan - - - 0.556" 
(2.43) 
-
0.489" 
(2.08) 
- -
Dummy: EFTA 64.755* 
(5.79) 
32.503* 
(4.24) 
11.72 
(0.95) 
41.48/ 
(4.54) 
- - 64.218* 
(8.32) 
48.768* 
(6.99) 
Intercept 105.33* 
(8.21) 
78.324* 
(9.38) 
87.061* 
(11.88) 
57.669* 
(7.0) 
96.027* 
(15.87) 
-35.588** 
(-2.61) 
-17.551*" 
(-1.70) 
-12.033 
(-1.02) 
Adjusted R' 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.51 0.64 0.48 0.72 0.83 
DF 62 62 61 61 62 62 61 61 
Note; All regression models use data from eleven industrialized countries. The coefficient of determination in cose ofthndels estimated 
using the pooled cross-section time-series technique is the Buse R-Square. The Buse Raw Moment R-Square was substantially higher in all 
cases (not reported). Factor Ratio is as defined In Table V.I. 
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V.2.3 Determinants of the Political Welfare Function 
The above subsections attempt to explain the determination of agricultural protection 
from the viewpoints of two distinct interest groups. The interests of a particular group can 
overweigh the interests of the other in the policy formulation process. For example, in 
industrialized countries, the producer groups tend to be politically more powerful whereas 
consumers are the main beneficiaries of government intervention in the agricultural sector in 
the developing countries. As depicted in the politician model in Chapter IV, the policy 
makers take into account the interests of both the producers and the consumers in policy 
formulations. Thus, the policy outcomes in a particular country are influenced in part by the 
interests of both these groups as well as other government characteristics. Therefore, in this 
subsection, the determinants identified in the consumer and producer models have been 
combined with the variables constraining the politicians in the decision-making process, in 
order to assess their joint influence on the policy outcome. 
The results reported in Table V.6 indicate that the inclusion of variables from all these 
interest groups increases the explanatory power of the models. For example, the model (5) is 
able to explain up to 82 percent of the variation in protection levels across selected countries 
(the Raw Moment Buse in this case was about 0.93). This indicates that the determinants 
identified in the theoretical models and subsequently tested empirically in this chapter 
account for a substantial portion of the variation in the agricultural protection levels across 
industrialized and developing countries. The Results obtained for variables associated with 
the producer and consumer groups are similar to those obtained above. 
An important variable associated with the political leadership's decision-making 
process is the goverrmient finance which states the surplus or deficit position of the treasury. 
This variable was included in all the models. The variable had the expected positive sign and 
was statistically significant in model (3). The government finance was usually negative in 
almost all countries, albeit in varying magnitude. This indicates that the governments with 
lower deficits are able to supply more subsidies to the farm sector. 
The time trend variable was also positive and significant indicating the increasing 
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Table V.6 : The results of integrated producer, consumer and politician models 
Independent Variables 0) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation Technique OLS OLS OLS Pool Pool 
Engel Coefficient 4.655* 
(3.52) 
- 3.546* 
(2.80) 
2.649* 
(3.16) 
2.265* 
(2.25) 
(Engel Coefficient^ -0.046* 
(-3.30) 
- -0.034** 
(2.54) 
-0.033* 
(-2.76) 
-0.013 
(-1.02) 
Income Elasticity- Wheat -56.648* 
(4.94) 
-49.850* 
(-4.54) 
-49.953* 
(-4.58) 
-63.833* 
(-5.33) 
-38.846* 
(-2.82) 
Relative Risk- Aversion -47.348** 
(2.34) 
-36.487* 
(-4.93) 
-32.709*** 
(-1.69) 
- -
Per Capita Income (GNPC) 0.004* 
(4.47) 
- 0.005* 
(5.51) 
0.004* 
(7.42) 
-
/«(GNPC) - - - - 27.855* 
(5.585) 
Factor Ratio -11.121* 
(-5.72) 
-13.551* 
(-7.21) 
-13.334* 
(-7.33) 
12.093* 
(-7.74) 
-10.702* 
(-5.86) 
World Price (Lagged) - -0.104* 
(-3.74) 
-0.148* 
(5.67) 
-0.029 
(-1.63) 
-0.029 
(-1.40) 
Government Finance 0.00007 
(1.13) 
- 0.0001** 
(2.03) 
0.00001 
(1.17) 
0.00005 
(0.63) 
Trend - 3.948* 
(3.51) 
- - -
Dummy: Japan 35.637* 
(3.11) 
25.009** 
(2.12) 
- 29.567* 
(4.95) 
31.753* 
(5.58) 
Intercept 3.384 
(0.13) 
-7724.1* 
(-3.46) 
20.862 
(0.87) 
-8.854 
(-0.55) 
-225.58* 
(-3.95) 
Adjusted R^ 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.75 0.82 
DF 171 173 171 171 171 
Note; In case of the pooled cross-section time-series estimation, the coelTicicnt of determination is the Buse R'. The Buse Raw 
Moment R' was about 0.93 in model (5). 
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protectionistic policies across the selected 30 industrialized and developing countries. The 
per capita income appeared to be highly statistically significant in both the linear as well as 
log linear specifications. It will be interesting to examine the correct specification of this 
variable in the models of political economy of agricultural protection. This would essentially 
determine the rate of growth of protection, as depicted by the trend variable, associated with 
the level of economic development. The next subsection highlights this relationship and 
develops a dynamic map of the political market forces that influence the protection levels 
across countries. 
Overall, the results of this subsection are very encouraging. This analysis overcomes 
the problem of excluded variables which is prevalent in most of the earlier studies. In this 
sense, this is the first systematic and comprehensive attempt that provides a broader coverage 
of the determinants of the political economy of agricultural protection across countries. Not 
only are the empirical results highly significant, a well-founded theoretical background is 
also provided for their inclusion in the empirical estimation. 
V.2.4 Economic Development and the Dynamics of Agricultural Protection 
In this subsection, an attempt is made to examine the nature of the relationship 
between the level of economic development and the growth patterns of agricultural protection 
across countries. Empirical studies have usually approximated economic development by the 
per capita national income. A number of studies in the PEAP literature have pointed out the 
existence of a linear relationship between the level of protection and the per capita gross 
national product (de Gorter and Tsur, 1991; Herrmann, 1987; Honma and Hayami, 1986a; 
Balisacan and Roumasset, 1986). A few other studies have instead used a log linear 
specification (Honma and Hayami, 1986b; Fulginiti and Shogren, 1992; Fulginiti, 1992). 
The argument of the non-linear relationship would indicate that the agricultural 
subsidies increase at a decreasing rate with the increase in the per capita incomes of the 
society. An implication of this argument is that the protection provided to domestic 
producers increases in the initial phase of economic development but may stabilize or even 
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subside at higher level of economic development. The analysis below formally develops a 
conceptual framework of the relationship between the agricultural protection and the level of 
income. The findings also highlight the dynamic process of the growth of agricultural 
protection as an economy develops. 
Figure V. 1 displays income-protection quadrants for agricultural producers. The 
horizontal axis, which measures the producer subsidies, is divided into two quadrants at the 
zero level of protection. A division of the vertical axis is considered at GNP per capita level 
of $7,000. These divisions show that the countries that fall in the upper-right quadrant have 
high incomes and tend to subsidize their agricultural producers. Low-income countries that 
tax their farmers generally fall in the lower-left quadrant. Another subjective division of the 
%-axis is made in the lower-right quadrant, at the PSE level of 20 percent. This separates the 
middle income countries from the newly industrializing countries (NICs), such as Taiwan and 
South Korea, which have substantially higher levels of producer support. The same division 
in case of industrialized countries (upper-right quadrant) separates the countries with 
significantly high levels of distortion (Switzerland, Norway, Japan, E.G. etc.) from those 
where distortion levels are relatively lower (Australia and New Zealand). None of the 
industrialized countries falls in the upper-left quadrant, which depicts effective taxation of 
agricultural producers. However, if consumer protection levels were displayed in this 
schematic diagram, most of the industrialized countries would appear in this quadrant. 
The figure offers significant insight into the dynamics of the political market forces of 
agricultural protection. The map of the political market forces that emerges from the analysis 
is summarized in Figure V.2. The four main quadrants of Figure V.l are displayed in this 
figure maintaining the division of horizontal axis into positive and negative quadrants. A 
subjective division of the level of income at)/ is made on the vertical axis. It may be noted 
that in both these figures, the hypothetical division on the vertical axis may occur anywhere 
in the proximity of the level of income that may differentiate high-income countries from 
developing countries. 
» 
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Figure V.l: Income-protection quadrants for agricultural producers 
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Figure V.2: Map of the political market forces of agricultural protection 
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In all the quadrants, two unique forces may be shown as working simultaneously. 
One of the forces shows the country's movement towards growth in income and development, 
while the other pertains to the demand for net protection arising from the producer group." 
In the first quadrant, a low-income country would exhibit effective taxation of agricultural 
producers due to the reasons explained above. The momentum in this quadrant, towards 
economic growth and development (force one) encourages the demand for agricultural 
subsidies (second force) from the producer group. When these two forces become 
sufficiently strong, they may initiate a movement towards quadrant II. These dynamics of 
agricultural protection across countries reveal that the countries switch from taxing their 
agricultural producers to increasingly subsidizing them in the course of economic 
development and rise in gross national product {GNP) per capita. The switch in policy 
usually occurs around initial levels of development, as shown in Figure As Anderson 
and Hayami (1986) note, "the faster the economy grows, the more rapidly these changes 
occur in the political market for distortionary agricultural policies" (p. 3). 
Now, in the second quadrant, the country would have achieved the status of a 
middle-income country or an NIC. The horizontal movement would progress more rapidly, 
the faster the country moves vertically upward. In this quadrant, the forces point in the 
Northeast direction. For example, until the 1960s, the agricultural prices in South Korea and 
Taiwan were administered below the world prices. With the economic progress in these 
countries and rising per capita incomes, the demand for protection from the farmers grew 
steadily. In the early 1980s, the domestic prices in these countries were observed to be twice 
the level of international prices. 
As a country achieves further gains in the levels of income, it crosses the threshold 
level, y, and becomes industrialized. In quadrant III, the push for further growth in income 
would be in the upward direction. However, as the subsidization of producers reaches a 
" Although these forces may becorrelatcd, the correlation does not alter the focus of the proposition. 
These observations might also have important implications for the international multilateral trade negotiations such as the Uruguay 
Round whose goal is the containment and gradual reduction of global protectionism in the agricultural sector. 
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relatively high level, several countervailing forces ma}' begin to be observed. It may not be 
feasible to keep on increasing the level of farming subsidies any further. The hitherto 
successful farming organizations may also witness inefficiencies creeping up into the system 
and their marginal benefits from lobbying would diminish. In addition, the consumer group, 
with high levels of income and education, may become increasingly aware of the transfers to 
producers and the wastes involved, as is the case now in the European Community. The 
increased budgetary outlays would further heighten the awareness among consumers. 
These mounting pressures may force the political leadership to retract their support 
for agricultural producers. Besides, as the level of domestic protection reaches a certain 
distortionary level, the trading partners of the country as well as international organizations 
might mount external pressure on the government to reduce the political support to 
producers. These external forces, combined with the increasing internal pressures, may 
necessitate a decrease in support for agricultural producers in industrialized countries, 
resulting in the backward bending of the forces. For example, the ongoing GATT 
negotiations have been increasingly focusing on effectively reducing the agricultural support 
levels in countries such as B.C., U.S., Japan and Canada. 
It may be noted, however, that such external and internal pressures may start building 
up at lower levels of protection and incomes as well. In fact, multilateral trade negotiations 
are showing much concern for halting the increase in protectionism in case of NICs, which 
fall in quadrant II. In addition, the exact path of the movement may vary from country to 
country depending upon factors such as the proportion of food expenditures in household 
budgets, food security reasons, consumers' risk aversion, national self-sufficiency and 
comparative advantage in agriculture, national security, and budgetary pressures etc. 
The dynamic adjustment process explained above is subject to empirical verification 
in order to assess the exact nature of relationship between these two variables. If a constant 
relationship exists between the protection levels and incomes, it can be expected that the 
protection levels would continue to grow as the incomes of the society rise. On the other 
hand, if a non-linear relationship exists, as is argued above, the growth in agricultural 
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subsidies would not be proportional to the rise in income levels. A corollary of these 
arguments is that the producer support may increase at initial levels of growth in incomes but 
may taper off at later stages. A test for the exact nature of relationship is, therefore, 
performed using the linear and log-linear specifications for the per capita incomes. The 
methodology follows the Davidson and MacKinnon's test for model specification. The 
results are presented in Table V.7. 
Table V.7: Tests for the dynamics of political market forces 
Hypothesis X-Statistics Decision Conclusion 
Ho! Linear Relationship 3.906 Cannot accept Hq 
Non-linear 
relationship exists 
between the 
protection level 
and economic 
development. 
Hq: Log Linear Relationsliip 1.224 Accept Ho 
Note; The models ore tested using the Davidson and MacKinnon's pair-wise J tests which are discussed in detail In the next 
section. The /-statistics are for the null hypothesis where the alternate hypothesis is the other specineation. The critical value at 
1% level of significance is 2.60. 
The null hypothesis implying that a linear relationship exists between the level of 
income and protection awarded to wheat farmers could not be accepted at one or five percent 
level of significance. The results indicate that the alternate hypothesis holds and that there 
exists a log-linear relationship. In the second test, the null hypothesis is that the exact nature 
of relationship is non-linear. The results support the null hypothesis that the log-linear 
specification is correct and reject the alternative hypothesis of linear relationship. These 
results provide strong empirical evidence to support the dynamic process discussed above. 
The results point towards a non-linear relationship between economic development and 
protection levels. The trend observed during the last decade, thus, may not be observed 
indefinitely. 
Additional information on the influence of economic development and protection can 
be obtained through the calculation of wheat producer protection elasticity. A wheat 
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producer protection elasticity is defined as the percentage change in producer protection 
caused by a one unit change in the exogenous variable. The income elasticity of wheat 
protection is estimated to be 1.313 at the mean. This implies that each one percent increase 
in the level of per capita income would increase the producer subsidies to wheat farmers by 
approximately 1.3 percent.®' The findings corroborate earlier discussion about the society 
having an income-elastic demand for assisting agricultural producers. 
V.3 Non-Nested Tests for Model Specification 
Explanations of most economic phenomenon are beset with alternative or competing 
theoretical specifications. While two alternative explanations may be theoretically 
justifiable, no a priori grounds exist for choosing one model over the other. For example, the 
PEAP literature has developed along two different lines. While altruistic motives may be the 
reasons for protectionistic policies in the SWG literature, the CHG group of studies do not 
recognize such motives as the mainstay of political intervention. In the present study, the 
role of consumer benefits of food security from price stabilization may follow the altruistic 
motives more closely. Risk and uncertainty have been put as reasons for the social concerns 
view of the political economy of protection. The producer model, with political contributions 
towards lobbying, lies closer to the CHG approach. 
It would be interesting to analyze which of the two approaches is supported by the 
empirical evidence. If self-interest is the primary motivational force that explains the 
political preferences, then the producer model would be the "correct" specification. If, on the 
other hand, the social welfare is the true cause of intervention, the consumer model would 
hold.®^ This result would be analogous to testing the relative strengths of consumers and 
producers in policy formulation across countries. The empirical evidence may also either 
reject both these models or embrace them both at the same time. In case the results are 
Balisacan and Roumasset (1986) report an income elasticity of agricuitural price protection of 3.23 wliercas Herrmann (1989) 
reports the wheat price protection elasticity of 0.31. 
" It must be noted that in the agricultural policy formulation, the producer and consumer interests may not be mutually 
exclusive. A producer may also be a consumer while consumers may also be involved in (he production proccss. Besides, 
the political leadership generally takes into account the interests of dilTcrcnl groups in the society. 
184 
inconclusive, it may be inferred that the politicians' preferences do not accord superiority to 
either the SfVG or the CHG approach. 
The purpose here is not to propose an alternative model specification of the 
determinants of the political economy of agricultural protection. Rather, the aim is to 
evaluate the role of consumers' concerns that have been labeled as food security concerns in 
the study. The variables identified in the consumer model, such as the relative risk-aversion, 
Engel coefficients, income and price elasticities of demand, can be expected to sufficiently 
capture the consumers' preferences in this regard. These variables, then, can be alternated 
with the variables suggested by the producer model (such as, the number of farmers, the share 
of agricultural income, price elasticity of supply) to perform the pair-wise non-nested J tests 
as proposed by Davidson and MacKimion (1981). 
It is pointed out that a positive producer subsidy equivalent or an NPC greater than 
one does not necessarily suggest that the producer group has more political power, as is 
generally inferred in the PEAP literature (Miller, 1991). Providing subsidies to farmers to 
produce more may be in the general interest of the people. The non-nested tests in this 
section are, therefore, performed to check which group's concerns overweigh in the policy 
formulation since it cannot be ascertained just by observing the sign of the protection level. 
V.3.1 The Empirical Model 
The non-nested testing techniques can be employed to ascertain the superiority of one 
approach over the other. Using the classical work of Cox (1961,1962), Pesaran and Deaton 
(PD, 1978) proposed procedures for testing the validity of a possibly nonlinear and 
multivariate regression model in the presence of a non-nested alternative hypotheses. Since 
then, Davidson and MacKinnon (DM, 1981) have put forth a relatively easier non-nested 
hypotheses test called the y test. They showed that the resulting test was asymptotically 
equivalently to the tests proposed by PD.®^ Therefore, to test the consumer and producer 
" White (1982 and 1983) later showed that one of the test procedures proposed by DM can be dircctly obtained by 
implementing the Cox test in a straightforward manner. Later, MacKinnon, While and Davidson (1983) extended the results 
of DM by relaxing some of their assumptions and proposed a test for non-nested linear regression models in which some of 
the regressors are endogenous. 
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models, the present study shall employ the y test as proposed by DM. A brief outline of the 
test is given below. 
If the politician's preferences are formed only over the consumers' interests, the 
reduced form expression for T* would include the variables identified in the consumer model 
alone. In this case, the empirical model may be specified as: 
T* = Ca +ec, 
where, T* is a {TN x 1) vector of dependent variable, a is (AT x 1) vector of coefficients and C 
is a (JN X K) matrix of variables identified in consumer model (with C,=l : intercept) and ec 
is a (TN X1) vector of disturbances assumed to be normally distributed N(0,ae^ ). If, on the 
other hand, the policy preferences are formed over the interests of commodity producers, the 
empirical model to be tested would be: 
t* = Py 
where y is an (Mx 7) vector of coefficients, P is a { T N  \ M )  matrix of variables identified in 
the producer model (with f,= 1 : intercept) and Cp is a {TN x 1) vector of disturbances with 
N(0, Ogp ). It is assumed that C and P cannot be written as a linear combination of each other. 
These non-nested models may now be tested by the following hypotheses: 
H „  :  T* = C a  + e c ,  
H, : X* = Py+e,.. 
In applying the J test, the first model can be fitted using the OLS or the pooled 
cross-section time-series technique to obtain the parameter estimates: 
T* = a C 
where, a* represents the estimated coefficients. In the second stage, the following model 
would be estimated using these parameter estimates: 
x' = 5 { a ' C }  + ( l - b ) { y P } + e  
where, Ô is a "mixing" parameter. Now, the following hypothesis can be tested instead: 
H„:  Ô =0,  
H] : Ô 0. 
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Since a* will be asymptotically independent of e, therefore the conventional f-test can 
be used. If ô =0, then the test statistics would imply that the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
The next step in the pair-wise test is to proceed similarly with the producer model as the null 
hypothesis.®'' 
V.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Two pair-wise non-nested tests are performed in this section. The first estimation 
uses the ordinary least squares estimation while the pooled cross-section time-series 
estimation technique was used for the second pair-wise tests. The following consumer and 
producer models are specified in both cases: 
T = a, + UzENGEL + (ENGEL)^ + a4 «5 ti + e,. » 
T = Yi + Y2 GDP AG + 73 FACTOR + P, , ,+ yj  Z)^ x  Cp.  
The OZS estimation of these models yielded the following results: 
= 105.97+ 3.138 ENGEL - 0.026 (ENGELf- 98.864 R, - 33.573 q , 
(7.10) (2.38) (-1.90) (-4.28) (-2.64) 
= 8 2 2 1 6 -  1 5 . 6  I n  G D P A G - 1 1 . 9 1 3  F A C T O R - 0 A 9  + 3 0 . 8 9 4  D , x E , p .  
(7.29) (-4.01) -(5.88) (-6.39) (3.88) 
The predicted values of the dependent variables were saved from both models as Tc and Xp , 
respectively. The figures in parentheses represent the /-statistics. All these variables are 
statistically significant at 1% level, except (ENGELf which is significant at 10% level. 
Similar results were obtained from the pooled estimation where coefficients were all 
significant at 1% level except (ENGEL f (at 5%) and (10%), as given below; 
= 103.63 + 5.169 ENGEZ - 0.046 (ENGEL)'-115.57 R,- 46.375 q , 
(5.43) (3.04) (-2.58) (-3.89) (-2.74) 
" In case of more than two models, the procedure may be generalized along the similar lines. 
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= 71.093 - 17.542 In GDPAG -11.021 FACTOR - 0.042 f,,,30.017 . 
(5.73) (-4.05) (-7.11) (-1.84) (3.32) 
To perform the pair-wise J tests, the consumer and producer models were then 
reestimated using OLS and pooled techniques, with alternating null hypotheses. The results 
of these tests are presented in Table V.8. The test statistics reported for the null hypothesis 
that the consumer model specified is the "correct" model are reported on the left hand side. 
The null hypothesis in agreement with the producer model is on the right. Under the 
consumer model, the /-statistic for the mixing parameter (t*,, ) in the OLS case was highly 
significant (1% level). The null hypothesis, thus, could not be accepted. Similarly, the 
/-statistic in the OLS estimation of the producer model was also significant at 1% level and 
the null hypothesis was rejected in this case too. No general conclusion, therefore, can be 
reached from the pair-wise 7tests since the null hypotheses are rejected in both cases. 
On the basis of the inconclusive nature of the results, it can be inferred that neither of 
the two approaches in PEAP literature is superior to the other. The pooled estimation, 
however, does provide conclusive results. The test statistics reported for the mixing 
parameter in case of consumer model was statistically insignificant. However, the mixing 
parameter in case of the producer model was significant at one percent level. The consumer 
model specification, thus, could not be rejected in either of the models. The pooled results, 
therefore, imply that the consumer model specified for explaining the cross-country variation 
in the protection levels is superior to the producer model. It is tempting to suggest that the 
food security concerns of consumers are relevant in the determination of farm programs 
across industrialized and developing countries. The results also indicate that social concerns 
do matter in the food policy formulation. This may have been due to the inclusion of many 
developing countries in the models that pursue "cheap food" policies for the poor consumers. 
The results, therefore, suggest that the pressure-group studies in the PEAP literature cannot 
ignore the consumer risk concerns. This result is contrary to the conclusions reached by 
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Table V.8: Results of the pair-wise non-nested J tests 
Regressor OLS Pool Regressors OLS Pool 
Consumer Model Producer Model 
ENGEL 2.876" 
(2.51) 
5.215* 
(3.38) 
In GDPAG -2.211 
(-0.528) 
-18.468* 
(-4.54) 
(ENGEL)^ -0.021"* 
(1.79) 
-0.048* 
(-2.89) 
FACTOR -12.575* 
(-6.80) 
-11.067* 
(-8.40) 
Rc -48.775** 
(2.31) 
-111.34* 
(-4.09) Af, (-/ 
-0.139* 
(-4.88) 
-0.069* 
(-2.98) 
-42.018* 
(-3.79) 
-48.780* 
(-3.26) 
Dv X E„, 10.434 (1.30) 
21.774" 
(2.53) 
0.824* 
(7.66) 
4.623 
(1.17) T*c 
0.805 
(6.02) 
9.904* 
(3.09) 
Intercept 22.156 
(1.31) 
95.091* 
(5.28) 
Intercept 36.85* 
(2.89) 
77.875* 
(6.66) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the t-statistics. The parenthesized bold t-s(atistics are for the respective null 
hypotheses. Under the null hypotheses, the test statistics is distributed as standard normal. The critical value at the 
0.01 level is 2.60 at 174 degrees of freedom. 
*, represent statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variyam et al. and Carter et al. who argue that the self-interest is the primary motivational 
force that explains political preferences. 
V.4 Nested Tests for Model Specification 
In the previous section, the consumer and producer models were estimated separately. 
In this section, the policy-makers' welfare function, as developed in Chapter IV, is estimated 
empirically with additional restrictions imposed. The analysis is performed in order to 
ascertain the joint significance or the extent of complementarity of the consumer and 
producer interests in the political welfare function. The specification of the empirical model 
is explained briefly in the next subsection. The results of the estimation and the nested 
hypotheses testing are provided in the second subsection. 
» 
189 
V.4.1 The Empirical Model 
The theoretical model of the policy-maker incorporates the variables from both 
consumer and producer models. The reduced form for the optimal policy instrument, x*, 
becomes; 
T* =  x { ^ , R c , z , y \ ,  p , w , n ,  v|/) 
' , ' » ' 
consumer producer 
where the variables are as identified earlier. In this case, the following empirical model may 
be tested: 
t ' =  a ;  +  a ^ p +  a j i f c +  a < 8 +  a 5 T i + ô , p  +  Ô j » » > + Ô j n+y,v|; + p, 
where appropriate proxies can be used for the independent variables. If a model can be 
written as a special case of a more general model, the former is said to be nested in the latter 
model. In this case, the standard f-norm or the /-test statistics can be applied to discriminate 
between the structures (Holt and Johnson, 1986). In the above model, two separate nested 
tests can be conducted to ascertain the relative significance of the two groups in the political 
preference function. 
To test whether only the variables identified in the producer model matter in the 
explanation of the protection levels, the test would be analogous to the hypothesis: 
Ho: a2 = ttj = = as = 0, 
H,: a;, aa, , Œ; 9^ 0. 
The resulting test statistic { F )  can then be compared to F-values from the table to verify the 
hypothesis. If the test statistics support the null hypothesis, then it can be concluded that 
above model should only include the variables identified in the producer model. 
A similar test can be performed to ascertain whether only the variables identified in 
the consumer model should be included in the political preference function: 
Ho: Ô, = 62 = 63 = 0, 
H | :  6 1 , 6 2 , 6 3  # 0 .  
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Accepting the null hypothesis in this case would amount to the conclusion that politician's 
preferences are formed only over the consumers' concerns regarding the optimal value of the 
policy instrument. In case that none of the hypotheses are rejected, the results would suggest 
that the political preference function incorporates both the producers' lobbying efforts as well 
as consumers' food security concerns. 
V.4.2 Results and Discussion 
The following general regression model was fitted with appropriate proxy variables to 
ascertain the significance of consumer and producer groups in the policy-makers' preference 
function: 
+ ajENGEL + aj (ENGELf+ R^+ aj r| 
+ ô| In GDP AG + 62 FACTOR + Ô3 ,./+ E^p + Cp. 
The first four variables are as identified in the consumer model while the last four are from 
the theoretical model of agricultural producers, with e,, representing the error term. Separate 
regression analysis were performed using the OLS and pooled cross-section and time-series 
estimation techniques. The results of the hypothesis testing from the estimation are given in 
Table V.9. 
Table V.9: Results of the nested tests of policy-makcr's model 
Hypothesis 
OLS POOL 
^-Statistic DF Decision ^-Statistic DF Decision 
Only 
Producer 
Interests 
10,45 4 and 171 
Cannot 
accept 
H„ 
16.19 4 and 171 
Cannot 
accept 
Ho 
Only 
Consumer 
Interests 
17.45 4 and 171 
Cannot 
accept 13.72 4 and 171 
Cannot 
accept 
H„ 
Note: The critical value of /^-statistic at 4 and 171 degrees of freedom and I % level is 3.32. 
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The results indicate that the null hypothesis that only the producers' interests are taken 
into account by the policy-makers cannot be accepted at 1% level of significance under both 
the OLS and the pooled estimations. The calculated value of /^-statistic under the OLS and 
the pooled estimation is 10.45 and 16 19, respectively while the critical value is 3.32. The 
results imply that consumer interests are also significant in explaining the cross-country 
variations in agricultural protection levels. 
In the second test, the null hypothesis implies that only consumer interests matter in 
the politicians' preference function. In this case also, the alternate hypothesis is accepted 
implying that the producer interests too are not ignored by the political leadership in deciding 
the level of agricultural protection. 
The results confirm that policy-makers take into account the interests of both 
producers and consumers. The pressure group characteristics of the producers and 
consumers' food security concerns are important elements of the policy preference function 
across industrialized and developing countries. These results further solidify the conclusions 
reached earlier that the SWG and CHG approaches are essentially complementary. The next 
section takes a different approach to determine the relative influence of different variables 
identified in the empirical models so far. 
V.5 The Probit Model 
The effects of the independent variables in the above models do not distinguish 
between whether the protection levels are positive or negative. In order to account for this 
outcome, and to ascertain the effects of these variables on the probability that the protection 
levels will be positive, the dependent variable can be modified. The producer subsidy 
equivalents can, therefore, be transformed to form a discrete choice model. The dependent 
variable may take a value of one or zero depending upon the way the variable is defined.®' In 
this case, the normal ordinary least square estimation will not yield efficient results and the 
Probit or Logit estimation techniques may be used based on the assumptions about the 
" In fact, the dependent variable may be defined not only as a (1,0) variable but also in the form of (1,2, 3) or (0, 1,2,3) etc. 
depending upon the research criterion. 
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distribution function. The estimated coefficients in case of Probit or Logit models cannot be 
interpreted as in the earlier models. The coefficients need to be modified to obtain the 
estimate of the effect that the independent variable will have on the probability of the 
dependent variable taking a specific value. Assuming a normal distribution function, the 
Probit procedure is briefly explained below and the results of estimation are provided in the 
last subsection. 
V.S.I The Empirical Model 
In case of a discrete dependent variable, with values (0,1) for example, a linear 
probability model may be estimated using the ordinary least squares technique. The resulting 
estimates of coefficients will be unbiased but will not reflect the minimum variance. The 
predicted values of the dependent variable will not be bound between zero and one (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1991; Greene, 1990; Maddala, 1983; Kmenta, 1986). Therefore, the estimates 
of coefficients will not be efficient. In order to overcome this problem, it is desired to 
transform the original model in such a way that predictions will lie in the (0, 1) interval for 
all values of the independent variables. Assuming a normal cumulative distribution function, 
the Probit estimation procedure may be used as follows. 
Consider a model, = P'% + n, where y may be unobservable. Instead, the data may 
be available whether a particular observation of^ falls in one category (y > 0) or the other 
()/<0). The Probit analysis may be used to solve the problem of how to obtain the efficient 
coeff ic ient  es t imates .  Let  z  represent  a  binary var iable  which takes  a  value of  one i f ) /> 0,  
and zero otherwise. In this case, the probabilities that z takes a value of one or zero may be 
defined as: 
Pj = Pr 0> 0) = F (P'x), and 
( l -P i )  =  PrO<0 )=l-F(p 'A:) ,  
where, F (•) is the normal cumulative distribution function of the error terms associated with 
the normal density function Then, the likelihood function for this case may be 
defined as; 
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Z(P, jc, z) = li Pr [z/ = 1] • n Pr [z/ = 0], 
/=1 /=/»! +1 
where n = 1,..., n,, n,+l,..., N, are the observations, with first n, observations taking the 
value of one and the rest are zero. Alternatively, in terms of the distribution function, 
Z(P,x,z)  = f t  • n  [1 -F,(P 'x)] .  /=! /=/(| + l 
The maximum likelihood estimation {MLE) technique can be used to obtain the best, linear, 
unbiased estimates (BLUE) for the coefficients, p, by solving 
Moreover, since z may only take values one or zero, the variance of error terms may be 
assumed as unity. However, the coefficient estimates in this case do not represent the 
marginal effects on the probability of the dependent variable taking a value of one. To obtain 
the estimates of the effects of independent variables on this probability, the estimated 
coefficients need to be transformed by taking the product of the estimated coefficient and the 
probability density function, p • /(P'x). The resulting effect on the probability of dependent 
variable taking a value of one of a unit change in the /"'explanatory variable may, then, be 
calculated as follows: 
IÈL - im. - B, —!— g-:( d x ,  -  -  P '  y i T  ^  
The usual /-statistics can now be used to test a hypothesis about the statistical significance of 
a single variable. The likelihood ratio test statistic, with a x" distribution, can be used in case 
of a joint hypothesis about more than one variables. A derivative of the Probit model is the 
Logit model which is based on the logistic cumulative distribution function. The logistic 
function closely approximates the distribution function of a normal variable (Judge et al., 
1982). However, the coefficient estimates from Probit and Logit models are generally not 
significantly different as shown below. 
» 
194 
V.S.2 Results and Discussion 
To identify factors that affect the political positions of consumers and producers and 
the likelihood of producers being subsidized, a Probit model is estimated. The data on PSEs 
are grouped according to whether the protection is positive or negative. That is, the 
dependent variable, PSE^^cai, was transformed such that z =1 if PSE^,.,„,,„ > 0, and z =0 
otherwise. In order to compare the results of Probit estimation with those provided by the 
linear probability and the Logit models, the same model was estimated using the Probit, OLS 
and Logit estimation techniques. The comparative results are provided in Table V.IO. 
Table V.IO: Comparison of linear probability, Probit and Logit predictions: 
Probability of agricultural producer receiving subsidies 
Independent Variable 
Linear Probability 
Model 
Estimated t-Statistic 
Coefficient 
Probit Model Logit Model 
Estimated {-Statistic Estimated t-Statistic 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Engel Coefficient -0.009* -3.45 
Labor Force in Industry 0.006 1.38 
Income Elasticity (rt) -0.556' -3.91 
Factor Ratio -0.087* -3.51 
World Price (Lagged) -0.001* -2.97 
Intercept 1.148* 5.42 
Cragg -Uhler 
Likelihood Ratio 
Percent of Correct Predictions 
0.54 
-0.033** 
0.045 
-3.276* 
-0.606* 
-2.06 
1.46 
-3.12 
-3.79 
-0.006* 2.7 
2.92"* 2.23 
0.71 
126.94 at 5 d.f. 
86.67 
-0.057*' 
0.082 
-2.05 
1.48 
-5.831* -3.04 
-1.148* -3.79 
-0.01* 
5.237** 
-2.7 
2.21 
0.71 
126.05 at 5 d.f. 
86.11 
Note: In case of the Linear Probability Model, the coelficicnt of determination is the Adjusted R\ 
•, •• Statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
195 
The results from the linear probability model show significant impact of Engel 
coefficient, income elasticity of demand, factor ratio and the previous year's world price on 
the probability that the farmers in that year would receive subsidies. All these coefficients 
have the expected negative sign indicating that a unit increase in these variables decreases the 
probability of farmers being subsidized. The results of the Probit and Logit models are not 
very different from the linear probability model. All the coefficients on the Probit model are 
consistent with the theory and validate earlier results. The Cragg-Uhler coefficient is 0.71 
and the model predicted the correct outcome 86.7 percent of the time. However, the 
numerical implications of the models yield different interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients. Further, when the individual coefficients are considered, it is the relative 
magnitude that matters and not the absolute size of the coefficients. For example, in the 
Probit and Logit models, the coefficient on the income elasticity is about a 100 times that on 
the Engel coefficient. The incomes elasticity coefficient in the linear probability model is 
only 62 times as large as the Engel coefficient. However, as discussed, the estimates 
provided by the linear probability estimation tecluiique are inefficient, and, therefore, the 
Probit model is superior. 
As mentioned above, the estimated coefficients in case of Probit as well as Logit 
models do not represent marginal effects on the probability of the producer protection being 
greater than zero. These coefficients indicate a movement along the cumulative distribution 
function for a unit change in the explanatory variable. The Probit coefficients indicate the 
direction of change in the probability of being positive, but not necessarily a measiu-e 
of the magnitude of the change. These coefficients have to be transformed to be interpreted 
as the marginal effects and are given in Table V. 11. 
The marginal probabilities in the Probit model vary depending upon the original level 
of probability while in the OLS model, the marginal probabilities are constant (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991). The results given in Table V.l 1 are calculated at the mean vnlues of the 
independent variables. The mean values used in the transformation, along with their standard 
deviations, are provided in Table V.12. 
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Table V.ll: Marginal effect coefficients and elasticities of positive protection 
levels predicted by the Probit and Logit models 
Probit Model Logit Model 
Independent Variable Marginal 
Coefficient 
Elasticity 
at Mean 
Marginal 
Coefficient 
Elasticity 
at Mean 
Engel Coefficient -0.012 -0.303 -0.012 -0.252 
Labor Force in Industry 0.016 0.382 0.018 0.336 
Income Elasticity (rt) •1.157 -0.255 -1.25 -0.218 
Factor Ratio -0.214 -0.18 -0.246 -0.163 
World Price (Lagged) -0.002 -0.241 -0,002 -0.208 
Intercept 1.033 1.122 
Table V.12: Means and standard deviations of selected explanatory variables 
Independent Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Engel Coefficient 30.567 15.172 
Labor Force in Industry 28.028 8.9706 
Income Elasticity (r^) 0.256 0.288 
Factor Ratio 0.977 1.107 
World Price (Lagged) 138,08 76.978 
Growth Rate of Agricultural Labor Force -2,004 1.103 
Gross National Product 337,230 803,880 
Price Elasticity-Demand (e) -0.401 0.209 
Price Elasticity- Supply (e^p) 0.625 0.29 
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The coefficients indicate the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable, 
ceteris paribus, on the probability of producers being subsidized. Both the Probit and Logit 
models provide similar estimates for the elasticities. For example, the Probit model predicts 
that a one percent increase in the Engel coefficient will decrease the probability of producer 
subsidies by 0.303 percent. A comparison of these results shows that the Probit and Logit 
models also yield significantly similar coefficient estimates. For example, the models yield 
same predictions for the effect of a unit increase in the Engel coefficient or the previous 
year's world wheat price on the probability of farmers receiving subsidies. A one unit 
increase in the factor ratio would decrease their probability of being subsidized by 0.214 in 
case of Probit model and 0.246 in the case of Logit model. 
Probit estimates for some alternative model specifications with some additional 
variables are also performed and the results are reported in Table V.13, along with the mean 
elasticities.®® The marginal coefficients are reported in case of model (1) only. In models (1) 
and (3), the gross national product (GNP) was a significant additional variable that affects the 
probability of producer protection. The elasticity of the GNP and the Engel coefficient at 
their mean values, are the most significant among the variables considered. In case of Engel 
coefficients, which range between 11 to 61 percent across the sample, a one percent increase 
is expected to decrease the probability of positive protection levels by 0.02. The income 
elasticity of demand has the largest effect on this probability. A one unit increase in income 
elasticity of wheat is expected to decrease the probability of wheat farmers being subsidized 
by about 0.91. 
The Cragg-Uhler for these models ranges between 0.71 to 0.73 and the models 
predicted the correct outcome about 87 percent of the time. The results of this section 
highlight the impact of each explanatory variable on the probability that the domestic 
producers would receive positive protection. The results validate the findings reported in 
earlier subsections. All the independent variables have the correct sign with most of them 
highly statistically significant. 
^ Since tiie cumulative distribution function Is assumed to be standard normal, and Logit results are not dllTerent from tlie 
Probit model, the table reports only the results for the Probit estimation. 
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Table V.13: Probit estimates to explain the probability of positive producer 
protection levels 
Probit Models 
Independent Variable (I) (2) (3) 
Estimated Elasticity Marginal Estimated Elasticity Estimated Elasticity 
Coefficient at Mean Coefficient Coefficient at Mean Coefficient at Mean 
Engel Coefficient -0.043" -0.082 -0.016 -0.039" -0.378 -0.045" -0.091 
(-2.28) (-2.44) (-2.5) 
Labor Force in 0.04 0.069 0.015 - - 0.041 0.076 
Industry (1.27) (1.33) 
Income Elasticity (n) -2.404" -0.038 -0.905 -3.634" -0.296 -2.35" 
(-2.0) (-3.56) (-2.23) -0.039 
Factor Ratio -0.577* -0.035 -0.223 -0.641* -0.199 -0.566* -0.036 
(-3.61) (-4.05) (-3.59) 
World Price (Lagged) -0.005** -0.044 -0.002 -0.005* -0.244 -0.005** -0.048 
(-2.36) (-2.68) (-2.43) 
Growth Rate of - - - -0.175-0.111 
Agricultural Labor (-0.78) 
Force 
Gross National 0.000004"* 0.083 0.000001 - - 0.000004" 0.086 
Product (1.88) (2.1) 
Price Elasticity- -0.027 -0.0007 -0.043 .... 
Demand (e) (-0.023) 
Price Elasticity- 0.259 0.01 0,081 .... 
Supply (E^p) (0.43) 
Intercept 2.529*** - - 4.08* - 2.12" 
(1.73) (4.32) (2.04) 
Cragg-Uhler R' 0.73 0.71 0.73 
Likelihood Ratio 132.18 at 8 d.f. 125.29 at 5 d.f. 132.0 atSd.f. 
Percent of Correct 
Predictions 
87.78 86.11 86.67 
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The results of the empirical analysis in this chapter provide a significant contribution 
to the understanding of the agricultural protectionistic policies across industrialized and 
developing countries. The theoretical models developed earlier have been validated here. 
The analysis, in general, suggests a complementarity between the CHG and SWG approaches. 
However, in the case of pooled cross-section time-series tests of model specification, the 
model representing consumers' food security concerns (the SWG approach) has found 
stronger support. The results corroborate the public support argument of goverrunent 
intervention in the presence of risk and uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the prominent determinants of 
agricultural protection across industrialized and developing countries. The hypotheses tested 
are that consumers' food security concerns and producers' pressure group characteristics play 
an eminent role in the determination of political market equilibrium in the agricultural sector. 
The methodology employed provides an integrated development of theoretical and empirical 
analysis. 
The political economy of agricultural protection literature has progressed along two 
distinct paradigms of the interactions among the economic agents: the self-willed 
government (SWG) models and the clearing house government (CHG) models. The first 
approach assumes that the government is an autonomous unit maximizing a social welfare 
fiinction. The CHG approach treats the political process as a clearing house where a 
relatively passive government redistributes resources among different interest groups. These 
two approaches, therefore, represent two extremes in terms of their explanation of the 
political economy of agricultural protection. In this study, the two approaches have been 
viewed as complementary explanations of government intervention. 
Chapter II provides a review of studies in agricultural protection literature pertaining 
to these two paradigms. The food security and price stabilization literature has also been 
reviewed in a separate section. The section highlights that food programs and food price 
stabilization policies seem responsive, in part, to consumers' attitudes towards food insecurity 
risk. The focus of this section is not on evaluating the best and most efficient instruments of 
achieving food security. Rather, the purpose is to emphasize the linkage between the food 
security concerns of consumers, price stabilization policies and government intervention in 
the agricultural sector. However, these concerns have not been explicitly incorporated in the 
earlier studies on the determinants of agricultural protection. 
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The purpose of Chapter III has been to provide an analytical overview of the political 
economy market of agricultural protection. The chapter begins by providing a simple 
political market framework of agricultural protection in order to explain the factors that lead 
to divergent policy outcomes across industrialized and developing countries. Since an 
accurate measurement of the actual level of intervention is a prerequisite for the effectiveness 
of the analysis, a comprehensive comparative analysis of different measurement concepts 
and their respective policy coverage is also discussed at length. The choice of the 
measurement concept to be used in the empirical analysis that emerges from this analysis 
apparently favors the producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) on the basis of their 
comprehensiveness and wider coverage of different policies and their suitability to analyze 
the extent of government intervention across countries. A graphical exposition of the policy 
effects captured by some selected measurement concepts is provided under many different 
scenarios and market conditions. Finally, the case of price discrimination, where foreign 
markets are competitive and domestic market is monopolized, is also discussed at the end of 
the chapter. The analysis reveals the superiority of the PSE concept over other alternative 
measures of agricultural protection. 
The theoretical models developed in Chapter IV incorporate two analytical 
viewpoints. The self-interest of individuals seeking personal benefits is combined with the 
larger societal goals representing altruistic motives. The consumers seeking government 
intervention in the agricultural sector to reduce the risk of food insecurity are viewed from 
the larger societal perspective. It is postulated that the perceived benefits from improved 
food security through stabilization of food prices translates into preferences of the consumers. 
These perceived benefits constitute the demand for intervention from them. Since incomes 
and the size of risk in relation to income vary from society to society, this generates varying 
degree of demand from consumers across countries. The comparative static results of the 
model indicate that the share of food in consumers' household budget, their incomes, degrees 
of relative risk-aversion, and price and income elasticities are important variables that affect 
their demand for protection. This section, thus, proposes an alternative hypothesis to explain 
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the causes of government intervention in the agricultural sector and identifies the linkages 
between food security, price stabilization and PEAP policies. Consumers accept government 
intervention because of the benefits of food security accruing to them. This altruistic motive 
has largely been ignored in the PEAP literature so far. 
The self-interest elements, on the other hand, are the mainstay of the producer model. 
Producer group contributes resources to lobby the government in seeking agricultural 
subsidies to enhance their profits. The level of contribution is shown to differ across 
countries depending upon factors such as the size of the producer group, their incomes and its 
ability to control free-riding by the members. The effectiveness with which the group can 
exert political pressure then depends upon the perspective gains to the members. The results 
of the model point out that the number of farmers, their incomes, the mean of free-market 
prices and productivity are some of the important factors impacting the political resource 
contributions. Since there is significant variation in these variables across industrialized and 
developing countries, the demand for protection would also vary across these countries. 
Therefore, the overall demand for government intervention in the agricultural sector is 
shown to be created by the relative influence of these two groups in a given society. The 
political supply of intervention from the policy makers is assumed to respond to both these 
groups. The political leadership forms policy preferences by taking into account the marginal 
effects of policy outcomes on the utility of consumers and the profits of producers. The 
society's preferences are then transformed into programs and policies to the extent permitted 
by the available resources, including fiscal resources and bureaucratic capacity. The factors 
and relationships that determine the degrees of subsidies or taxation to any group would 
depend upon the compatibility or conflict between the interests of these two groups and the 
government's treasury position. These results are subject to empirical tests in Chapter V. 
The results of the empirical analysis provide a significant contribution to the 
understanding of the agricultural protectionistic policies across industrialized and developing 
countries. The theoretical models developed earlier have been validated here. The analysis 
uses the ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, pooled cross-section time-series. 
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and Probit and Logit estimation techniques to test the data from 30 industrialized and 
developing countries for the period 1982-87. The relative effectiveness of the consumer and 
producer models have been examined using the non-nested as well as nested testing 
procedures. 
The variables identified in the consumer and producer models have been empirically 
tested and all were found to be highly statistically significant. The political welfare function 
was able to explain up to 82 percent (the Buse Raw-Moment was about 0.93) of the 
variation in the protection levels across countries. An important variable associated with the 
political leadership's decision-making process is found to be the government finance which 
states the surplus or deficit position of the treasury. This indicates that the governments with 
lower deficits are able to supply more subsidies to the farm sector. 
In order to correctly specify the functional relationship between some important 
explanatory and the dependent variables, the model specification tests are performed. The 
results in case of the GNP suggested a non-linear relationship with the level of protection. 
This result supported the dynamics of the demand for agricultural protection discussed in 
Section V.2.4. The model specification tests in case of the Engel coefficients were 
inconclusive since the results did not favor any of the specifications - linear, log-linear and 
quadratic — over one another. 
Davidson and MacKinnon's pair-wise J tests have been used to analyze the 
superiority of the two approaches in the PEAP literature. If self-interest, or the CHG 
approach, is the primary motivational force that explains the political preferences, then the 
producer model would be the "correct" specification. If, on the other hand, the social welfare 
(the SWG approach) is the true cause of intervention, the consumer model would hold. This 
test is also analogous to determining the relative strengths of consumers and producers in 
policy formulation across countries. The results from the OLS analysis did not yield 
conclusive results regarding the superiority hypothesis. However, in the case of pooled 
cross-section time-series tests of model specification, the model representing consumers' food 
security concerns has found stronger support. Therefore, the results suggest that the food 
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security concerns of consumers are relevant in the determination of farm programs across 
industrialized and developing countries. This also indicates that the social concerns do 
matter in the food policy formulation. The results, therefore, point out that the 
pressure-group studies in the PEAP literature cannot ignore the consumers' risk concerns as 
an important determinant. 
The earlier PEAP studies have viewed the protectionistic policies as either the 
outcomes of altruistic motives or as being determined by the self-interest motives. However, 
PEAP economists have, of late, begun to point out the complementarity between the altruistic 
and self-interest motives in the policy formulation. To evaluate this contention, the nested 
tests are performed by imposing restrictions on the political welfare function. On the basis of 
the results it can be inferred that the variables from both consumer and producer models have 
significant effect on the level of protection awarded to wheat farmers and neither can be 
ignored. Both significantly explain protection but none alone is sufficient. The results 
confirm that policy-makers take into account the interests of both producers and consumers. 
The pressure group characteristics of the producers and consumers' risk concerns are 
important elements of the political welfare function across industrialized and developing 
countries. Therefore, a significant implication of the results is that both SWG and CHG 
approaches are complementary. 
In order to ascertain the effects of the explanatory variables on the probability that the 
protection levels will be positive, the Probit estimation procedure is used. For comparison 
purposes, the results of linear probability and the Logit models are also provided. The results 
regarding the marginal effects of explanatory variables as well as their mean elasticities are 
also provided. Signs of all the variables in Probit and Logit models were essentially the same 
as those determined by the OLS and pooled estimations. The Craigg-Uhler values 
obtained were as high as 0.73. The results suggest that the probability of positive protection 
levels is highly sensitive to the changes in the Engel coefficients, the gross national product, 
income elasticity of demand for wheat, factor ratio and the lagged world prices. As expected, 
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there were no significant difference between the coefficient estimates provided by the Probit 
and Logit models. 
Overall, this study represents a first systematic and comprehensive attempt at 
explaining international agricultural protection across countries. The study proposes an 
alternative hypothesis to explain the determination of international agricultural protection. 
The results of the hypothesis testing corroborate the public support argument of government 
intervention in the presence of risk and uncertainty. The relative superiority and 
complementarity of the CHG and SWG approaches has been examined whereas the earlier 
PEAP studies have concentrated on either of the two approaches. The models were also 
tested for correct specification of important variables. The study improves upon earlier 
works in the PEAP literature in a number of other ways also. 
First, an attempt has been made to provide an integrated theoretical and empirical 
justification for the determinants of protection. The study is more complete since the 
empirical analysis is based on a well-founded theoretical framework whereas most of the 
earlier quantitative works are based on ad hoc specifications of their empirical models. 
Second, the study provides a broad coverage of the determinants emanating from the 
interactions between the interest groups of consumers, commodity producers and the political 
leadership. All the variables suggested by the theoretical models are highly statistically 
significant in explaining the protection levels. The overall results of the analysis are very 
robust in that up to 83 percent variation in protection has been accounted for by the models. 
In contrast, many earlier studies have reported values between 20 to 35 percent only with 
many variables showing insignificant contribution in explaining the protection levels (see for 
example, Herrmann, 1989; Miller, 1991; Gardner, 1987 etc.). 
Third, a more comprehensive and flexible measure of agricultural protection levels, 
the producer subsidy equivalent, has been used throughout the analysis after analyzing and 
comparing the effectiveness of various alternative measures of protection. This measurement 
concept encompasses the effects of the broadest range of direct and indirect distortionary 
policies. In contrast, the earlier studies have commonly used the wedge between the 
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domestic and world prices, which is, at best, only a partial indication of how government 
affects domestic production. 
Fourth, the analysis concentrates on a specific staple food commodity, thus avoiding 
the problems associated with averaging the positive and negative protection levels across 
commodities. This is especially important in developing countries, since certain 
commodities in these countries are taxed while some others are subsidized. Finally, the 
analysis uses a broad sample of developing and industrialized countries in order to identify 
some consistent and prominent patterns of international agricultural protection. 
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